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On 7 March 2019, Queensland’s new Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) received royal assent. The Human 
Rights Act 2019 (Qld) introduces 23 rights for Queenslanders. Some of them codify existing common law 
rights, but others are new.   
 
The Act has the potential to change the way decisions are made by administrative decision-makers, as 
public entities will be required to act or make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights, and 
give proper consideration to human rights that are relevant to the decision. 
 
The Act creates the possibility of obtaining relief or a remedy for human rights breaches by enabling a 
person to complain that a decision has been made in a way that was not compatible with their human rights, 
or their human rights were not properly considered, if they have another cause of action available to them. 
 
The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) is the first of its kind in Australia to create an additional complaints 
mechanism. An aggrieved person may make a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commissioner in 
relation to a decision or act of a public entity. This creates another avenue by which a person can have their 
concerns addressed, other than through legal proceedings. There are myriad possible conciliated outcomes 
– indeed, any outcome that both parties lawfully agree to is possible. 
 
What we seek to do in this report is to: 
• consider how human rights within the Act might be interpreted, drawing on both domestic and 
international case law, as well as relevant literature; and 
• speculate on the kinds of conciliated outcomes that parties might seek, and agree to, in respect of 
each right. 
 
The chapters of this report have been written by students enrolled in Human Rights Law at the University of 
Queensland’s School of Law in semester 2 of 2019.  
 
A team of four volunteer students edited the papers and put together this report. I sincerely thank them for 
their hard work. 
 
These student papers offer interesting insights into what the passing of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) 
might mean for Queenslanders. I am pleased to make it available to you. 
 
 
Professor Tamara Walsh 
Course Coordinator, Human Rights Law 
 
12 February 2020 
 
 
This report is provided free of charge and for research purposes only. It is the responsibility of the user to verify the accuracy, completeness, 
timeliness, quality or suitability for a particular use of the information provided in this report. The University of Queensland (“UQ”) make no claims, 
guarantees or warranties about the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, quality or suitability for a particular use of the information provided 
through this report. In particular, UQ accepts no liability for any loss of damage suffered by the user. UQ disclaims any and all liability for any 
claims or damages (including without limitation indirect or consequential loss or damage or any loss of damage arising whatsoever out of or in 
connection with the use of this report) that may result from providing the report or the information within. The user of this information assumes all 
liability and waives any and all claims or causes of action against UQ for all uses of and reliance on the information. In addition, UQ reserves the 
right to change the information at any time or remove the information entirely, without notice and in its absolute discretion. If any provision of this 
disclaimer is, or is found to be, unenforceable under applicable law, that will not affect the enforceability of the other provisions of this disclaimer. 
By choosing to use this report and the information it contains, you acknowledge and agree to the terms of this disclaimer. 
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Section 16: Right to Life  
Aoibh Cassidy and Emma Beckinsale  
 
‘16 Right to Life 
Every person has the right to life and has the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life.’ 
 
Section 16 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) protects the right to life. The provision consists of two 
limbs: firstly, it provides that ‘every person has the right to life’ and secondly, it provides for the ‘right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of life’.1 The outline below considers how Queensland decision-makers are likely to 
interpret s 16 and the potential outcomes that complainants may seek through the HRA’s conciliation 
process. 
The Right to Life in Other Jurisdictions 
Section 16 is based on art 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).2 In 
addition to the ICCPR, the right to life is also contained in various other international agreements, including 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’),4 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,5 and the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.6  Both the 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)7 and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)8 
contain a right to life in terms virtually identical to that in s 16 of the HRA. Human rights legislation in New 
Zealand,9 the United Kingdom,10 Canada11 and South Africa12 also contain a right to life.  
Public Entity  
The right to life will likely be engaged in situations involving the use of force by a public authority, the delivery 
of medical treatment by health services, or the death of a person in the care or supervision of a public 
authority.13 Therefore, public entities likely to impact the right to life include the police, public health services, 
correctional facilities, services connected to foster care and child protection, and courts or tribunals (acting in 
an administrative capacity), particularly in relation to coronial inquests.14 
 
1 Human rights Act 2019 (Qld)) s 16 (‘HRA’). 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 6(1) (‘ICCPR’); Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 3. 
3 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 3. 
4 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 
UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) article 2. 
5 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1566 UNTC 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) 
art 6. 
6 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for signature 
18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003) art 9. 
7 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 9. 
8 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 9. 
9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (New Zealand) s 8. 
10 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) art 2. 
11 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I ('Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms') s 7. 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) ch 2, s 11. 
13 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Section 9 Right to 
Life’, The Charter – Individual Rights (Fact Sheet, May 2013) 1-2 
<https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/media/k2/attachments/Charter_FS_IND_SECT_9.pdf>. 
14 Ibid 1-2. 
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A Fundamental Right  
The right to life is considered the ‘most basic, most fundamental and supreme right which human beings are 
entitled to have’.15 The drafters of the ICCPR described the right to life as ‘the most fundamental of all 
rights’.16 All other human rights depend on the right to life, as an individual cannot enjoy other human rights 
without it.17 For example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) has stressed the importance 
of the right to life, stating that it ‘should not be interpreted narrowly’ as it ‘cannot be properly understood in a 
restrictive manner’.18  
Negative and Positive Duties 
Section 16 of the HRA provides that ‘[e]very person has the right to life and has the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life’. The right therefore imposes both negative and positive duties on public authorities. The 
negative duty requires that public authorities must not arbitrarily deprive a person of life.19 The positive duty 
requires that public authorities must take positive steps to protect people from threats to life.20 This is also 
consistent with international jurisprudence, which provides that the right to life must be interpreted so as to 
impose both positive and negative duties on the State and public authorities.21 Further, in its response to an 
invitation from the United Nations General Assembly to comment on the ICCPR, the Australian Government 
stated that the right to life consists of two elements, a right not to be killed and a right to ‘some positive 
provision concerning the right to life which, although not defined in the Covenant or the Universal 
Declaration, may be assumed to mean the right of every person to preservation and enjoyment of his 
existence as an individual’.22  
 
The two limbs of s 16 are considered separately below; however, it should be noted that this distinction is 
somewhat arbitrary in practice, as there is the potential for significant overlap between the two. 
The Right not to be Arbitrarily Deprived of Life: The Negative Duty 
Meaning of ‘Arbitrarily’ 
Under the negative duty imposed by s 16, public entities are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving a person of 
their right to life. The term ‘arbitrarily’ qualifies this prohibition and leaves much room for interpretation by the 
courts.23 The inclusion of this term demonstrates that the right to life is not absolute, as it highlights that 
some deprivations of life may be permissible.24 Indeed, the Explanatory Notes to the Human Rights Bill 2018 
(Qld) (‘Bill’) state that ‘[n]ot every action that results in death will be arbitrary’.25  
 
The HRC has emphasised that the concept of arbitrariness is not limited to something that is unlawful, but 
rather, should ‘encompass the elements of inappropriateness, injustice, absence of predictability and due 
 
15 Douglas Hodgson, ‘The Child’s Right to Life, Survival and Development’ (1994) 2 International Journal of Children’s Rights 369, 372. 
16 Marc Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1987) 115. 
17 Waseem Qureshi, ‘Legal Exceptions to the Inalienable Right to Life’ (2019) 53 University of San Francisco Law Review 263, 263. 
18 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 6: Right to Life, 16th sess, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1 (30 April 1982) [5]. See also 
ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘The Right to Life’, Human Rights in Detail (Fact Sheet, June 2010) 3 <https://hrc.act.gov.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Right-to-life-281011.pdf>. 
19 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 19 (‘Explanatory Notes’). See also Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights 
Commission, (n 13) 1; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 3. 
20 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. See also Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, (n 13) 1; ACT Human Rights 
Commission (n 18) 3. 
21 Rebecca Arbolino, ‘Withdrawing Life Support under the European Convention and the ICCPR: The Right to Life at the End of Life 
after Lambert v France’ (2016) 3 Indonesian Journal of International Comparative Law 239, 247. 
22 UN GAOR, 10th Session, Annexes (10), 28-1, 12; quoted in Hodgson (n 15) 381. 
23 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. See generally Victorian Toll & Anor v Taha and Anor; State of Victoria v Brookes & Anor [2013] VSCA 
37, [198]-[201]. 
24 Jordan Paust, ‘The Right to Life in Human Rights Law and the Law of War’ (2002) 65(2) Saskatchewan Law Review 411, 415. 
25 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. 
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process of the law’.26 A deprivation of life may be authorised by law and still be arbitrary.27 For example, in 
Guerrero v Columbia, the HRC held that the use of force by the police could not be justified simply because 
it was taken in accordance with the law.28 Therefore, in determining whether the deprivation of life was 
arbitrary, Queensland decision-makers are likely to consider factors such as reasonableness, proportionality 
and necessity as well as legality.29 Some examples of particular applications of the right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life are considered below. 
Use of Force 
The right to life will be engaged where public authorities and government officials use force that results in the 
deprivation of life.30 For example, police officers, officers at a correctional facility or healthcare workers may 
use force against a person who poses a risk to others.31 In its comment on art 6 of the ICCPR, on which s 16 
of the HRA is based, the Committee on Civil and Political Rights indicated that States must implement laws 
to ‘strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by [public] 
authorities’.32 In McCann v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) held that the 
right to life under art 2 of the ECHR and art 6 of the ICCPR has evolved to the point that lethal force can only 
be used against a person who poses a lethal threat or a threat to the bodily integrity of others.33  
 
The negligent or reckless use of force resulting in death may also breach s 16. For example, the ECtHR has 
found that deficiencies in operational planning and control34 or failure to adequately train agents may breach 
the right to life.35 For example, Gulec v Turkey related to the use of force by police officers who fired guns to 
disperse protestors, resulting in the death of one demonstrator.36 The ECtHR found that this conduct 
breached the right to life and that the failure to use a less lethal method of crowd control (such as batons, riot 
shields, water cannons, rubber bullets or tear gas) was ‘incomprehensible and unacceptable’.37 Therefore, 
the intentional or reckless use of lethal force by public authorities will breach s 16 if it is not reasonable and 
proportionate in the circumstances. The precise stringency of the test that Queensland decision-makers will 
adopt is unclear, but it could require that the use of force be ‘strictly proportionate’ or ‘absolutely necessary’ 
in the circumstances.38  
Capital Punishment 
Article 6 of the ICCPR, on which s 16 of the HRA is based, is largely directed at reducing and regulating the 
use of capital punishment by States.39 However, s 16 HRA only replicates the more general art 6(1) of the 
ICCPR; it does not include any of the additional provisions related to capital punishment.40 As capital 
punishment was abolished in Queensland in 1922,41 it is likely that the additional provisions of art 6 of the 
ICCPR were excluded from s 16 of the HRA as they were not considered relevant in a Queensland context. 
However, capital punishment could be relevant in other contexts. For example, under international law, a 
 
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), 112th sess, CCPR/C/GC/35 (23 
October 2014) [12]. See also Enobong Mbang Akpambang, ‘Right to Life: Tackling the Little Foxes that Spoil the Vine’ (2018) 9 
Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 83, 87; Bossuyt (n 16) 115.  
27 Human Rights Committee, Guerrero v Columbia, Communication No. R 11/45, Views, 31 March 1992 [13.2]-[13.3]. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, (n 13) 1. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 6 (n 18) [3].  
33 McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 ECHR 97.  
34 Gulec v Turkey (Application No 54/1997/838/1044, 27 July 1998); Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, (n 13) 1. 
35 McCann v United Kingdom (n 33). 
36 Gulec v Turkey (Application No 54/1997/838/1044, 27 July 1998). 
37 Ibid [71]. 
38 McCann v United Kingdom (n 33) [148]-[149]. 
39 ICCPR (n 2) art 6(2)-(6). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland's Guardianship Laws (Report No 67, September 2010) [783]. 
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State is not entitled to deport an individual if there is a ‘real risk’ that they would face the death penalty in 
their home country.42  
Abortion  
Section 106 provides that the HRA does not affect ‘any law relating to termination of pregnancy or the killing 
of an unborn child’. Therefore, s 16 will not impact the legality of abortion in Queensland and abortion will not 
constitute a breach of the HRA. As such, the HRA does not require public entities such as hospitals and 
other health services to alter any procedures or approaches in relation to the termination of pregnancy. 
Euthanasia 
Euthanasia or assisted dying is not currently legal in Queensland.43 However, the Queensland Government 
commenced an inquiry into aged care, end-of-life and palliative care and assisted dying in 2018.44 The 
Legislative Assembly will hear the report from the inquiry by 31 March 2020.45 The legislature will be required 
to consider the HRA, and s 16 in particular, in relation to any new legislation regulating voluntary assisted 
dying in Queensland,46 and courts are obliged to interpret any statutory provisions consistently with human 
rights to the extent possible.47 However, s 16 would not necessarily prevent the legalisation of euthanasia. 
Indeed, international jurisdictions have found that the right to life does not extend to or prohibit voluntary 
assisted dying.48 
Withdrawal of Treatment 
The right to life under s 16 may also be a relevant consideration for hospitals and health services to take into 
account in relation to decisions to withdraw treatment. However, provided these decisions are justified in the 
circumstances, they are unlikely to breach the right.49 On an international scale, the ECtHR held in Lambert v 
France that the withdrawal of life support does not violate the right to life under art 2 of the ECHR.50 On a 
domestic level, the common law position is that ‘withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in 
accordance with good medical practice is not an offence and the cause of death is then classified as the 
patient’s underlying condition’.51  
The Right to Life: The Positive Duty 
The right to life also imposes a positive duty on public authorities to take steps to protect life and reduce 
threats to life.52 This is consistent with international jurisprudence. For example, the breadth of the right to life 
was noted in Olga Tellis v Bobmay Municipal Corporation, where the Supreme Court of India held that the 
‘right to life is wide and far reaching’.53 The European Commission on Human Rights has also expressed the 
view that the concept of everyone’s life being protected by the law ‘enjoins the State not only to refrain from 
 
42 Human Rights Committee, Kwok v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (23 November 2009). 
43 Lindy Willmott, Ben White, Christopher Stackpoole, Kelly Purser and Andrew McGee, '(Failed) Voluntary Euthanasia Law Reform in 
Australia: Two Decades of Trends, Models and Politics' (2016) 39(1) UNSW Law Journal 1, 11. 
44 Queensland Parliament, ‘Inquiry into Aged Care, End-of-Life and Palliative Care and Voluntary Assisted Dying’, Health, Communities, 
Disability Services and Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Committee (Web Page, 30 October 2019) 
<https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/work-of-committees/committees/HCDSDFVPC/inquiries/current-inquiries/AgedCareEOLPC>. 
45 Ibid. 
46 HRA (n 1) ss 38, 39. 
47 Ibid s 48. 
48 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
49 HRA (n 1) s 13. 
50 Lambert & Ors v France Application No. 46043/14 Eur. Ct. HR (June 5 2015). 
51 See Northridge v. Sydney Area Health Services [2000] 50 NSWLR 549; Isaac Messiha (By His Tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East 
Health [2004] NSWSC 1061; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
52 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. 
53 [1985] 3 SCC 545 [2.1]. See also Henry Steiner, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials, 
(OUP, 3rd ed, 2008) 323. 
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taking life intentionally, but further, to take appropriate steps to safeguard life’.54 These sentiments are 
reflected in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, which provide that s 16 ‘reflects the positive obligation on states 
in art 6(1) of the ICCPR to take positive steps to protect the lives of individuals through, for example, 
appropriate laws that prohibit arbitrary killing and positive measures to address other threats to life such as 
malnutrition and infant mortality’.55 The categories and scope of the positive duties likely to arise from s 16 
are considered below. 
Laws and Procedures  
Section 16 will require that the Queensland government and public authorities implement laws and 
procedures that are directed towards protecting life. One area in which this duty may be particularly relevant 
is that of criminal law.56 The government must enact appropriate criminal laws to protect the lives of people in 
Queensland, as well as implementing appropriate policies, procedures and training for police officers and 
other agents who enforce laws through the use of force.57 This duty may also be relevant to some of the 
issues discussed above, such as abortion, euthanasia and withdrawal of medical treatment. While the right 
to life would not preclude the legality of any of these acts, any regulatory legislation would need to take into 
account the rights under s 16.58 
A Duty to Warn  
Section 16 is also likely to impose a duty on the Queensland government and public authorities to warn 
people of any threats, hazards or risks to life.59 Examples of these risks could include risks relating to fires, 
floods, chemical spills, hazardous waste, infectious diseases, contamination of food or recall of other items.60 
This duty will arise where the public entity knows or ought to know of the risk and the risk is ‘imminent’ and 
‘clearly identifiable’.61 The duty will be owed to the class of people who are likely to be at risk as a result of 
the danger.62  
 
Public hospitals and other health services may also have a duty to warn individual people about the risk of 
contracting an infectious disease.63 For example, where a healthcare worker knows that a patient is 
HIV/AIDS positive and is exposing his or her partner to HIV/AIDS, the worker may have a duty to warn the 
partner of the risk.64 However, such a duty would need to be balanced with the patient’s right to 
confidentiality. The common law65 and the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights66 provide 
further guidance on how to reconcile this conflict. 
Special Duty of Care 
Section 16 is likely to impose a special duty of care on any public authority that has people within its care, 
custody and control.67 Examples of public authorities to which the special duty of care would apply include 
prisons, detention centres, medical facilities and other instances of state care.68 This is consistent with 
 
54 Association X v United Kingdom Application 7154/75 14 DR 31 (1978) 32. See also J Fawcett, The Application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1987). 
55 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. 
56 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (n 13) 1. 
57 Ibid. 
58 HRA (n 1) s 38, 39, 48. 
59 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (n 13) 1. 
60 Ibid; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 9. 
61 Budayeva v Russia [2008] ECHR 15339/02 (20 March 2008) [137]; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 9. 
62 LCB v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 9. 
63 Budayeva v Russia (n 61) [137]; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 9. 
64 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 9; See also BT v Oei [1999] NSWSC 1082. 
65 BT v Oei (n 64). 
66 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 
International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, 2006, Consolidated Version, HR/PUB/06/9. 
67 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (n 13) 1. Cf Slaveski v State of Victoria & Ors [2009] VSCA 6. 
68 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (n 13) 1; ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 10. 
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international law, under which positive obligations imposed on public authorities to safeguard life include 
providing adequate care to a person whose life is known to be at a particular risk,69 taking measures to guard 
against detainee suicides,70 and protecting the lives of individuals deprived of their liberty by the State.71 
 
For example, in Fabrikant v Canada, the HRC found that the right to life required the provision of quality 
medical care and treatment to prisoners because the State is ‘responsible for the life and well-being of its 
detainees’.72 The HRC has also found that correctional and detention facilities must implement standards to 
prevent the spread of diseases and ‘provide appropriate medical treatment to persons who have contracted 
diseases, either in prison or prior to their detention’.73 
 
The right to life may also require that special measures of protection be provided to witnesses.74 UK courts 
have held that witnesses fall into a special category of ‘vulnerable persons’ and are therefore entitled, under 
the right to life, to be afforded additional measures of protection than ordinary members of the public 
because they have been exposed to risks by the State.75 This duty will only arise where there is a ‘real and 
immediate’ risk to the witness’s life76 and must not impose a ‘disproportionate’ or ‘unrealistic burden’ on 
authorities.77 This duty was considered and applied by the Victorian Supreme Court in the Lawyer X 
proceedings.78 This case indicates that despite the high value placed on the right to life, it is not paramount 
and may have to be balanced against competing rights. Indeed, the Court in that case had to balance the 
rights of potentially wrongfully convicted persons (such as the right to a fair hearing and criminal procedural 
rights) against the right to life of the witness and her children, and ultimately determined it was appropriate to 
publish the witness’s identity.79 
Health Care and Welfare Rights 
There is the potential for significant overlap between the right to life under s 16 and the right to accessing 
health services under s 37. In international jurisdictions, different iterations of the right to life have been used 
to assert a right to access health services or a right to health more generally.80 The Explanatory Notes to the 
Bill indicate that the right to health services under the HRA is not intended to encompass a right to the 
provision of the ‘underlying determinants of health’, such as food, water, social security, housing, a clean 
environment and insurance.81 South African jurisprudence indicates that the right to life should not be used 
as a vehicle of complaint where the right to health services deals specifically with the issue.82  
 
However, as the right to health services is defined narrowly, the right to life may extend to a more general 
right to health and other ‘underlying health determinants’. Therefore, s 16 is likely to complement s 37 and 
require public health authorities to allocate resources appropriately and to only deny life-saving or prolonging 
 
69 Osman v United Kingdom [1988] ECRR 101; Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security (2001) 12 BHRC 60. 
70 Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) ECtHR 149 [86]. 
71 Sarah Joseph, ‘Extending the Right to Life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comment 36’ 
(2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 347, 353. 
72 UN Doc CCPR/C/79/D/970/2001 (6 Nov 2003) [9.3]. See also ACT Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Audit on the Operation 
of ACT Correctional Facilities under Corrections Legislation, July 2007, Recommendation 4.2.1. 
73 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Republic of Moldova, 75th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/CO/75/MDA (5 August 2002) [9]. 
74 Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2007] EWCA Civ 325.  
75 Ibid [75]-[76] 
76 Ibid; see also Re Officer L (Respondent) (Northern Ireland) [2007] UKHL 36. 
77 Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2007] EWCA Civ 325 [93]. 
78 AB v CD; EF v CD (2018) 362 ALR 1; AB v CD & EF [2017] VSCA 338; AB & EF v CD [2017] VSC 350. 
79 Ibid. See also Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, 2018 Report on the Operation of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities (Report, November 2019) 76. 
80 See, eg, Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624; Oyal v Turkey (2010) 51 EHRR 30 [54]; Lopes de Sousa 
Fernandes v Portugal (2016) 66 EHRR 28 [39]; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits) (Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Series C No 125, 17 June 2005). 
81 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 28. 
82 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1) SA 765 (CC) [15]. 
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treatment in circumstances that are reasonable and demonstrably justified.83 Queensland decision-makers 
may also extend the right to life to include other ‘underlying health determinants’. Indian courts have 
construed the right to life as encompassing a right to livelihood,84 nutrition, clothing, shelter85 and 
education.86 However, New Zealand and Canadian courts have adopted a narrower approach and balanced 
the right to life with matters of social policy and budgetary constraints.87 The Explanatory Notes refer to an 
obligation to take positive measures to reduce ‘threats to life such as malnutrition and infant mortality’.88 
Therefore, it is likely that s 16 may encompass rights to nutrition and health. However, given that neither s 16 
nor the Explanatory Notes to the Bill stipulate that the right to life is wide enough to encompass other 
‘welfare’ rights, it is likely that Queensland decision-makers will follow the cautious approach taken in New 
Zealand and Canada and prioritise budgetary constraints and social policy concerns over rights to housing, 
clothing or social security. 
Duty to Investigate  
The right to life under s 16 also likely encompasses a procedural duty to investigate deaths that occurred in 
circumstances where a public entity may have breached the right to life.89 The duty is likely to arise where a 
person has been killed by a police officer or other State agent,90 or where a person has died while in the 
care, custody or control of a public entity (such as a hospital, health service or correctional facility).91  
This duty is consistent with the application of the right to life at both an international and domestic level. UK 
courts have construed the right to life to impose a procedural duty on the State to conduct an ‘effective 
investigation into any death occurring in circumstances where the substantive obligations not to take life 
arbitrarily and to protect life have (or may have) been breached’.92 International jurisprudence provides that 
an effective investigation must fulfil the following criteria: be initiated by the State; be conducted 
independently; be effective insofar as it leads to a determination of culpability, not in the sense that it 
generates a particular result; be reasonably prompt; be transparent and open to public scrutiny; and allow for 
the family of the deceased to participate in the inquiry process.93 
The Victorian Coroner’s Court has recognised a similar duty, stating that the right to life ‘requires the Coroner 
to conduct an inquest that investigates not only the immediate circumstances of the death but also the 
possibility of systemic failure on the part of the authorities to protect life’.94 The right to life and duty to 
investigate is likely to be particularly relevant to the deaths of Indigenous peoples in custody or at the hands 
of police officers. For example, the right was recently invoked in relation to the inquest into the death of 
Tanya Day; the Coroners Court of Victoria confirmed the application of the right to life and ruled that the role 
of systemic racism in Day’s death and the obligation to provide ‘culturally safe and trauma-informed care’ 
would be investigated.95 
 
83 See, eg, R v Cambridge Health Authority; Ex parte B [1995] 1 WLR 898 (CA). See also Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights 
Commission (n 13) 1; HRA (n 1) s 13. 
84 Tellis & Or v Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors (1987) LRC (Const) 351. 
85 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan & Ors (1997) AIR SC 152. 
86 Jain v State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 4 LRC 234. 
87 Lawson v Housing New Zealand (1997) 4 LRC 369; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429, [82]. 
88 Explanatory Notes (n 19) 19. 
89 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission (n 13) 2. 
90 See, eg, McCann v United Kingdom (n 33). 
91 See, eg, Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 487; Tas v Turkey (Application No 24396/94), 14 November 2000; Keenan v 
United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 913. 
92 McCann v United Kingdom (n 33); R (Amin) v Home Secretary (2004) 1 AC 653. 
93 Jordan v UK (2001) 37 EHRR 52. 
94 Coronial Investigation of 29 Level Crossing Deaths – Ruling on the Interpretation of Clause 7(1) of Schedule 1 of the Coroners Act 
2008 (Vic) (25 June 2010) (Web Page, 08 September 2019) <www.hrlc.org.au/human-rights-case-summaries/coronial-investigation-
of-29-level-crossing-deaths-ruling-on-the-interpretation-of-clause-71-of-schedule-1-of-the-coroners-act-2008-vic-25-june-2010> . 
95  Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2018-19 (Report, October 2019) 38. 
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Scope of the Positive Duty 
Queensland decision-makers will likely interpret this positive obligation ‘so that an impossible or 
disproportionate burden is not imposed upon the authorities’.96 These obligations must be considered in light 
of the priorities of the relevant public entity and the resources available to them.97 The scope of the positive 
duties owed by public entities under s 16 is also tempered by s 13, which provides that conduct and 
decisions that limit human rights will still be consistent with the HRA provided that the limitation is 
‘reasonable’ and ‘demonstrably justified’.98 
Conciliated Outcomes 
The conciliated outcomes that complainants may seek when making a complaint under s 16 include the 
following: 
• issuing a private or public explanation of the circumstances leading to the death; 
• issuing a private or public apology and acknowledgement of responsibility for the death; 
• paying compensation (e.g. for any medical treatment or out-of-pocket expenses incurred by a 
relative of the deceased, or in circumstances where the complainant's life was at risk but they did not 
actually die);99 
• altering policies directed at protecting life (e.g. policies relating to the use of force, the assessment of 
suicide risk, the assessment of health risks, the investigation into deaths, the provision social 
security and other welfare rights, etc); 
• providing education and training for staff directed at protecting life (e.g. training relating to the use of 
force, the assessment and response to suicide risk, the assessment and response to other risks to 
life, the investigation into deaths, the provision of welfare rights or ‘underlying determinants of 
health’, etc); 
• improving workplace health and safety procedures, policies and practices; 
• developing decision-making tools and other instruments for assessing risks to life (such as suicide 
risks, risks to health, risks posed by natural disasters, etc);  
• directing an inquest or inquiry into a death that involved a public authority; and 
• agreeing to take disciplinary measures against individuals involved in the death. 
 
96 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay IACtHR Series C No 146 (2006) [155]. See generally Kilic v Turkey [2000] 
Application No. 2249/93 (28 March 2000) and Mahmut Kaya v Turkey Application No. 2235/93 (28 March 2000). 
97 See, eg, Osman v United Kingdom (n 69) [116]. See generally ACT Human Rights Commission (n 18) 3. 
98  HRA (n 1) s 13(1). 
99  See, eg, Menson v United Kingdom (Application No 47916/99) 6 May 2003; R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2006] EWCA Civ 143. 
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Section 17: Right to Protection from Torture and Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment 
Aimee Griffin, Tiarelle Zach and Alexia Cuss 
 
 “17 Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
A person must not be—  
(a) subjected to torture; or 
(b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or 
(c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s 
full, free and informed consent.” 
 
The right to protection from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (‘the right’) under 
s 17 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) was modelled on art 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),1 and is seen as containing ‘one of the most fundamental values of a 
democratic society’.2 The ICCPR creates a non-derogable protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment to protect the dignity and physical and mental integrity of individuals. The right also 
additionally protects against non-consensual medical treatment and scientific experimentation, to protect 
peoples’ bodily autonomy and reflect the importance of informed consent.   
 
Given that the HRA was enacted to consolidate protections and establish dispute resolution processes for 
certain human rights recognised in international law,3 it is necessary for Queensland to draw upon existing 
interpretations of the right in domestic and international jurisprudence to ensure a consistent approach is 
taken. Especially as the provision is represented similarly in international and domestic legislation.4  
Interpretation 
It is clear that the right must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights,5 and courts may be 
guided by relevant international and domestic law.6 The right has been understood in domestic and 
international case law to ‘capture treatment which is grossly disproportionate in the circumstances’.7  
Although the boundaries between the different aspects of the right (torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment) are not completely concrete under international and domestic law, as they are largely approached 
 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 7 (‘ICCPR’). 
2 See, eg, Gorobet v Moldova (European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, Application No. 30951/10, 11 October 2011) [49]. 
3 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 2 (‘Explanatory Notes’).  
4 See, eg, Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 10; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 10; Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK), art 3.  
5 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 48(1)-(2) (‘HRA’).  
6 Ibid s 48(3).  
7 Taunoa v Attorney-General (2007) 9 HRNZ 104 [176] (‘Taunoa’). See also Certain Children by their litigation guardian Sister Marie 
Brigid Arthur v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) (2017) 52 VR 441 [239], [245] (‘Certain Children (No 2)’).  
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as “being distinct but related”8 rights, for illustrative purposes, it is worth briefly exploring the individual 
backgrounds of the components first.  
Torture 
The definition of ‘torture’ is derived from art 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture.9 Rogers v 
Chief10 summarises the principles and the three main components that must be present for treatment to 
constitute torture. Firstly, there must be a certain severity of physical or mental pain and suffering; secondly, 
the act must be intentionally inflicted for a prohibited purpose; and thirdly, it must be inflicted with 
involvement by a public official or person acting in an official capacity either instigating, consenting, or 
acquiescing.11 To ascertain the severity of the treatment, courts have looked at the duration of the treatment, 
its mental and physical effects, as well as the sex, age and state of health of the victim.12 One overseas case 
amounting to torture, involved a group of police officers repeatedly striking a suspect on the back of the head 
during an interrogation.13 Here, it was evident that public officials were acting with unnecessary force, and 
there was a significant severity to the treatment.14 In cases where the severity of harm falls short of the high 
bar to torture, such as a single punch to the head rather than an extensive beating,15 it may be necessary to 
consider the corresponding component of the right of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.  
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has not been as clearly defined as torture, however, the case of 
Ireland v United Kingdom drew a distinction between such treatment and torture, finding that cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment may involve acts that are less severe and that are not conducted for a prohibited 
purpose.16 Islam v Director General identified that although the threshold is lower than torture, there is still a 
minimum level of severity necessary.17 Degrading treatment has been described to hold the lowest level of 
severity,18 and has been specifically defined in Wainwright v United Kingdom as acts where the object is to 
humiliate or debase the person concerned.19 Further, the suffering and humiliation must stretch further than 
the inevitable humiliation connected with legitimate forms of treatment.20 The treatment must necessarily go 
beyond the deprivation of liberty to engage this right.21 The courts have taken into account the same factors 
as are considered in relation to torture, such as the manner, intensity and duration of the act, its physical and 
mental effects, and the victim’s sex, age and health status.22 Particular vulnerabilities of the victim have also 
been considered.23 Thus, in the Australian case of Davis v State of Victoria,24 the Victorian Supreme Court 
 
8 Council of Europe, The prohibition of torture: A guide to implementation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights - 
Human Rights Handbook No. 6, July 2003, 11.  
9 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 
1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) art 1. 
10 Rogers v Chief Commissioner of Police (General) [2009] VCAT 2526, [113] (‘Rogers’). 
11 Ibid.  
12 See, eg, Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403, [100] (‘Selmouni v France’). See also AYI15 v Minister for Immigration & Border 
Protection [2016] FCA 1554, [10]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See, eg, Rogers (n 10) [114]. 
16 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 5310 ECHR 71, [162] (‘Ireland v United Kingdom’). 
17 Islam v Director General of the Justice and Community Safety Directorate [2016] ACTSC 27, [66] (‘Islam v Director General’).  
18 Rogers (n 10) [115]. 
19 Wainwright v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 40, [41] (‘Wainright’).  
20 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 900/1999, 76th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (28 October 2002) [4.6] 
(‘C v Australia’). 
21 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 265/1987, 35th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (2 May 1989) [9.2] 
(‘Vuolanne v Finland’). 
22 See, eg, Ireland v United Kingdom (n 16); Selmouni v France (n 12) [100]; Bataliny v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 10060/07, 23 July 2015) 18 [82]; AYI15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 1554, [10]. 
23 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1184/2003, 86th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1184/2003 (17 March 2006) [9.4] 
(‘Brough v Australia’). 
24 Davies v State of Victoria [2012] VSC 343 
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found that that the treatment of a mental health patient, who was dragged naked across a carpeted floor, 
amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.25 
Medical or Scientific Experimentation or Treatment 
The protection against medical or scientific treatment without consent is also derived from art 7 of the 
ICCPR,26 and mirrors equivalent provisions in domestic human rights legislation in Victoria and the ACT.27 
The majority of litigation involving this section has not been focused on scientific experimentation,28 but 
rather the interpretation of ‘medical treatment’ and what classifies ‘full, free and informed consent’. 
 
In De Bruyn, ‘medical treatment’ was defined as an operation, administration of drug or other substance, or 
any other medical procedure.29 The court in Re BWV; Ex parte Gardner also provided that “whether or not a 
procedure is a medical procedure, depends upon whether the medical knowledge upon which it is based has 
become so widespread within the community that it might… be regarded as common knowledge [and] not 
medical knowledge”.30 Accordingly, a ban on smoking in a hospital did not fall under the definition of medical 
treatment in De Bruyn, as the court held that the reasons for a smoking ban are “now such a matter of 
common knowledge that it could not be properly termed as… based upon medical knowledge”.31 However, it 
was held in an ACT case that a mental health assessment to determine fitness for a firearm licence could 
properly be seen as based upon medical knowledge.32 
 
Interpreting the boundaries of consent has also been a primary consideration of the courts. Whether consent 
is full and informed will be determined by reference to whether the individual understood the treatment 
completely and were told of its potential side-effects and risks.33 The consent must also be free in that there 
is no duress or undue pressure to force compliance with the treatment.34 Indeed, deciding whether the 
affected person had the capacity to consent has been frequently litigated. Under common law, it is presumed 
that all adults have capacity to consent, and the burden is on the defence to show there was no capacity.35 It 
was determined in In Re T that the right enables a person of full age and understanding to reject medical 
treatment, and this decision does not have to be rational or sensible.36 ACT v JT specifies that there is a 
presumption in favour of life-sustaining treatment , except where this conflicts with a competent patient’s 
right to refuse.37 Therefore, in the case of ACT v JT where the plaintiff refused to eat, it was held to not be 
against his human rights to force-feed him as he was determined to be of unsound mind and could not 
accordingly refuse treatment.38 
Other interpretations  
In its General Comment on art 7, the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) stated that distinctions between the 
elements depend on the ‘nature, purpose and severity of the treatment’.39 As such, the HRC did not consider 
 
25 Ibid [56]. 
26 ICCPR (n 1) art 7.  
27 See, Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 10(c); Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 10(c). 
28 Cheriff Bassiouni, Thomas Baffes and John Evrad, ‘An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice: The 
Need for International Regulation of Human Experimentation’ (1981) 72(4) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1597, 1611.  
29 De Bruyn v Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health [2016] VSC 111, [159] (‘De Bruyn’). 
30 Re BWV; Ex parte Gardner [2003] VSC 173, 75. 
31 De Bruyn (n 29) 111, [160].  
32 P v Registrar of Firearms (Administrative Review) [2018] ACAT 20. 
33 See, eg, D v S (1981) 93 LSJS 405. 
34 See, eg, Beausoleil v Sisters of Charity (1964) 53 DLR (2d) 65. 
35 In Re T (An adult: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
36 Ibid, 665. 
37 Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105, 62 (‘ACT v JT’).  
38 Ibid. 
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 20: Article 8 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment), 44th sess, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1Rev.9 (10 March 1992) [4]. For commentary, see Association for the Prevention of 
Torture and Centre for Justice and International Law, Torture in International Law, a guide to jurisprudence (2008) 7-8 (‘Torture in 
International Law’).  
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it necessary to establish sharp distinctions between torture and other forms of ill-treatment, or develop a list 
of prohibited acts.40  
 
One approach taken to interpret the equivalent right41 under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’), is to distinguish treatment by reference to the severity of pain and suffering occasioned and the 
purpose of the treatment.42 As set out above, treatment is classified on a spectrum of severity, with the most 
severe being torture and the least being degrading treatment.43 A relative assessment of the circumstances 
of the case, including the sex, age and state of health of the victim, the duration of the ill-treatment, and its 
effects are all also considered.44 However, this approach has been critiqued for drawing arbitrary and 
subjective boundaries between the types of treatment experienced by victims. Justice Elias makes the point 
that where there has been a breach of the right, it is likely that the treatment endured has been all at once 
cruel, inhuman and degrading.45  
 
Victorian courts have discussed an alternative approach in obiter.46 That approach does not require three 
distinct inquiries into whether the treatment is unlawful. Instead, the elements are viewed as an expression of 
a norm that prohibits conduct that is ‘incompatible with humanity.’47 In Certain Children (No 2), Justice Dixon 
endorsed this approach and stated that it is a combination of the ‘adjectives in the right that defines the 
prohibited treatment’.48 As such, Victorian courts have been hesitant to distinguish between the different 
components of the right.  
 
Regardless of which approach is followed in Queensland, it is imperative that the HRA, and the rights it 
enshrines, be viewed ‘as a living instrument that is interpreted in light of the present-day conditions’.49 
Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind when considering previous case examples in this area that 
‘certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment”, as opposed to “torture”, 
may be classified differently in the future’.50 As recognised by the European Court of Human Rights, ‘the 
increasingly high standard required in the protection of human rights will inevitably require greater firmness 
in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.’51 
 
Finally, although it is not an express requirement under the HRA, it might still be relevant to consider the 
purpose of the treatment when determining whether there has been a violation of the right, as it speaks to 
the circumstances of the conduct.52 Where the treatment departs from the terms of the legislation or 
standards and principles connected to the legislation, it is likely that the treatment is arbitrary and therefore 
not proper treatment.53 For example, in Lukatela v Birch,54 a police officer who sprayed intoxicated detainees 
with capsicum spray was ‘clearly acting outside his authority’ and intended to cause pain and discomfort to 
the victims.55 However, the absence of a purpose may not conclusively rule out a violation of the right.56 
 
40 Ibid.  
41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature on 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 
221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), Article 3. For scholarly commentary, see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (2nd ed, 2005) 160.  
42 See ‘The Greek Case’ (1969) 1 Yearbook of the European Convention of Human Rights 1; Torture in International Law (n 39) 57.  
43 Torture in International Law (n 39) 7-8. 
44 Ireland v United Kingdon (n 16). 
45 Taunoa (n 7) [83].  
46 Certain Children (No 2) (n 7) [250].  
47 Taunoa (n 7) [81]-[82].  
48 Certain Children (No 2) (n 7) [250]. 
49 Selmouni v France (n 12) [101]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Certain Children (No 2) (n 7) [250]-[258].  
53 Taunoa (n 7) [81]-[82]. 
54 (2008) 164 ACTR 24.  
55 Ibid [68], [71].  
56 Certain Children (No 2) (n 7) [250].  
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Conciliated Outcomes 
Court remedies are not always the most effective or beneficial to the parties involved. The variability and 
adaptability of remedies in a conciliation process are likely to be preferable to individuals whose rights under 
s 17 are violated. Conciliated outcomes that claimants may seek include:  
• Apologising and acknowledging wrongdoing. Giving the affected individual the opportunity to be 
heard and to speak to the offender about the effect of their actions and allowing the offender to 
apologise and agree to work together to best remedy the situation can be an empowering 
experience.57 For example, the Queensland Ombudsman was able to assist a complainant’s 
pregnant daughter to access maternity clothes whilst imprisoned, and the correctional centre 
acknowledged that there was a systemic issue with their policy on providing clothes.58 
• Correcting the conditions of ill-treatment to impose minimum standards of proper treatment. For 
example, the Victorian Ombudsman, noting the prohibition on degrading treatment, was able to 
ensure treatment for incontinence aids that had stopped, were promptly re-commenced by prison 
and medical staff.59 The Victorian Ombudsman is also currently investigating the treatment of young 
people in solitary confinement and isolation in prisons60 and advocating for significant reform due to 
the grave human rights abuses uncovered.  
• Compensating persons for the pain and suffering experienced, including by providing financial 
reparations and access to support services. The physical and mental trauma victims suffer as a 
result of a rights violation may affect their ability to work, thus they may seek compensation for loss 
of earnings or opportunity.61 Additionally, it may be an effective remedy to fund counselling sessions 
or remedial medical treatments to assist the victim in returning to the position they were prior to the 
trauma.62  
• Educating the person who caused the harm will also be an important factor, and where an 
organisation or governing body is concerned, systemic changes may be necessary.63 In the context 
of medical treatment performed without fully informed consent, a system change that seeks to 
improve communication between doctors and their patients that helps to clarify consent may be a 
useful conciliated outcome.64 The parties might also agree on registration restrictions that prevent, 
for example, an offending doctor from working with particularly vulnerable people to provide greater 
protection.65 
• A transfer of the victim from the facility where they are receiving the ill treatment may be appropriate. 
• Training for correctional staff regarding their conduct, removing offenders from positions of 
authority,66 or adding staff to lessen the stress which might affect the judgment of offenders. In 
Lukatela v Birch,67 the use of capsicum spray to desist detainees who were intoxicated and difficult 
might be considered to be the result of a lack of training in some cases. 
 
 
57 Carl Schneider, ‘Apology in Mediation’ (2000) 17(3) Mediation Quarterly 41. 
58 Queensland Ombudsman, Annual Report 2017-18 (Report, 31 August 2018) 56.  
59 Victorian Ombudsman, Annual Report 2018 (Report, 18 September 2018) 34.  
60 Kendall Masters, ‘Unlawful and wrong - solitary confinement and isolation of young people in Victorian prison and youth justice centres: 
Ombudsman’ Victorian Ombudsman (News, 5 September 2019) <https://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/News/Media-Releases/Unlawful-and-
wrong%E2%80%9D-solitary-confinement-and-isola>. 
61 Sarah Joseph, Katie Mitchell and Linda Gyorki, Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims (Gerald Staberock, 2nd ed, 2014) 264.  
62 Jeevan Sharma and Tobias Kelly, ‘Monetary Compensation for Survivors of Torture’ (2018) 10(2) Journal of Human Rights Practice 
307. 
63 Victor Madrigal-Borloz, ‘Rehabilitation of Torture Survivors’ (Research Paper, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, 
2013) 40. 
64 Ibid, 47. 
65 See, eg, Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, ‘Undertakings: National Restrictions Library’ (Research Paper, Australian 
Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, July 2017). 
66 Lukatela v Birch (2008) 164 ACTR 24 [46].  
67 Ibid.  
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• Referring the offender to the relevant authorities, including the Queensland Ombudsman,68 the 
Queensland Parole Board,69 or relevant medical professional boards if necessary.  
• Ongoing inspections of the conditions of the treatment and punishment in correctional and health 
facilities. 
• Taking into account that Queensland has a high population of First Nations peoples,70 it is important 
to acknowledge that the above types of conciliated outcomes on their own may be insufficient to 
meet the needs of this group. A conciliated outcome for Indigenous peoples that takes on a more 
holistic approach might include meeting with the individual’s community and elders for 
supplementary reconciliation.71 This might involve apologising directly to the community or facilitating 
further conversations and working together to achieve the best outcome to ensure that the ill-
treatment does not reoccur. 
 
68 HRA (n 5) ss 73(1), 73(7).  
69 If the treatment amounts to an ‘exceptional circumstance’ under the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) s 176. 
70 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians June 2016 (Catalogue No 
3238.0.55.001, 18 September 2018). 
71 Patrick Dodson, ‘The State of Reconciliation in Australia’ (Research Paper, Reconciliation Australia, November 2017). 
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Section 18: The Right to Freedom from Forced Work 
Alexia Cuss  
 ‘18 Freedom from forced work 
(1) A person must not be held in slavery or servitude. 
(2) A person must not be made to perform forced or compulsory labour.’ 
 
Section 18 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD) (‘HRA’)1 protects against the human rights violations of 
slavery, servitude and forced labour. These violations are unfortunately not a relic of the past, with modern 
forms of slavery and forced labour continuing to be present throughout Australia. Although violations of these 
rights occur in many industries, they are particularly common in the areas of construction, agriculture, 
catering and cleaning.2  Accordingly, public entities3 should be especially mindful of exploitation when 
engaging contractors and services in these sectors, to ensure they are not complicit in any violation of this 
section of the HRA.  
Given that the rights enshrined in s 18 are largely derived from international legal norms and instruments,4 it 
is necessary to explore the approaches taken in other jurisdictions to ensure that a compatible interpretation 
is adopted in Queensland. To reflect the diversity of ways in which subjugation occurs, the conciliated 
outcomes available to victims should be diverse and flexible to ensure that victims of rights violations have 
access to appropriate remedies.5 
Interpretation  
Slavery  
As stated by the High Court of Australia in the key case of R v Tang,6 which involved the first conviction for 
slavery under Division 270 of the Criminal Code Act,7 the meaning of ‘slavery’ in Australia and its definition in 
the Act is derived from the 1926 Slavery Convention.8 Article 1 of the Slavery Convention defines slavery as 
‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised’.9 Whilst the court largely endorsed this interpretation, they distinguished it from the definition in 
Australia,10 as the Australian wording excludes the ‘status’ of slavery and is limited to the ‘condition’ of 
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’).  
2 Julia O’Connell Davidson, Modern Slavery (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 133. See also Pam Stewart ‘Tortious Remedies for Deliberate 
Wrongdoing to Victims of Human Trafficking and Slavery in Australia’ (2011) 34(3) UNSW Law Journal 898, 898.  
3 See HRA (n 1) s 9, 10.  
4 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
23 March 1976) art 8 (‘ICCPR’). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (‘ECHR’) sch 1 art 4; Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK) art 4.   
5 See Basak Çali ‘Explaining variation in the intrusiveness of regional human rights remedies in domestic orders’(2018) 16(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 214.  
6 R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1 (‘Tang’).  
7 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code Act’).  
8 Tang (n 6) 16 [21]; Slavery Convention, opened for signature on 25 September 1926, 60 UNTS 254 (entered into force 9 March 1927) 
(‘Slavery Convention’). See also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature 30 April 1956, 266 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 September 1956) art 7. 
9 Slavery Convention (n 8) art 1(1).  
10 See Criminal Code Act (n 7) s 270.1.  
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slavery alone. This exclusion merely reflects the position in Australia, where de jure and chattel slavery have 
never been legally recognised.11   
The court in Tang emphasised that the definition of ‘slavery’ should not be ‘artificially narrowed’, nor should 
the exact boundaries or circumstances of its invocation be circumscribed.12 To properly address the ever-
evolving nature of modern-day de facto slavery, a broad and flexible approach to interpretation needs to be 
adopted.13 The court recognised that such an approach is supported by the phrasing of ‘any or all’ in the 
definition both domestically and internationally,14 and is to be favoured over the more narrow application 
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Siliadin v France.15 Accordingly, whilst there are a 
number of factors that may be relevant to showing the exercise of ownership over another human being,16 
the most central indicia of slavery is the ‘commodification of an individual by treating them as an object of 
sale and purchase’.17 
Queensland decision-makers should interpret the meaning of ‘slavery’ in the HRA broadly to be consistent 
with the existing approach in Australia18 and to give effect to our obligations under international law. Whilst a 
liberal approach is indeed necessary to properly protect individuals’ rights under s 18, decision-makers 
should still be mindful not to ‘debase the currency of language, or banalise crimes against humanity, by 
giving slavery a meaning that extends beyond the limits of the text, context and purpose of the 1926 Slavery 
Convention’.19 Invocations of ‘slavery’ should therefore only be reserved to the most heinous violations of s 
18 and ‘cases involving the total degradation of and dominance over another person’.20  
Servitude 
The exact meaning and scope of ‘servitude’ is not clearly defined in any international legal instruments, nor 
is the boundary between ‘servitude’ and ‘slavery’ clearly established.21 However, the general consensus 
appears to be that the term ‘servitude’ is intended to cover ‘all conceivable forms of dominance over another 
human being’,22 which ‘deny the victim of their freedom in fundamental respects, yet fall short of ownership’23 
and otherwise constituting slavery. It is arguably unnecessary to draw clear boundaries between the two 
concepts though, as the protections under s 18 are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, ‘those who engage 
in violations of such rights are not likely to arrange their practices to conform to some convenient 
taxonomy’.24 Accordingly, the meaning of ‘servitude’ is intended to capture more subtle forms of domination25 
 
11 Tang (n 6) 20 [33]. See also Stephen Tully ‘Sex, Slavery and the High Court of Australia: The Contribution of R v Tang to International 
Jurisprudence’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 403, 405.  
12 Tang (n 6) 38 [81], 18-19 [28]-[29]. Cf Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgement) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001) 194 [542] (‘Kunarac’).  
13 Cf Siliadin v France (2005) VII Eur Court HR 333 (‘Siliadin’).    
14 See Tang (n 6) 19 [31]. See also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, opened for signature 30 April 1956, 266 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 September 1956) art 7. 
15 Siliadin (n 13).    
16 See e,g, Kunarac (n 12).  
17 Tang (n 6) 21 [35]. 
18 See, eg, R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51; Nantahkum v R (2013) 279 FLR 148; R v McIvor and Tanuchit (2010) 12 DCLR (NSW) 77; Ho 
v R (2011) 219 A Crim R 74. 
19 Tang (n 6) 20 [32]. 
20 Andreas Schloenhardt and Laura-Rose Lynch ‘McIvor and Tanuchit: A Truly ‘Heinous’ Case of Sexual Slavery’ (2012) 35(1) UNSW 
Law Journal 175, 197.  
21 See Siliadin (n 13).   
22 Schloenhardt and Lynch (n 20), quoting Anne Gallagher 'Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A 
Response to James Hathaway' (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 789, 803. See also Anne Gallagher, The International 
Law of Human Trafficking (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 179-89; Andreas Schloenhardt and Jarrod Jolly, 'Honeymoon from 
Hell: Human Trafficking and Domestic Servitude in Australia' (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 671, 689. 
23 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and Sexual Servitude) Bill 1999 (Cth) [44], quoted in 
Schloenhardt and Lynch (n 20). See Siliadin (n 13); Virginia Mantouvalou ‘The Prohibition of Slavery, Servitude and Forced and 
Compulsory Labour under Article 4 ECHR’ in Filip Dorssemont, Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schömann (eds), The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Employment Relations (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1st Edition, 2013) 143, 145.  
24 Tang (n 6) 19 [29].  
25 See Explanatory Memorandum, Crimes Legislation Amendment (Slavery, Slavery-like Conditions and People Trafficking) Bill 2012. 
 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): A Guide to Rights Interpretation 22 
 
and is primarily seen as involving the use of coercion, threats or deception that cause the victim to believe 
they are not free.26  
The scope of ‘servitude’ under the Criminal Code Act was expanded to include non-sexual forms of 
servitude, in order to reflect and criminalise the diverse range of exploitative circumstances that occur. 
Protection against violations of s 18(1) of the HRA in cases involving servitude, should therefore be similarly 
interpreted as broadly as the circumstances of each case allow. A liberal approach to interpretation of s 
18(1) of the HRA is necessary to protect the human rights enshrined in the provision, particularly as the 
rights are considered absolute and non-derogable.27  
Forced Labour 
Whilst the protection against forced labour under s 18(2) of the HRA is open to some limitation,28 protection 
from violation is still seen as paramount, as reflected in the number of international legal instruments that 
protect against exploitative labour practices.29 The European Court of Human Rights has used the definition 
of ‘forced labour’ in the 1930 Forced Labour Convention30 as ‘the starting point for interpreting the term’s 
meaning’31 in s 18’s equivalent in the ECHR.32 The Forced Labour Convention defines ‘forced or compulsory 
labour’ as ‘all work or service that is exacted from a person under the menace of penalty and for which the 
person has not offered themselves voluntarily’.33 ‘Work’ encompasses all types and contexts of employment 
or occupation.34 
 
The fundamental distinguishing factor between ‘forced labour’ and ‘servitude’ lies in the ‘victim’s belief in the 
impossibility of altering their condition’.35 Servitude is therefore ‘an aggravated type of forced labour’.36 
Accordingly, the primary distinction between ‘forced’ and ‘compulsory’ labour is that in the former, the 
element of duress is actual, so the victim is mentally, physically or financially coerced into complying, 
whereas the coercive element in the latter is founded in legal regulations.37  
 
Whilst the implications of the intersection between protections under s 18(2) of the HRA and existing labour 
laws may be unclear,38 the provision should nevertheless be interpreted to protect against as many forms of 
exploitative conduct that it can appropriately permit.  
Given the presence of forced labour across many sectors in Australia, public entities should ensure that they 
do their due diligence when outsourcing services to prevent complicity in violations of s 18(2).  Furthermore, 
 
26 See Stephen Tully ‘Sex, Slavery and the High Court of Australia: The Contribution of R v Tang to International Jurisprudence’ (2010) 
10 International Criminal Law Review 403, 412; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 270.4. See also R v Huang & Anor (District Court of 
Queensland, Moyinhan J, 8 February 2017).  
27 See, eg, Ramona Vijeyarasa and Jose Miguel Bello Y Villarino ‘Modern Day Slavery? A Judicial Catchall for Trafficking, Slavery and 
Labour Exploitation: A Critique of Tang and Rantsev’ (2012) 8 Journal of International Law and International Relations 36, 55.  
28 See HRA s 18(3)(a)-(d). 
29 See, eg, Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No 29), opened for signature 28 June 1930 (entered into force 1 May 1932) (‘Forced 
Labour Convention’); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (C105), opened for signature 25 June 1957 (entered into force 17 
January 1959); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182), opened for signature 17 June 1999 (entered into force 19 
November 2000).  
30 Forced Labour Convention (n 29) art 2. See also ICCPR (n 4). Cf Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 270.6. 
31 See Van der Mussele v Belgium (European Court of Human Rights, Court (Plenary), Application No 8919/80, 23 November 1983 [32]; 
Graziani-Weiss v Austria (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 31950/06, 18 January 2012) [36]; 
Stummer v Austria (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 3745/02, 7 July 2011) [118]. See also Niklas 
Bruun and Joanna Unterschütz ‘Article 5 – Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour’ in Filip Dorssemont et al (eds), The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Employment Relation (Hart Publishing, 2019) 209, 218.  
32 ECHR (n 4) art 4.  
33Forced Labour Convention (n 29) art 2(1).  
34 See Bruun and Unterschütz (n 31) 209, 218. 
35 Siliadin (n 13) [123]. See Chowdury v Greece (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 21884/15, 30 March 
2017) [99]; CN v France (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 67724/09, 11 October 2012) [92] (‘CN 
v France’).  
36 CN v France (n 35) [91].  
37 Bruun and Unterschütz (n 31) 218-219.  
38 See, eg, Mantouvalou (n 23) 154. 
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the State should note that not all derogations of the right in accordance with s18(3) will be absolved. 
Accordingly, public entities should be mindful of the risk of contravening s 18, where compulsory labour, 
such as prison labour, is capable of being found to be unjustifiably exploitative.39 The International Labour 
Organisation provides the following factors to consider whether prison labour conditions are exploitative:40 
 
a) Prisoners are able to freely consent to the labour relationship (written consent should preferably 
be obtained) - 
‘…if a prisoner refuses the work offered there [should be] no menace of any penalty, such 
as loss of privileges or an unfavourable assessment of behaviour which could jeopardize 
any reduction in his or her sentence.’41 
b) The conditions of work are similar to those outside the prison, such as:  
§ Wages are comparable to free workers with similar skills and experience in the relevant 
position (allowing for relevant differences, e.g. due to costs for prison security 
supervision of the workers and productivity levels);   
§ Wages are paid directly to workers;  
§ Daily working hours are in accordance with the law; 
§ Workplace health and safety standards are complied with; and  
 
c) Prisoners obtain benefits such as learning new skills and the opportunity to work cooperatively in 
a controlled environment. 
Conciliated Outcomes 
The HRA does not expressly include an equivalent of the ‘right to an effective remedy’ that is contained in 
the ECHR. Thus the same positive obligations imposed on states to provide adequate protections against, 
and remedies for, rights abuses may not apply.42 However, to ensure that the enforcement of human rights in 
Australia remains consonant with international standards, victims of especially egregious rights violations, 
such as those occurring under s 18 of the HRA, should undoubtedly have avenues for appropriate redress 
available to them. 
Given the diversity of circumstances in which rights under s 18 may be derogated, claimants against public 
entities are likely to seek a broad range of remedies, although most claimants are likely to seek a conciliated 
outcome in the form of compensation. Such compensation should encompass both material and non-
material damages, 43 as those subject to forced labour usually incur extensive loss and enduring trauma from 
the emotional and physical injuries they suffer.44 Claimants may also seek compensation for rehabilitation, 
 
39 See Mantouvalou (n 23). Note the ECHR has been reluctant to find that prison labour is exploitative though, see e,g, Meier v 
Switzerland (European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 10109/14, 9 February 2016), as “the purpose of compulsory work in 
the context of the execution of custodial sentences and measures [is] to develop, maintain or promote prisoners’ capacity to resume 
working life after their release… the requirement to work… fostered appropriate social behaviour and the capacity to avoid 
reoffending”: at [14].  
40 International Labour Organisation, ‘When is it ok to use prison labour?’ Q&As on Business and Forced Labour (Web Page) 
<https://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/faqs/WCMS_DOC_ENT_HLP_FL_FAQ_EN/lang--en/index.htm#Q3>. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See, eg, Siliadin (n 13) [112]. See also Marta Johansson ‘State (In)capacity to prevent Human Trafficking: Adequate Responses to 
the Market for Servitude and Forced Labour’ in Joakim Nerfelius and Eleonor Kristoffersson, Human Rights in Contemporary 
European law (Hart Publishing, 2015) 105, 115.  
43 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Model Law against Trafficking in Persons, 5 August 2009, 55-56, cited in Inter-Agency 
Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT), Issue Paper on Providing Effective Remedies for Victims of Trafficking in 
Persons (2016) 1, 11 (‘Issue Paper on Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking’).  
44 See Ligia Kiss and Cathy Zimmerman ‘Human trafficking and labor exploitation: Toward identifying, implementing and evaluating 
effective responses’ (2019) 16(1) PLOS Medicine 1, 1. 
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such as through the provision of medical, psychological, legal or social support services.45 Some claimants 
may seek to recover unpaid wages,46 and if appropriate, other remedies available in labour law.47 Lastly, the 
value of an apology in cases such as these, where claimants have suffered grave moral wrongdoing and 
injury to their dignity, should not be overlooked:48 ‘public apologies, official declarations restoring the dignity, 
reputation and rights of the victim, and administrative sanctions for the officials involved in the violation’ of 
their rights may also be sought.49 
It is clear that a holistic approach is needed, both in terms of interpretation and the conciliated outcomes that 
are given, to address the egregious nature of slavery, servitude and forced labour in Australia. Accordingly, 
the HRA ‘should be viewed as a living instrument that is to be interpreted in light of the present-day 
conditions,’50 especially regarding the interpretation of s 18, given the fundamental values of our democratic 
society that the provision enshrines. 
 
45 United Nations Human Rights Council, Summary of the consultations held on the draft basic principles on the right to effective remedy 
for victims of trafficking in persons: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 26th sess, Agenda Items 2 
and 3, A/HR/26/18 (2 May 2014) [21], cited in ICAT, Issue Paper on Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking (n 43) 11. 
46 See, eg, Ram v D & D Indian Fine Food Pty Ltd & Trivedi [2015] FCCA 389 (‘Ram’). ‘Mr Ram was a victim of trafficking and forced 
labour, and despite the case involving the first conviction for forced labour in Australia, the perpetrator, Mr Trivedi, was only 
sentenced to community service and ordered to pay $1000 fine. After the criminal proceedings concluded, the Mr Ram obtained pro 
bono legal representation and brought a civil action against the Mr Trivedi and his company for unpaid wages and damages. A court 
ordered Mr Trivedi and his restaurant to pay $186,000 in unpaid wages to Mr Ram. The judge accepted that Mr Ram was trafficked 
from India to Australia and forced to work 12 hours a day, seven days a week, without pay for 16 months in an Indian restaurant’: 
ICAT, Issue Paper on Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking (n 31) 22. 
47 See ICAT, Issue Paper on Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking (n 31) 22 [4.4]. For example, victims of labour 
exploitation may be able to pursue compensation claims through labour law avenues instead of or in addition to criminal or civil 
action. See also Ram (n 46) for illustration of this. Key benefits of these avenues is that unsuccessful applicants are not usually 
subject to a cost order, as in other civil claim areas, and the relevant employment body is often able to pursue the action to obtain 
compensation and/or prosecution of the employer, removing the burden from victims: at ICAT 22 [4.4].   
48 Prue Vines ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The 
Journal of Law and Social Justice 3, cited in also Pam Stewart ‘Tortious Remedies for Deliberate Wrongdoing to Victims of Human 
Trafficking and Slavery in Australia’ (2011) 34(3) UNSW Law Journal 898, 908. 
49 ICAT, Issue Paper on Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Trafficking (n 43) 12. 
50 Siliadin (n 13) [121]. 
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Section 19: Freedom of Movement 
 Rui Yu 
‘19 Freedom of Movement 
Every person lawfully within Queensland has the right to move freely within Queensland 
and to enter and leave it, and has the freedom to choose where to live.’ 
 
Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) is broadly analogous to s 13 of the Human Rights 
Act 2004 (ACT) and s 12 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ( ‘Victorian 
Charter’), which are further derived from arts 12 and 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (‘ICCPR’).1  
Interpretation  
The Explanatory Note of the Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) explains that s 19 is drafted to reflect the 
intentions of art 12 of the ICCPR.2 In Australia, 'a treaty only becomes a direct source of individual rights and 
obligations when it is directly incorporated into domestic legislation.'3 Now that the internationally recognised 
right to freedom of movement has been incorporated directly into domestic legislation via the HRA, s 19 can 
be interpreted in accordance with arts 12 and 13 of the ICCPR.4  
The right imposes a negative obligation on public Queensland bodies to refrain from acting in a way that 
would unduly restrict the freedom of movement of individuals in Queensland. Further, the freedom of 
movement only applies to individuals.5 The right is not intended to impose positive obligations on public 
entities (defined in s 9 to include Queensland Police Service, Ministers, etc.) and governments by requiring 
them to take positive actions to promote free movement, such as providing free public transport.6  
Importantly, the right only applies to those who are ‘lawfully within Queensland’.7 There, are of course, 
justifiable restrictions to the freedom of movement, such as illegality, court orders, visa expiration and the 
protection of society.8 Section 13(1) of the HRA authorises limitations on all human rights, but ‘only to 
reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom’.9 
Persons ‘Lawfully within Queensland’ 
The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that:10 '[i]n principle, citizens of a State are always lawfully 
within the territory of the State.'11 Also, individuals 'who entered the State illegally, but whose status has been 
 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) arts 12, 13 (‘ICCPR’). 
2 Explanatory Note, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld), 20. 
3 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287. 
4 ICCPR (n 1) arts 12, 13.  
5 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) s 11.  
6 ‘Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (IP 46): Protections from statutory encroachment’, 
Australian Law Reform Commission (Report, 8 December 2014) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/protections-statutory-
encroachment-1#_ftn12> (‘Traditional Rights and Freedoms’). 
7 ‘Freedom of movement’, Queensland Human Rights Commission (Fact Sheet, July 2019) <https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/your-
rights/human-rights-law/freedom-of-movement> (‘Freedom of movement’). 
8 Ibid. 
9 HRA (n 5) s 13(1). 
10 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), 2 November 1999, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45139c394.html> (‘General Comment No 27’). 
11 Ibid [4]. 
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regularised… must be considered to be lawfully within the territory for the purposes of article 12.'12 In relation 
to the equivalent provision in the Victorian Charter, it has been said that the following people may be held not 
to be ‘lawfully within the State’:  
• where legislation prohibits a person; or 
• if they are unlawful non-citizens breaching the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).13  
Despite this, the High Court has held that unlawful non-citizens should not be permanently detained without 
clear Parliamentary intention and acknowledgement from the legislature that addresses the consequences of 
such detention,14 which is in line with art 13 of the ICCPR.15 Thus, the principle of legality has provided some 
protection of individuals’ right to movement prior to the HRA.16 
When the right may be restricted 
The freedom of movement is not absolute;17 s 43 of the HRA specifies that the Parliament has the power to 
make an override declaration, but only in exceptional circumstances such as ‘war, a state of emergency, or 
an exceptional crisis situation constituting a threat to public safety, health or order’.18 Article 12.3 of the 
ICCPR states that ‘freedom of movement shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order…, public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the present Covenant.’19  
In Celepli v Sweden,20 a Turkish man falsely suspected of terrorism claimed that Sweden had violated his 
human rights for restricting his movement by ordering him to report to the police three times a week and not 
giving him the right to appeal despite never being officially charged. Sweden argued that Celepli’s claim 
under art 12 was untenable, since he could ‘only be regarded as having been lawfully in the country to the 
extent that he complied with the restrictions imposed upon him’21 and that the restrictions were necessary ‘for 
the protection of national security and public order’ under art 12.3.22 Ultimately the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (‘HRC’) held that the author was lawfully in the territory of Sweden, for the purposes of art 
12(1), of the ICCPR, only under the restrictions placed upon him by the State party.23 Bearing in mind that 
the State party had invoked reasons of national security to justify the restrictions on the author's freedom of 
movement, the Committee found that the restrictions to which the author was subjected were compatible 
with those allowed under art 12(3) of the ICCPR.24 Thus, an ‘alien’ can be regarded as ‘lawfully within the 
State’ but still have their freedom of movement validly restricted due to national security reasons, and as 
long as the State can justify the difference in treatment.25  
The HRC has stated that laws authorising restrictions: ‘must conform to the principle of proportionality; must 
be appropriate to achieve their protective function; must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those 
which might achieve the desired result; and must be proportionate to the interest to be protected’.26 For 
example, counter-terrorism laws and quarantine laws will inevitably limit individuals’ movement,27 but laws 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 ‘Section 12 – Freedom of movement’, Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (Charter Guide, 21 July 2017) 
<http://humanrights.vgso.vic.gov.au/charter-guide/charter-rights-by-section/section-12-freedom-movement>. 
14 Plaintiff M 47/2012 v Director General of Security [2012] HCA 46, [529]. 
15 ICCPR (n 1) art 13.  
16 ‘Traditional Rights and Freedoms—Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (ALRC Report 129)’, Australian Law Reform 
Commission (Report, 12 January 2016) 190. <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/traditional-rights-and-freedoms-encroachments-
by-commonwealth-laws-alrc-report-129/7-freedom-of-movement/>. (‘ALRC Report 129’). 
17 Ibid 191.  
18 Ibid s 43.  
19 ICCPR (n 1) art 12.3; ALRC Report 129 (n 16) 195.  
20 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991(1994) (‘Celepli v Sweden’).  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid; See also ICCPR (n 1) art 12.3.  
23 Celepli v Sweden (n 22). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid; See also ICCPR (n 1) art 13. 
26 General Comment No 27 (n 10) [13]-[14]. 
27 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.5(3)(a)-(c).  
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requiring passports to be surrendered automatically upon bankruptcy may not fall within the permissible 
restrictions of art 12.3.28 The Victorian decision of DPP v Kaba concerned a man who was questioned by 
police during a random check.29 Justice Bell held that the coercive questioning from police, in circumstances 
where the individual was made to feel that they could not cease cooperating or leave, breached the 
applicant’s right to freedom of movement under the Victorian Charter.30 
Comparison with s 92 of the Constitution 
Prior to the existence of the HRA, the freedom of movement was tentatively protected under s 92 of the 
Constitution, which provides: 
‘[o]n the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the 
States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.’31  
This construction shares similarities with s 19, in that movement must be lawful, and ‘absolute’ freedom does 
not warrant ‘anarchy’. It is worth noting that the meaning of ‘absolutely free trade and commerce’ is different 
to ‘absolutely free intercourse’.32 The freedoms under the Constitution are subject to competing public 
interests, 33 and will be subject to the best interests of the child where relevant;34 noting that cases involving 
the relocation of separated parents and child custody have historically relied upon s 92.35 
In Cole v Whitfield,36 the term ‘intercourse’ was construed as meaning ‘to pass to and fro among the States 
without burden, hindrance or restriction’.37 However, such freedom is subject to reasonable limitations. In 
Miller v TCN Channel Nine,38 Murphy J proposed that there was a freedom of movement ‘in and between 
every part of the Commonwealth’ implied by the provision.39 However, the High Court in Kruger v 
Commonwealth – a case involving a question of whether a freedom of movement and association existed for 
indigenous children who were part of the stolen generations – was split 3:3 on the right’s implied existence 
under Australian law.40 The ambivalent nature of the freedom of movement prior to the HRA is aptly 
described by Williams and Hume:  
‘[there is a] lack of a clear textual basis for such a freedom and for the incidents of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of federalism which would support it, and an implicit view that 
the Constitution’s federalism is not intended to protect individuals’.41 
Conciliated Outcomes 
There are a number of situations in which an applicant may seek conciliation in reliance on s 19 of the HRA. 
For example, persons with disability or mobility impairment may bring a claim under the HRA if they are 
prevented from accessing premises and goods or services due to the absence of any special access 
provisions. In these circumstances, the most appropriate remedy will usually be an apology and an 
undertaking to provide special measures to ensure access to persons with impairment. Examination of 
conciliated outcomes reached in complaints brought under anti-discrimination legislation provides examples 
 
28 ALRC Report 129 (n 16) 196. 
29 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba [2014] VSC 52, [458] (‘DPP v Kaba’). 
30 Ibid. See also Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 12 (‘Victorian Charter’). 
31 Australian Constitution s 92.  
32 ALRC Report 129 (n 16) 192.  
33 Ibid; Cunliffe v The Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 307–308 (Mason CJ). See also AMS v. AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160. 
34 B v B (1997) 21 Fam LR 676. 
35 AMS v. AIF (n 33). 
36 (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
37 Cole v Whitefield (n 38) [23], citing Gratwick v Johnson (1945) 70 CLR 1, 17. 
38 [1986] 161 CLR 556. 
39 Ibid [11]. 
40 Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1.  
41 George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 120; 
ALRC Report 129 (n 18) 192-193. 
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of the types of undertakings that may arise in these circumstances, including the installation of unisex 
accessible toilets and support rails, the provision of special parking spaces for persons with a disability, 
allowing assistance animals inside premises, and the provision of sign-language interpreters at public 
performances.42   
In circumstances where a public authority has breached an individual’s freedom of movement and the 
breach cannot be justified on public policy grounds, an appropriate outcome may be an apology and an 
undertaking aimed at preventing future breaches, such as the provision of additional staff training or changes 
to departmental policies. In cases where the breach was substantial or caused significant mental distress or 








42 Conciliation Register, Australian Human Rights Commission (Register, 2019) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-register>. 
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Section 21: Freedom of Expression 
Campbell Halliday, Monet Mooney and Thomas Parnell 
‘21 Freedom of expression 
(1) Every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference. 
(2) Every person has the right to freedom of expression which includes the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, whether within or outside 
Queensland and whether— 
(a) orally; or 
(b) in writing; or 
(c) in print; or 
(d) by way of art; or 
(e) in another medium chosen by the person.’ 
Section 21 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) protects the ability to express and hold opinions and 
is vital to the operation of democratic societies. The section is constituted by two distinct rights: the right of 
every person to hold an opinion without interference;1 and the right of every person to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, no matter the medium of communication.2 The latter right is 
generally referred to as the ‘freedom of expression’. Both rights are modelled upon art 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).3  
Interpretation  
A right to hold an opinion 
Section 21(1) protects both the right to hold an opinion and the right to not hold an opinion.4 This right relates 
to a person’s autonomy, and may be enlivened where a person’s opinion is involuntarily influenced by a 
public authority, or where legislation penalises or disadvantages a person because of their opinions.5 The 
ICCPR proclaims this right as absolute, and unable to ever be interfered with, due to the unjustifiability of 
interfering with a person’s internal autonomy.6 This may be relevant to a determination on the 
‘reasonableness’ of any limitation, under s 13 of the HRA.  
Once the opinion is expressed, the second right is enlivened.   
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 21(1) (‘HRA’).  
2 Ibid s 21(2).  
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 19.1 (‘ICCPR’). 
4 RT (Zimbabwe) v Home Secretary [2013] 1AC 152, [43]. 
5 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, ‘Section 15 – Freedom of Expression’ Human Rights (Web Page, 22 August 2017) 
<http://humanrights.vgso.vic.gov.au/charter-guide/charter-rights-by-section/section-15-freedom-expression>. 
6 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 102nd sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011) [9].  
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Freedom of Expression 
The freedom of expression, contained in s 21(2), is more complex because the expression of an opinion, 
observation or belief can interfere with the rights of others. Consequently, it is the more litigated aspect of the 
freedom of expression. Jurisprudence relating to the constitutionally implied freedom of political 
communication,7 United States jurisprudence,8 and the equivalent section of the Charter of Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’) 9 is relevant to the manner in which Queensland decision-
makers should interpret s 21(2). In these jurisdictions, judgments focus on the meaning of ‘expression’ and 
the validity of content-based limitations upon expression.  
The following analysis reveals that s 21(2) should be interpreted more broadly than the implied freedom of 
political communication, but more narrowly than the First Amendment in the United States, as it is subject to 
‘reasonable limits’ under s 13 of the HRA.10 
What is ‘expression’? 
Freedom of expression protects a broad range of conduct and speech which aims to seek, receive and 
impart information. The section covers any act which is capable of conveying some meaning11 although, 
when assessing this, there is no requirement to prove that the specific act actually conveyed the correct 
meaning to a specific person; rather it is sufficient that a reasonable member of the public would perceive 
that the act seeks to convey one or more messages.12 Both the acts of painting over advertising posters and 
wearing a tent have been held to constitute forms of expression.13 Indeed, there are few limits on what 
constitutes ‘expression’ as it is generally interpreted broadly.14 Criminal conduct is perhaps the most obvious 
exception, due to the ‘destructive impact [of criminal conduct] upon society’s most cherished democratic 
values’.15 Similar considerations have led Canadian courts to hold that violence, though capable of 
conveying meaning, is not protected by the freedom of expression.16 However, not all criminal conduct 
should be excluded from the protection offered by s 21(2). Minor criminal conduct, such as peaceful protest 
without a permit, may and should constitute expression, as the ‘unlawfulness does not detract from the fact 
that the protest is intended to convey a message’.17  
In addition to its protection of the expression of information, s 21(2) includes a freedom to seek and receive 
information, similarly to s 15(2) of the Victorian Charter and art 19.2 of the ICCPR. In XYZ v Victoria Police, 
Bell J declared that this aspect of the right incorporates an implied positive right to access government-held 
information, with a corresponding positive obligation on the government to provide access to that 
information.18 The circumstances in which this obligation arises were not exhaustively described, but include 
times when information engages the public interest, or when the seeker has a legitimate interest in the 
information.19 This right exists independently of freedom of information legislation, however, it is capable of 
being observed by reference to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).20  
 
7 Australian Constitution ss 7, 24. 
8 United States Constitution amend I.  
9 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 15. 
10 HRA (n 1) s 13. 
11 Magee v Delaney [2012] VSC 407 at [62]. 
12 Ibid [63]. 
13 Kerrison v Melbourne City Council [2014] FCAFC 130 at [232]; Magee (n 11) at [65]. 
14 See the Victorian case of Kuyken v Lay [2013] VCAT 1972 at [205] – [210] and American case Village of Skokie v National Socialist 
Party of America 373 NE 2d 21(Ill S Ct, 1978) and contrast with the Canadian cases of R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452; R v Keegstra 
[1990] 3 SCR 697. 
15 Magee v Delaney (n 11) at [62].  
16 Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927; R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
17 Alistair Pound and Kylie Evans, Annotated Victorian Charter of Rights (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2018) 144. 
18 XYZ v Victoria Police [2010] VCAT 255 [528] – [530], [554] – [558]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid [515]-[559] and [560]-[573]. 
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In circumstances where the conduct falls outside of ‘expression’ as defined by precedents, or where the 
obligation to provide information is uncertain, the question will be whether imposing the limitation is ‘justified 
in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.21  
Justifiable Limitations 
In the United States, the freedom of expression is contained in the First Amendment of the Constitution, 
preventing Congress from making any ‘law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’.22 This is a 
negative, injunctive right and is absolute and personal, embodying: 
‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials’.23  
The United States’ right goes further, however, protecting hateful and defamatory speech,24 as well as that 
required for the functioning of a democratic government. Thus, it is evident that the United States courts 
have construed the right strictly and inflexibly, in contrast to other jurisdictions, like Canada, Victoria and the 
ACT, which apply a ‘proportionality’ or ‘reasonableness’ test. Given the embrace of such a test in Australian 
jurisdictions, and its presence in s 13 of the HRA, it would be consistent to interpret the Queensland freedom 
of expression in a similar manner, distancing it from the First Amendment.  
What about the implied freedom of political communication? 
In 1992, the High Court of Australia recognised the existence of a freedom of political communication implied 
from sections 7, 24, 64 and 128 of the Australian Constitution.25 The High Court found that such a right, 
allowing free and unrestricted communication about public affairs and politics between all members of the 
community, was necessary to uphold a system of representative and reasonable government. Therefore, the 
‘class of communication protected by the implied freedom in practical terms is wide’.26 However, that right is 
not absolute, but limited to what is necessary and may not extend to non-political or non-governmental 
communication or to non-federal communication.27 Further, it is not an individual ‘right’, but a restraint upon 
the exercise of legislative power,28 enabling courts to challenge the validity of Commonwealth and state laws 
on the basis that they burden the freedom of political communication and therefore, are inconsistent with the 
Constitution.  
In deciding whether the freedom has been infringed, the issue is the effect of the law on political 
communication in general, not its effect on the method of expression.29 For example, when the Federal Court 
found that requiring protesters to purchase permits required citizens to seek permission to express political 
opinions, the High Court held that they had conflated the freedom with an individual right.30 Instead, the 
question was whether the by-laws requiring protesters to obtain permits were reasonable and proportionate 
restrictions upon the freedom.31 The proportionality test is echoed in s 13(2) of the HRA, and requires that 
there not be a reasonable practicable means of achieving the same purpose which has a less restrictive 
effect on the freedom, balancing the importance of the purpose served by the restricting law and the extent 
 
21 HRA (n 1) s13(1). 
22 United States Constitution (n 8) amend I. 
23 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969).  
24 Village of Skokie v National Socialist Party of America, 373 NE 2d 21(Ill S Ct, 1978) and New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 
(1964). 
25 Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
26 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1 [67]. 
27 Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (Report No 129, 
December 2015), 81. 
28 Ibid 80 and APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2005) 224 LR 322, 381.  
29 Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 [80]. 
30 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (n 26) [222]. 
31 Ibid.  
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of the restriction.32 Therefore, it appears that ‘the permitted restrictions [in the HRA] are not relevantly 
different from the permitted limitations on the implied freedom of political communication’.33 
What should Queensland do?  
Two polarised positions regarding reasonable limitations upon the freedom of expression have emerged; the 
incredibly broad American position, which abhors any content-based limitation upon the freedom of 
expression and the rather narrow Australian implied freedom of political communication, limited to political 
communication necessary for the effective operation of representative and responsible government.34 The 
freedom of expression under s 21(2) should be interpreted by the courts as occupying the middle-ground 
between these positions; it extends to protect all content, not merely that which is political, but is subject to 
reasonable content-based limitations under s 13 that would not be permissible under the First Amendment. 
Article 19.3 of the ICCPR allows the freedom of expression to be restricted where necessary, for the respect 
of the rights or reputations of others, and for the protection of national security, public order or public health 
or morals.35 Although these restrictions are not included in the HRA, despite being included in the Victorian 
Charter, they should nevertheless inform the general application of the general limitation to s 21(2).36 
Limitations on some offensive expressions should also be considered reasonable, particularly where the 
expression is ‘unquestionably antithetical to freedom, democracy and the rule of law that sustains our 
society’.37 Expressions which are vilifying are one example, as it is: 
‘antithetical to the fundamental principles of equality, democratic pluralism and respect for 
individual dignity which lies at the heart of the protection of human rights’.38  
However, expressions during public debate have increased value, because they are essential to create an 
informed citizenry, which is vital to the functioning of a representative and responsible government. The 
requirement of reasonableness and proportionality thus lies at the heart of the operation of any limitations 
imposed upon the freedom of expression, noting the fundamental nature of the right in a free and democratic 
society.   
Conciliated Outcomes 
Under the Act, a person may make a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission39 for breach 
of s 21 by a public entity.40 If they satisfy the requirements outlined in s 65,41 the commissioner may conduct 
a conciliation conference42 in order to resolve the complaint in a way that is informal, quick and efficient.43 
Noting that conciliation is only suitable for cases of minor misconduct and cannot set precedents, the 
process allows for ‘repair and improvement of public confidence’ in the relevant public entity’.44 
A complainant may be seeking a variety of conciliated outcomes, as any outcome that the parties agree to is 
available. For instance, in circumstances where a government employee is dismissed for posting 
controversial opinions on Facebook which are protected under s 21, they may seek reinstatement or re-
employment, or if the situation has become untenable, compensation.  
 
32 McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34.  
33 Muldoon v Melbourne City Council (2013) 217 FCR 450 [450], per North J. 
34 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560. 
35 ICCPR (n 3) art 19.3. 
36 HRA (n 1) s 13.  
37 Magee v Delaney (n 11) [89]. 
38 Alistair Pound and Kylie Evans, Annotated Victorian Charter of Rights (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2018) 145-146.  
39 HRA (n 1) s 64. 
40 Ibid s 9.  
41 Ibid s 65. 
42 Ibid s 79. 
43 Ibid s 80.  
44 Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the external oversight of police 
corruption and misconduct in Victoria (Parliamentary Paper No 432, September 2018) 321.   
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Alternatively, if a claimant was arrested for taking part in a peaceful protest in a manner that is protected by s 
21, they may seek a conciliation conference with a representative of the Queensland Police Service (‘QPS’) 
to receive an apology for an infringement of their rights, or with the hope of the QPS agreeing to review 
crowd-control procedures, police training policies or compensation depending upon the severity of any harm.  
Similarly, a person reprimanded by a University for expressing opinions or political views that are protected 
by s 21 could ask the University to devise and release guidelines on the parameters of speech protected by 
s 21, to further the University’s understanding of the freedom and make the parameters of protected speech 
clear to students and staff. Moreover, they may seek to be compensated or reinstated.45  
Regarding the implied right to access information under s 21, a person who is denied government-held 
information that is in the public interest or that they have a legitimate interest in may request a conciliation 
conference to seek access to that information.  
Clearly, this complaints mechanism provides complainants with the ability to seek a wide variety of 
conciliated outcomes and avoids the onerous and costly process of legal proceedings, and therefore, is a 
valuable inclusion in the HRA. 
 
45 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Political belief or activity case studies’, Case Studies (Web Page, 31 January 2019) 
<https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/resources/case-studies/political-belief-or-activity>.   
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Section 22: The Right to Peaceful Assembly  
Jonathan McMillan and Sienna McInnes-Smith  
‘22 Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association 
(1) Every person has the right to peaceful assembly  
(2) Every person has the right to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and join trade unions.’ 
 
Section 22 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) in Queensland provides two limbs: the right to 
peaceful assembly in s 22(1) and the right to freedom of association in s 22(2). The wording of s 22 of the 
HRA is similar to that in arts 21 and 22 of the ICCPR and almost identical to art 11(1) of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’), enacted by the European Union. 
However, art 11(2) of the ECHR is not included in s 22 of the HRA. Equivalent rights are also found in the 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’)1 and the Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT) (‘ACT Act’).2 These rights are closely related to other fundamental freedoms recognised in the 
HRA and in the common law, serving the same values that underpin our democracy.  
Interpretation  
Australian Jurisdictions 
The Queensland right is identical to that in the Victorian Charter and very similar to the ACT Act. The right to 
peaceful assembly has been interpreted in those jurisdictions as the right of individuals to gather for a 
common purpose or to pursue common goals, such as protesting or meeting.3 This includes gatherings in 
public or private, but does not include ‘assemblies’ of just one person.4 Although the original purpose of the 
right was to protect peaceful demonstration and participation in democratic processes, it has been 
recognised that the right may extend to assemblies of a social, cultural, religious, charitable or professional 
nature, as confining the right to political matters would be an ‘unacceptably narrow interpretation’ of the 
right.5  
The freedom of association protects the right of all persons to voluntarily group together for a common 
purpose and to form and join an association.6 It applies to all forms of associations, specifically including 
trade unions. Not all organisations, however, constitute associations and the right will not be enlivened 
without an association to which it can attach. In the ACT, the freedom of association also includes the right 
not to join an association.7 The ACT Human Rights Commission has endorsed the case of Young, James 
and Webster v The UK, in which the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) held that the notion of 
‘freedom’ implies the exercise of choice.8 Thus, the freedom of association also encompasses its corollary: 
 
1 Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 16 (‘Victorian Charter’). 
2 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 15 (‘ACT Act’).  
3 ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘Right to Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of Association (s.15)’ (Fact sheet) 
<https://hrc.act.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Section-15-Right-to-freedom-of-assembly.pdf> and Victorian Government 
Solicitor’s Office, ‘Section 16 – Peaceful assembly and freedom of association’ (Charter Guide, 22 August 2017) 
<https://humanrights.vgso.vic.gov.au/charter-guide/charter-rights-by-section/section-16-peaceful-assembly-and-freedom-
association> .  
4 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 3).  
5 Countryside Alliance v the UK [2009] ECHR 2068.  
6 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 3) and Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n 3).  
7 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 3). 
8 Young, James and Webster v The UK [1981] ECHR 4. 
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the freedom to not join an association, protecting people from being compelled to join groups to which they 
do not want to belong. Furthermore, the freedom does not give a right to join any association, as 
associations are able to administer their own affairs, set their rules of membership and decide upon 
admission and expulsion.9 
At the Commonwealth level, the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association are related to the 
implied right to freedom of political communication, given by ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 of the Australian 
Constitution. The implied freedom appears to receive the same protection as the rights in the Victorian 
Charter, as the permitted restrictions upon those rights have been held to be not relevantly different to those 
on the implied freedom,10 with the same proportionality analysis required when determining whether an 
infringement has occurred.11  
International Jurisdictions 
The jurisprudence that exists, particularly in relation to the right as expressed in the ECHR, supports the view 
that the right imposes a positive duty on public authorities to take reasonable and appropriate measures to 
ensure that the right to peaceful assembly can be exercised by, for example, protecting demonstrators from 
physical violence or setting up areas for people to peacefully assemble.12 However, the UN Human Rights 
Committee is divided as to whether the right as it is given in arts 21 and 22 of the ICCPR also protects the 
right to strike. While a majority has taken the view that it does not, the dissenting view has been expressed 
as follows:  
‘the exercise of the right requires that some measure of concerted activities be allowed; 
otherwise it could not serve its purpose’.13 
The latter view would appear to support the ECtHR’s rhetoric about the right giving ‘strong protection’ to the 
right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. This is evident in Primov v Russia,14 where the 
ECtHR found that the ‘Government should not have the power to ban a demonstration because they 
consider that the demonstrator’s message is wrong’.15 The Court believed that this principle was especially 
relevant where the target of the criticism within the demonstration is the same authority which has the power 
to deny the public gathering.16 Thus, because the right encapsulates the public discussion of political matters 
within its protective ambit, it ‘must enjoy strong protection’17 and prohibiting a public assembly on the 
grounds of its ‘message’ will rarely be justified.18  
In addition to containing a positive duty to provide for the freedom of association, the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights also uniquely contains a negative right in art 20(2). The negative right provides that ‘No 
one may be compelled to belong to an association’. While the HRA contains no express equivalent, the 
freedom of association has also been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as encompassing 
a negative right, being the right not to join associations, including trade unions.19 Therefore, there is 
international jurisprudence which has been followed in the ACT (see above), supporting such an 
interpretation of the Queensland right. However, it seems that the negative right does not generally extend to 
the compulsory membership of a professional body, particularly if the association is a professional 
 
9 The ACT Human Rights Commission here follows Cheall v United Kingdom (1985) 42 Eur Comm HR 178. 
10 Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 [112] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ. 
11 Muldoon v Melbourne City Council [2013] FCA 994 [450] per North J.  
12 Platform 'Arzte für das Leben' v. Austria (1988) 126 Eur Court HR (ser A); (1991) 13 EHRR 204. 
13 JB v. Canada, Human Rights Committee, Communication No 118/1982, UN Doc. CCPR/C/28/D/118/1982 (18 July 1986). 
14 Primov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, 17391/06, 12 June 2014). 
15 Ibid [135].  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
18 ‘Case Digest: ECHR Decisions on Demonstrations, Riots and Protests: January 2013 – October 2014,’ Open Society Justice Initiative 
(case digest) 4 <https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/87cdaa06-0500-496c-a3cb-02d216b40842/case-digest-ECHR-protest-
11212014.pdf>. 
19 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom (n 8) [51]-[55]; see also Sigudur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland (1993) 264 Eur Court HR 
(ser A) [35]; (1993) 16 EHRR 462 [35]; Gustafsson v. Sweden (1996) II Eur Court HR 637 [42]-[44]; (1996) 22 EHRR 409 [45]. 
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regulator.20 That is because professional organisations requiring compulsory membership for an individual to 
practice within the profession are not considered ‘associations’, as they are typically founded by the 
legislature and serve a public function, safeguarding professional standards.21 This means that a 
Queensland professional person would not be able to rely on s 22 to justify their refusal to join such a 
regulatory body. Note that in Australia, the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) provides that persons are free to not 
become members of industrial associations.22 
Limitations 
There are several limitations which have been applied to the rights contained in s 22 in other jurisdictions.  
While s 22 is very similar to the right contained in art 11 of the ECHR, it does not adopt art 11(2) of the 
ECHR, also identically represented in art 22(2) of the ICCPR. Those articles prevent the right from being 
limited except in circumstances that: 
‘are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.  
These limitations are narrower and more specific than the general allowance for limitations given in s 13 of 
the HRA, those that are ‘reasonable and demonstrably justifiable’. They therefore implement a vital limitation 
on public entities, but perhaps give stronger protection against them than the Queensland right.  
It should be remembered that it is a fundamental feature of a democratic society that the people are free to 
raise awareness about matters of serious public concern, particularly by way of public assembly and 
association. This means that the narrower European limitations should be given weight when considering 
whether a limitation under s 13 of the HRA upon s 22 is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable, particularly 
so when considering the interaction of the right with the Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 (Qld) (‘PAA’) which 
regulates peaceful assemblies in Queensland.  
The Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 (Qld) 
Under the PAA, the right to peaceful assembly is more specifically limited than under the HRA, being ‘subject 
only to such restrictions as are necessary and reasonable in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, public order or the protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons’. Because the PAA must be 
interpreted consistently with the HRA, the way in which the right is interpreted in the latter will affect the way 
in which the powers under the former are exercised. Therefore, when the Commissioner of Police is 
considering whether or not to give permission for an assembly to occur under the PAA,23 they must consider 
the rights, and any reasonable limitations, that apply under the HRA.  
Proportionality  
While the need to apply for authorisation to assemble is not itself a violation of the right, particularly if it 
allows public authorities to ensure that the meeting remains peaceful,24 disproportionate limitations may 
constitute violations where they fail to correctly balance the right with the purpose of the limitation. One 
example is the case of Bukta v Hungary, in which the organisers of an assembly were unable to comply with 
a three-day notice requirement because the demonstration had been organised in response to the Prime 
Minister’s announcement that he would be attending a particular function the following day.25 The court held 
 
20 Lord Lester of Herne Hill and David Pannick (eds), Human Rights Law and Practice (2nd ed, Butterworths, 2004) 383 and 
accompanying notes; see also Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 43 Eur Court HR (ser A).  
21 Le Compte v Belgium [1981] ECHR 3. 
22 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 346.  
23 Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 (Qld) s 10-13, particularly s 11 which does not oblige the Commissioner to attach conditions to a notice 
permitting the assembly.  
24 Rassemblement Jurassien and Unite Jurassienne v Switzerland (1979) 17 Eur Comm HR 108 [3]. 
25 Bukta v Hungary [2007] ECHR 25691/04.  
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that in dispersing the peaceful assembly because of the inability to provide sufficient notice, the authority had 
disproportionately restricted the right to peaceful assembly.26 However, in Appleby v United Kingdom, the 
ECtHR found that not permitting an environmental group to petition in a privately owned shopping centre did 
not infringe their right to peaceful assembly as they had the option of petitioning elsewhere.27 Therefore, 
correctly balancing competing rights and interests is essential to achieving a proportionate restriction of the 
right where necessary.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
The following are conciliated outcomes which a client may seek when making a complaint about a public 
entity under on s 22 of the HRA.  
• Where the complainant has had their right to peaceful assembly violated by an act of the 
Commissioner of Police, they may seek an undertaking by the commissioner to revise their approach 
to authorising public assemblies. This may require the Commissioner to include other people in the 
decision-making process under ss 11 and 13 of the PAA, for example an independent advisory 
committee, to improve the application process and ensure an unbiased outcome (by preventing 
demonstrations from being prohibited due to their ‘message’). This would be especially important if 
the complainant regularly organised public assemblies regarding political matters. The complainant 
may also require the Commissioner to pay compensation to the organisers of such an event, and 
any legal fees incurred. Public assemblies are often organised by volunteer groups, who lack the 
resources to seek advice on or defend their rights.   
• Additionally, the Commissioner could also apologise to the organisers of a disallowed or banded 
public assembly. Public protests often involve a number of passionate people protesting emotive 
issues. The refusal or curtailment of their right to express themselves on this issue might have led to 
a great deal of offence and anger. By apologising, the Commissioner may ameliorate some of that 
anger, and show respect for their rights and concerns. This is particularly so where an assembly has 
been disbanded and any recalcitrant members unlawfully arrested for continuing to protest without 
permission. By issuing an apology, the Commissioner may save the police force the cost defending 
allegations of unlawful imprisonment.  
• Furthermore, the conciliation process could be used as an informal, friendly space within which the 
Commissioner could communicate their concerns over the demonstration, and the organisers could 
articulate their objections to any conditions which have been imposed. A conciliated agreement 
could be reached which authorised the assembly, with any appropriate conditions outlined. By giving 
the protestors a greater say in the negotiation process, it may make them more willing to comply with 
the resulting conditions.  
• Finally, where the complainant has had their freedom of association violated, they may wish to 
receive an apology from the offending public entity, recognising any hurt caused to the complainant 
by the violation. They may also request compensation to remedy the violation, allowing them to join 
the association (such things often require payment of a membership fee). Further, were Queensland 
to adopt the ACT’s interpretation of the freedom as importing both a positive and negative right, a 
complainant who has been unwillingly compelled to join an association may be freed from that 
obligation and may seek compensation (for example for their membership fees).  
 
26 Ibid [38].  
27 Appleby v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 222.  
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Section 23: The Right to Take Part in Public Life 
Frankie Harris  
‘23 Taking part in public life 
(1) Every person in Queensland has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without 
discrimination to participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives. 
(2) Every eligible person has the right, and is to have the opportunity, without 
discrimination— 
(a) to vote and be elected at periodic State and local government elections that guarantee 
the free expression of the will of the electors; and 
(b) to have access, on general terms of equality, to the public service and to public 
office.’ 
 
Section 23 of the Human Rights Act (Qld) (‘HRA’) relates to the right to take part in public life. The section 
creates two different classes of rights holders. First, every person in Queensland,1 and secondly, every 
eligible person in Queensland.2 This is consistent with s 18 of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibility (‘Victorian Charter’)3 and is analogous to the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘ACT Act’).4 
Although the ACT Act does differ slightly in its terminology, the scope of the right remains comparable. 
Therefore, s 23 appears to create ‘three different, but overlapping rights’.5   
Interpretation 
Right to Participation 
The first limb of s 23 in the HRA is applicable to all people in Queensland regardless of citizenship, age or 
incarceration. It states that every person has the right to participate in ‘public affairs’. The importance of s 
23(1), hence, lies within the meaning of ‘public affairs’. 
The HRA does not define ‘public affairs’, so international and domestic jurisprudence may be utilised in 
interpreting its meaning,6 particularly as s 23 is directly based upon art 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).7 ‘Public affairs’ in art 25 of the ICCPR is interpreted as extending to all 
features of public administration, including the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers.8 
This wide ambit given to its interpretation is further highlighted through the availability of both direct and 
indirect participation. Examples of direct participation include participating in popular assemblies, public 
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 23(1) (‘HRA’). 
2 Ibid s 23(2). 
3 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 18 (‘Victorian Charter’). 
4 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 17 (‘ACT Act’). 
5 ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘Collation of Factsheets on each right under the ACT Human Rights Act 2004’ (Fact sheet, February 
2015) 27. 
6 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14B; Simeon Beckett, ‘Interpreting Legislation Consistently with Human Rights’ (2007) 58 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 43, 44. Here, it is determined that both the ACT Act and the Victorian Charter 
encourage international jurisprudence. 
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 25. See also Explanatory Note, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld), 21. 
8 UN Human Rights Commission, General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal 
access to public service, 57th sess, UN Doc CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (12th July 1996) (‘General Comment No 25’).    
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debate and the ability to pose a question at council consultations. Indirect participation is achieved through 
‘freely chosen representatives’9 and involves the exercise of governmental powers and the implementation of 
policy decisions.10 The capacity of the chosen representatives is limited only to exercising the specific 
powers allocated to them,11 reflecting the ‘indirect’ nature of their role.   
It is important to note that s 23(1) does not include the right to social or community life,12 nor the general right 
to access private information related to public affairs,13 however, the right to public affairs is inherently linked 
to other provisions in the HRA, namely, the freedom of movement,14 freedom of expression,15 the right to 
peaceful assembly and freedom of association.16 Therefore, claims brought under s 23 may also involve 
consideration of those related provisions.  
Right to vote 
The Right to Elect 
The right to vote under section 23(2)(a) does not include the right to not vote.17 To be declared an ‘eligible 
person’ under this right, the person must be on the electoral roll,18 and therefore an Australian citizen over 
the age of 18.19 Furthermore, in Queensland, eligibility is restricted if the person is currently incarcerated.20 
Queensland is the only state in Australia that entirely disenfranchises prisoners from voting at state and local 
government elections, and this limitation will need to be considered reasonable and justifiable under section 
13(1) if it is comply with the HRA.21  
In order to uphold and give effect to the right, it is necessary that the Queensland government ensures that 
every eligible person has the capability to exercise their vote. Examples of procedures relevant to achieving 
this include disability access;22 literacy and elder assistance; and voter education. The UN Human Rights 
Commission has said that sufficient information should be readily available in regards to both the voting 
process and the candidates.23 In addition to these active measures, the right requires that elections are 
conducted on a periodic basis with the voters being capable to vote for any candidate with the use of their 
free will.  
The Right to be Elected 
The right to be elected is deemed a ‘passive electoral right,’24 thereby supporting that the protection it holds 
for its ‘eligible people’ is not as stringent. Here ‘eligible people’ is limited through the Parliament of 
Queensland Act where it is declared that imprisonment can alter one’s eligibility status.25 This right ensures 
that that eligible voters can realise the ‘free choice and election of candidates’.26 
 
9 HRA (n 1) s 23(1). 
10 General Comment No. 25 (n 8) art 5. 
11 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, ‘Charter Guidelines. Section 18: Taking Part in Public Life’, Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Guide (Web Page, 2017) <http://humanrights.vgso.vic.gov.au/charter-guide/charter-rights-by-section/section-18-
taking-part-public-life>.  
12 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 5) 28. 
13 Law Society of the ACT & Treasury Directorate and NRMA Insurance (Appeal) [2013] ACAT 36, [14]-[19]. 
14 HRA (n 1) s 19. 
15 Ibid s 21. 
16 Ibid s 22. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) s 106(1)(a) (‘Electoral Act’). 
19 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93(1). 
20 Electoral Act (n 18) s 106(3). 
21 HRA (n 1) s 13(1). 
22 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 
2008), art 9. 
23 UN Human Rights Commission (n 8) art 12. 
24 ‘European Court of Human Rights’, Factsheet - Right to Free Elections (Web page, May 2013) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Free_elections_ENG.pdf>. 
25 Parliament of Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 64(2). 
26 UN Human Rights Commission (n 8) art 15. 
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The Right to Access the Public Service and Office  
While the definition of an ‘eligible person’ is clear when considering the right to vote, it is less clear how it 
applies to the right to access the public service and office. It seems that it is to be determined by relevant 
legislation.  
The concepts of ‘public service’ and ‘public office’ are not defined in the HRA, however, in international law 
‘public service’ encompasses all positions within the executive, judiciary, legislature and other branches of 
state administration and public office does not appear to be relevantly different.27 However, in Queensland, 
the ‘public service’ is more narrowly defined as the Queensland Public Service, consisting of the persons 
who are employed under the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld).28 The term ‘public office’ would therefore appear 
to be broader than ‘public service’ under the HRA, encompassing other office holders, such as the judiciary, 
members of Parliament and holders of office in other areas of administration.  
In international human rights law, the UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted the right to access the 
public service and office as providing a right of access, on general terms of equality, to positions in the public 
service and in public office. This appears to import a positive duty, whereby:  
‘affirmative measures may be taken in appropriate cases to ensure that there is equal access to 
public service for all citizens. Basing access to public service on equal opportunity and general 
principles of merit, and providing secured tenure, ensures that persons holding public service 
positions are free from political interference or pressures’.29 
Examples of affirmative measures may include recruitment of indigenous persons or persons with a 
disability. To ensure that the right is complied with, appointment, promotion, suspension and dismissal 
processes within the public service must be objective and reasonable. Although the object of this system is 
to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the public service, by placing this right in the HRA equal 
opportunity and anti-discrimination policies are made fundamental to public life.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
Whilst s 23(1) does not create a right to a remedy,30 the right does require that public authorities act 
positively to ensure that every person has the ability to exercise this right of participation. For example, this 
may require adequate disability services and translated documents being made available in spaces of public 
debate. In the event of an infringement of the right, the most beneficial conciliated outcomes would be: 
• an apology or statement of regret from the responsible public entity to the claimant, acknowledging 
their wrongdoing and/or the hurt caused; 
• the review and implementation of anti-discrimination policies to avoid further infringements in the 
future, may also be desirable; 
• that the responsible public authority develop a range of accessible resources, such as in documents 
available in foreign languages or for sight-impaired people, that outline the importance of 
participation so that every person in Queensland can fully appreciate their role in and ability to 
participate in public affairs.  
Where a claimant’s right to vote has been infringed, it is unlikely that the infringement will be able to be 
rectified due to the time dependent nature of voting, however a conciliated outcome may be requested by the 
claimant or offered by the relevant public entity. Such outcomes may include: 
 
27 ACT Human Rights Commission (n 3).  
28 Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 5.  
29 Human Rights Commission (n 8) art 23. 
30 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n 11). 
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• an apology, possibly followed by rectification of the claimant’s position to exercise their rights and 
position relating to the voting franchise in time for the next election; 
• a re-education process applicable to the relevant entity - this is of the utmost importance due to the 
foundation of democratic societies upon the voting system and may also require a change in policy 
to ensure that all eligible voters are educated about their rights to vote, and have those rights upheld.    
Where the right to be elected has been infringed, a complainant may request an apology and financial 
compensation, though they are most likely to ask for an apology and acknowledgment of eligibility to become 
a candidate for elections.  
Where a complainant has had their right to access the public service or public office violated, an apology is 
likely to be desired by the complainant in the conciliation process, in addition to the restoration of a position 
or making an offer of employment.31 Likewise, compensation for financial loss may also be required where 






31 ‘Australian Human Rights Commission’, Understanding and Preparing for Conciliation – Unlawful Discrimination (Web Page, 14 
December 2012) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/complaint-guides/understanding-and-preparing-conciliation-unlawful-
discrimination>.  
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Section 25: The Right to Privacy  
Savannah Kuylaars  
‘25 Privacy and Reputation 
A person has the right— 
(a) not to have the person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or 
arbitrarily interfered with; and 
(b) not to have the person’s reputation unlawfully attacked.’ 
The right to privacy has been understood as the ‘right to be let alone by other people’.1 There is no clearly 
established or independently enforceable right to privacy at common law in Australia,2 and the state of 
authorities remains unclear.3 Despite this, protection of privacy is provided for in a number of statutes in 
Queensland and at the Commonwealth level.4 The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) introduced a right 
to privacy in Queensland, allowing Queenslanders to be free from unlawful or arbitrary interference with 
privacy, family, home or correspondence and unlawful attack upon reputation.5 
Interpretation  
A court may be informed by international and domestic jurisprudence when interpreting provisions,6 as 
directly expressed in the Act.7 Internationally, the right to privacy exists in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights8 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).9 The Queensland 
provision mirrors art 17 of the ICCPR,10 to which Australia is a party,11 however, minor differences exist, 
being the exclusion of ‘honour’ and subsection 2.12 
Domestically, jurisprudence concerning s 13 of the Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’)13 offers significant insight, particularly the judgments of Bell J,14 who found in Sudi15 
that the right protects:  
 
1 Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145, [24].  
2 AIT18 v Australian Information Commissioner (2018) 363 ALR 281, 302 [83]. See Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
3 WBM v Chief Commissioner of Police (2012) 43 VR 446, [81]. See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty 
Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151; Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 
CLR 479. 
4 See Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Public Records Act 2002 (Qld); Invasion of Privacy Act 
1971 (Qld); Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth); Do Not Call Register Act 2006 (Cth). See also Australian 
Privacy Commissioner, Federal Privacy Handbook: A Guide to Federal Privacy Law and Practice (Redfern Legal Centre Publishing, 
1993). 
5 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 25 (‘HRA’).  
6 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1, 36-7 [18]-[19]. 
7 HRA (n 5) s 48(3). 
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 12. 
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) (‘ICCPR’). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 8 (‘ECHR’). See also Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) art 
8; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; MA v Director of Immigration [2012] HKCA 514, [58]-[67]. 
10 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 22 (‘Explanatory Notes’). 
11 ICCPR (n 9) art 17(2). 
12 Malone v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 330. 
13 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’). 
14 See, eg, PJB v Melbourne Health and Another (Patrick’s Case) (2011) 39 VR 373; Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Others 
(2009) 29 VAR 1; Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba and Another (2014) 44 VR 526; Director of Housing v Sudi [2010] VCAT 
328; Jurecek v Director, Transport Safety Victoria [2016] VSC 285; ZZ v Secretary, Dept of Justice [2013] VSC 267. 
15 Director of Housing v Sudi (n 14).  






Privacy should be interpreted in the context of dignity and free, unhindered development of one’s 
personality.17 It embodies individual identity, personal development, meaningful social relations and physical 
and psychological integrity.18 In this respect, the right underpins other fundamental rights.19  
The term ‘privacy’ encompasses bodily, territorial, communications, information and location privacy.20 An 
important qualification of ‘private’ is whether the individual reasonably expected privacy. In Good Guys,21 a 
conversation secretly recorded in a public shop was held not to be private communication.22 The 
conversation occurred in the television area of a retail store and was capable of being heard by others, 
meaning that it was not reasonable for the speaker to expect that her words would only be heard by the 
person she was addressing.23  
Interference with the right has applied to restrictions upon employment, where an individual’s capacity to 
experience private life, including relationships, is restricted.24 More recently, ‘privacy’ has been interpreted to 
include protection of self-determination, personal autonomy and personal inviolability with respect to physical 
or psychological interference, including medical treatment.25 Access to knowledge of personal information 
possessed or used by public agencies is also critical to the protection of privacy.26  
Family and Home 
Under the ICCPR, ‘family’ takes the meaning given by the concerned State, 27 and operates to protect the 
privacy of existing intimate family relations.28 In Australia, the courts would be likely to expand traditional 
legal interpretations of ‘family’29 in light of modern considerations such as blended families and de facto 
relationships.30 The right offers the protection of security and autonomy of an individual in their home,31 for 
which sufficient and continuous links with the place must be demonstrated.32 This is a question of fact not 
law.33 In Sudi,34 examples of interferences with home were held to include every invasion of the sphere of 
‘home’ that occurs without the consent of the individual affected: evicting or seeking to evict someone living 
in social housing; serving a notice to quit and bringing possession proceedings and any other decisions 
 
16 Ibid [29].  
17 Joseph Cannataci, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, UN Doc A/HRC/31/64 (24 November 2016) [24]. 
18 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Others (2009) 29 VAR 1, [619]-[620]. 
19 Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (Final Report No 123, 2014) 30 [2.6]. 
20 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, Charter Guidelines (2017). 
21 Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Good Guys Discount Warehouses (Australia) Pty Ltd; Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v 
Parke Muir’s Pty Ltd (2016) 334 ALR 600. 
22 Ibid [124]. 
23 Ibid. 
24 ZZ v Secretary, Dept of Justice [2013] VSC 267, [87]. 
25 PBU & NJE v Mental Health Tribunal and Others (2018) 56 VR 141, [127]-[128]. 
26 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and 
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 32nd sess, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (8 April 1988) [10] (‘General 
Comment No 16’). 
27 Ibid [5]. 
28 Castles v Secretary of the Department of Justice and Others (2010) 28 VR 141, [81]. It does not, however, create a positive right to 
found a family. 
29 Fehlberg, B and Behrens, J, Australian Family Law: The Contemporary Context (Oxford University Press, 2008) 145.  
30 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n 20). See, eg, Human Rights Committee, Merit: Communication No 201/1985, UN DOC 
CCPR/C/33/D/201/1985 (12 August 1988). (‘Hendriks v Netherlands’). 
31 Patrick’s Case (n 14) [55]. Cf AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 1186. 
32 Director of Housing v Sudi (n 14) [32]. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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which deprive a person of, or impair their capacity, to live in their home, including denying planning 
permission, undertaking enforcement measures and withdrawing a permission already held.35  
Correspondence  
Correspondence encompasses written and verbal communication containing private information.36 Under the 
equivalent provision in the ICCPR, States are obliged to ensure private information does not reach persons 
who are not lawfully engaged to receive or use it.37 This requires ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of 
communications, including via physical and digital surveillance.38 Although mass surveillance of 
communications may be an effective and legitimate security tool, it may also interfere with privacy,39 
requiring the State to demonstrate it is neither arbitrary nor unlawful in the interests of aims such as national 
security.40 Importantly, the obligation arises regardless of the nationality or location of individuals.41 
Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference 
Parliament’s use of the adjective ‘unlawful’, means that no interference can take place unless envisaged by 
law.42 Domestically, ‘lawful’ has been further interpreted to mean identifiable and expressed with sufficient 
precision in an Act of parliament, subordinate legislation or common law.43 However, the inclusion of 
‘arbitrary’ indicates that lawful interferences may still violate the right.44 ‘Arbitrary’ operates to prohibit 
interferences that are not in accordance with the aims of the ICCPR or ‘reasonable in the circumstances’.45 
The term connotes an absence of reasonableness, procedural fairness or proportionality.46 Further 
jurisprudence speaks to principles of legality, predictability with respect to the rule of law, necessity to 
achieve a legitimate aim, and proportionality with respect of achieving that aim.47 Importantly, the 
Queensland right prohibits interferences only by public entities.48 ‘Interference’ can also be particularised as 
disturbance or unwanted involvement.49 
In Patrick’s Case,50 arbitrary interferences were interpreted as ‘capricious, unpredictable or unjust’ as well as 
unreasonable 51 Toonen52 explained that an assessment of ‘reasonableness’ should be ‘based on 
reasonable and objective criteria and which are proportional to the purpose for which they are adopted’.53 
Unreasonableness has also been coloured as vague or ambiguous.54 
 
35 Ibid [34]. 
36 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n 20); General Comment No 16 (n 26) 8. 
37 General Comment No 16 (n 26) [10]. 
38 Ibid [8]. 
39 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Seitlinger and Others (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-293/12; C-594/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, 
8 April 2014) [26]-[27], [37]. 
40 The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN GAOR, UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014) [20]. 
41 Ibid [36]. 
42 General Comment No 16 (n 26) [3]. 
43 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Others (n 18) [162]-[195]. 
44 Versey H, ‘Human Rights – The Privacy Balancing Act’ (Speech, Victoria University Law Week, 15 May 2007). 
45 General Comment No 16 (n 26) [4]. 
46 Rassemblement Jurassien and Unite Jurassiene v Switzerland [1979] Eur Court HR 7, 120. 
47 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 73 ALD 609, [144]; Uzun v Germany (2010) IHRL 
1838 Eur Court HR, [4]; Nowak, ‘UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary’ (NP Engel, 2nd ed, 2005) 382-3. 
See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), 67th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (2 November 1999) [11]-[16]. 
48 HRA (n 5) s 58.  
49 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n 20). 
50 Patrick’s Case (n 14). 
51 Ibid [85]. This was supported in WBM v Chief Commissioner of Police (2012) 43 VR 446, 471-2 [114]. 
52 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 488/1992, 50th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (31 March 1994) 
(‘Toonen v Australia’). 
53 Ibid [64].  
54 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board and Others (n 18) [193]. 
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Reputation Unlawfully Attacked 
Reputation generally refers to opinions or beliefs held about someone.55 The section prohibits attacks that 
are unlawful (intentional) and based on untrue allegations.56 Importantly, there is no reasonableness test. 
Case law suggests the right to privacy needs to be distinguished from the right to reputation when making 
complaints.57 The listing of an innocent individual’s name on a public terrorist watch list is an example of an 
unlawful attack, tarnishing and disparaging a person’s reputation due to the negative associations attached 
to that status.58  
Justifiable Limitations on the Right to Privacy  
The right to privacy and reputation is not an absolute right59 and is ‘necessarily relative’.60 Section 25 places 
limits on the right through the words ‘arbitrary or unlawful’,61 in addition to the general limitation clause under 
s 13, which permits limitations which are demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.62 
Queensland has enacted legislation which allows for reasonable interference with the right,63 and it is open 
to the Parliament to do so.64 If limitation provisions are proportionate, they are not legally inconsistent with 
Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR.65 In order to ascertain proportionality, the means chosen for 
interference must be the least restrictive reasonably available,66 and an inquiry into whether competing rights 
are effectively balanced must be performed.67 
The power of police to request the name and address of road-users has been upheld as one example of a 
reasonable interference proportionate to the legitimate purpose of public safety.68 However, coercive and 
continued demand may become unreasonable and constitute an arbitrary interference.69 Similarly, disclosure 
of the location of an offender subject to an extended police supervision order is justified in the interest of law 
enforcement,70 and conducting an employment misconduct investigation has been held to constitute a 
legitimate exercise of power.71 The recent high-profile Victorian case of ‘Lawyer X’ demonstrates 
circumstances in which courts will not protect privacy due to significant conflicting rights, particularly the 
public interest in the rule of law, right to a fair trial and general system of criminal justice.72 
Although courts appear sympathetic to prioritising public interest,73 it is necessary to balance rights on a 
case-by-case basis.74 The use of digital surveillance should be assessed carefully, to prevent a potential ‘big 
brother’ society.75  The High Court has observed that privacy is the primary justification for limitations on 
 
55 Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (n  20). 
56 Explanatory Notes (n 10) 22. See also Defamation Act 2005 (Qld). 
57 Complainant Z v Local Council [2006] VPrivComr 1. 
58 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1472/2006, 94th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (22 October 2008) 
(‘Sayadi & Vinck v Belgium’). 
59 AIT18 v Australian Information Commissioner (2018) 363 ALR 281, [85]; Jurecek v Director, Transport Safety Victoria [2016] VSC 
285, [67]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba and Another (2014) 44 VR 526, [148]-[149]. 
60 General Comment No 16 (n 26) [7]. 
61 McDonald v Legal Services Commissioner (No 2) [2017] VSC 89, [36]. 
62 HRA (n 5) s 13.  
63 See, eg, Telecommunications Interception Act 2009 (Qld); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). 
64 Taciak v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1995) 59 FCR 285, 299. See also AIT18 v Australian Information Commissioner 
(2018) 363 ALR 281, [85]. 
65 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba and Another (2014) 44 VR 526, [156]. 
66 Ibid [160]; Patrick’s Case (n 14) [352]. 
67 AC (Guardianship) [2009] VCAT 1186; Frangos, Thaedra, ‘The Right to Privacy in the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities’ (2007) 4(4) Privacy Law Bulletin 51, 53. Cf AIT18 v Australian Information Commissioner (2018) 363 ALR 281, [89]. 
68 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba and Another (n 65) [159]. 
69 Ibid.  
70 ARM v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 29 VR 472, [36]. 
71 Jurecek v Director, Transport Safety Victoria [2016] VSC 285, [71]. 
72 AB and EF v CD [2017] VSC 350, [415]-[420]. See also De Simone v Bevnol Constructions and Developments Pty Ltd [2011] VSCA 
54, [35]; Heery v Criminal Justice Commission; Re Pierre Mark le Grand [200] QSC 063, [33]. 
73 Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 178, [127]; WK v The Queen [2011] VSCA 345. 
74 Victoria Police v Marke (2008) 23 VR 223, [108]. See also Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881, 896 (Lord Denning). 
75 Coco v Newnham and Others (1990) 97 ALR 419, 452. 
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police search powers. 76 Similarly, privacy has prevailed over freedom of expression in some 
circumstances.77  
Conciliated Outcomes  
The HRA provides for conciliation as a method of resolving complaints informally and flexibly.78 Although the 
Human Rights Commission seeks resolution, a remedy is not as of right.79  
Any agreeable and lawful outcome may be sought during conciliation, including: 
• A formal apology, including acceptance of responsibility;80 
• An explanation for the interference; 
• Requirement to take reasonable steps to ensure conduct is not repeated;81 
• Compensation for any consequential loss or injury to feelings, humiliation, reputation; 
• Education and privacy training within the public authority; 
• Creation of new, or updating existing, policies and procedures;  
• Cessation of continuing interference; 
• Formal recorded documentation of interference;  
• Psychological care or social services; 
• Reprimand of liable individuals; and 
• Law reform.82 
A complainant might seek more specific redress dependent on the circumstances, including redemption of 
their home or tenancy,83 deletion or reparation of private data collected, or reinstatement of employment. 
Where a person’s reputation has suffered, removal of damaging content or public rectification of the truth 
may be sought. Many complainants may wish to receive a declaration that conduct amounted to an 
interference, however, conciliators are unable to make a ruling in this regard. 
In the event of unsuccessful conciliation, the Commissioner must prepare a report for the parties involved,84 
and the individual’s right to seek remedy through legal proceedings against a public entity under s 58 is not 
affected.85 The complainant may seek to have the matter heard before a tribunal. Complainants should have 
the possibility of seeking criminal prosecution for serious interferences.86 
 
76 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; 93 ALR 483, 487. 
77 Von Hannover v Germany (2004) 16 BHRC 545; ICCPR (n 8) art 19(3). 
78 HRA (n 5) ss 79-80. 
79 Explanatory Notes (n 10) 7. 
80 United Nations, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA Res 60/147, UN Doc A/RES/60/147 
(16 December 2005) annex (‘Basic Principles and Guidelines’). 
81 Professor Rosalind Croucher, ‘The Australian Human Rights Commission and Conciliation – a 40+ year success story, but…’ 
(Speech, National Mediation Conference Canberra, 17 April 2019). 
82 See, eg, Toonen v Australia (n 52). 
83 See, eg, Patrick’s Case (n 14). 
84 HRA (n 5) s 88. 
85 Ibid ss 58-59, 87. 
86 Basic Principles and Guidelines (n 80). 
 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): A Guide to Rights Interpretation 47 
 
Section 27: Cultural Rights – Generally  
Matilda McLennan Bird 
‘27 Cultural Rights- Generally  
All persons with a particular cultural, religious, racial or linguistic background must not 
be denied the right, in community with other persons of that background, to enjoy their 
culture, to declare and practise their religion and to use their language.’ 
Section 27 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’),1 is based on art 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),2 and is nearly identical to the equivalent right under the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’).3 Section 27 of the HRA is distinct 
from the specific cultural rights for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders under s 28, and is separate to, but 
complemented by, the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, and freedom of expression in ss 
20 and 21 respectively.4 This paper will analyse s 27 and consider how Queensland decision-makers should 
interpret and apply it with reference to approaches in Victoria,5 and international jurisdictions, and provide 
potential conciliated outcomes for individuals who might make a s 27 complaint. 
Interpretation 
Cultural Background 
Section 27 applies to all people in Queensland with a particular cultural, religious, racial or linguistic 
background. Unlike in other jurisdictions,6 protection is not restricted to Indigenous peoples, minority groups, 
Australian citizens, or residents of Queensland. In Hoskin v Greater Bendigo City Council, a permit was 
sought to build a mosque with attached facilities in Bendigo, Victoria, which 435 people objected to.7 
Applying s 19 of the Victorian Charter, the permit seekers submitted ‘that the community of “all Victorians” 
include[d] those who follow Islam’,8 with which the Court agreed.9 Section 31(1) of the South African 
Constitution also has a cultural right for any person belonging to a community, like the HRA,10 reflecting the 
history of South Africa.11  
‘With a background’ 
Courts should establish that the claimant has the background; in many cases this will also be 
uncontroversial. In Victoria, some established cultural, religious and linguistic groups with shared 
backgrounds include Assyrian Christians,12 Muslims13 and Greeks.14 
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 27 (‘HRA’) 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, vol. 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 
on 23 March 1976 (‘ICCPR’); Queensland Human Rights Commission, Cultural rights: Section 27 of the Human Rights Act 2019 
(July 2019) Queensland Human Rights Commission < https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/your-rights/human-rights-law/cultural-rights> 
3 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’), s 19. 
4 HRA (n 1), ss 20, 21, 27, 28. 
5 Note that to date section 27 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) has not been litigated. 
6 See Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 27; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 20; ICCPR, art 27. 
7 Hoskin and Another v Greater Bendigo City Council and Others [2015] VSCA 350, (‘Hoskin’). 
8 Ibid (emphasis added). 
9 Hoskin (n 7) [26]-[28]. 
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) ch 2, s 31(1). 
11 See Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education [2000] ZACC 11 (Constitutional Court), [22]-[23]. 
12 Rutherford & Ors v Hume CC [2014] VCAT 786, (‘Rutherford’). 
13 Hoskin’ (n 7). 
14 Rekatsinas v Transport Accident Commission [2010] VCAT 967 (‘Rekatsinas’). 
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An international example is Lovelace v Canada,15 where the UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) 
considered art 27 of the ICCPR, which protects cultural rights of minorities. The HRC found that someone 
would ‘belong’ to the Maliseet Indian minority group if they were ‘born and brought up on a reserve, [had] 
kept ties with their community and wish[ed] to maintain these ties’.16 The HRC’s General Comment No. 23 
also importantly emphasised that: 
‘the persons designed to be protected [by art 27] are those who belong to a group and who 
share in common a culture, religion and/or language.’17 
Parts of culture and limitation by public authorities  
Once it has been established that the cultural background exists, and the claimant has that background, 
courts will need to determine:18 
• whether the activity or thing is a part of the culture; and 
• whether the claimant is being denied the right to enjoy that culture in community with others 
of the same background. 
These two questions are intertwined and heavily dependent on the facts. ‘Denied’ can be given a plain, 
ordinary meaning and understood as an unreasonable limit on culture. However, in international case law, 
not every limit on culture amounts to a ‘denial’;19 measures which have ‘a certain limited impact’ on culture 
may not be in breach of s 27, as explained by the Human Rights Committee:20 
‘...a restriction upon [a] right... must be shown to have a reasonable and objective justification 
and to be necessary for the continued viability and welfare of the minority as a whole.’21 
Another aspect of this consideration is that the culture must be denied ‘in community with other persons of 
that background’. In relation to the ICCPR equivalent, General Comment No. 23 states that because the right 
depends on the ability of the group to maintain its culture, authorities might have positive obligations ‘to 
protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members’ so they can exercise their rights as a group.22 
In the Victorian case of Rutherford,23 it was acknowledged that mosques (and arguably by extension, other 
places of worship) are an indispensable part of faith and limiting them would infringe upon the ability of a 
group to enjoy their culture.24 Further, the Tribunal held that the presence of a mosque and its Muslim 
adherents near an Assyrian Christian church would not ‘provoke or intimidate or limit the religious freedoms 
of the [Assyrian Christian] Church (or the practice of their particular denominational culture and beliefs) in the 
sense raised by the Charter.’25   
In Rekatsinas,26 the issue was whether provisions of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) would provide 
compensation to pay for a certain monumental and culturally significant gravestone for the Greek victim, Mr 
Rekatsinas.27 The Tribunal acknowledged that both Greek and Italian populations had an ‘intense and 
 
15 Lovelace v Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977.  
16 Ibid [14].  
17 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 50th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (8 
April 1994), [5.1] (emphasis added) (‘General Comment No. 23’). 
18 See Queensland Act (n 1) s 27.  
19 Lovelace v Canada (n 15) [15]; Jouni Länsman et al. v Finland, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, [9.4] (‘Jouni Länsman (No 1)’). 
20 Jouni Länsman (No 1) (n 19) [9.4]  
21 Kitok v Sweden, UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, [9.8] (‘Kitok v Sweden’); Lovelace v Canada (n 15).  
22 General Comment No. 23 (n 17) [6.2]. 
23 Rutherford (n 12). 
24 Rutherford (n 12) [30]. See also Hoskin (n 7). 
25 Rutherford (n 12) [30] (emphasis added). 
26 Rekatsinas (n 14).   
27 Ibid. 
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expansive tradition’ of honouring the deceased, but would not allow compensation under the Act for the 
monument.28 
In decisions of the HRC applying art 27 of the ICCPR, the question has often been whether the cultural 
phenomenon is ‘essential’ to the culture, religion or language. For example, reindeer husbandry was found to 
be an essential element of the culture of the Sami ethnic group in Finland,29 as was the use and control of 
fisheries by Maori peoples in New Zealand.30 With regards to religion, the HRC found that although smoking 
cannabis is an essential element of Rastafarian religion, ‘a general prohibition of possession and use of 
cannabis’ was consistent with the author’s right under art 27.31 Language has also been held to be an 
essential component of culture; a newspaper published in the Tajik minority language in Uzbekistan was 
considered an essential ‘means of airing issues of significance and importance to the Tajik minority 
community’.32 
It is worth noting that cultural activities may still be protected under art 27 when they generate income. In the 
Finnish reindeer cases, the HRC has confirmed that economic activities can still be essential cultural 
elements and therefore authorities may not have as much regulatory power.33 
Many cases decided by the HRC have involved land as an important aspect of culture, particularly those 
involving Indigenous communities, as in the aforementioned Finnish reindeer cases.34 Similarly, in Poma 
Poma v Peru, the HRC found that water diversions from certain areas would significantly impact the culture 
of the Aymara ethnic minority group which raised and farmed llamas as a part of their cultural tradition.35 
Whereas in Diergaardt et al. v Namibia, the Rehoboth community’s claim failed as they could not 
demonstrate a distinct link between their culture and certain pastoral lands.36 Queensland decision-makers 
could consider adopting the ‘essential’ test used by the HRC to discern critical violations of the cultural right 
where there may be such ‘borderline’ cases.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
Due to the nature of the s 27 cultural right as something significant and particular to different communities, 
conciliation outcomes are ideal as parties can come to specific and individualised agreements to balance 
their rights.  
Where loss has occurred, whether economic or intangible, financial compensation could be an appropriate 
outcome. This could include:  
• Compensation for economic loss;  
• Compensation for loss of past and or future earnings; or  
• Compensation for non-economic loss, for example for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, 
intimidation or embarrassment.37 
If the alleged breach of cultural rights is inevitable, there may be conciliation solutions which seek to 
minimise damage caused in the current matter, or prevent similar breaches from occurring in future, such as: 
 
28 Ibid [45]. 
29 Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v Finland, UN Doc CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (‘Äärelä’). See also Kitok v Sweden, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985; Jouni Länsman (No 1) (n 19); Jouni Länsman et al. v Finland, UN Doc CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (‘Jouni 
Länsman (No 2)’).  
30 Mahuika v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993.  
31 Prince v South Africa, UN Doc CCPR/C/91/D/1474/2006.  
32 Mavlonov v Uzbekistan, UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004, [8.7].  
33 Kitok v Sweden (n 21); Jouni Länsman (No 2) (n 29).  
34 Kitok v Sweden (n 21); Jouni Länsman (No 1) (n 19); Jouni Länsman (No 2) (n 29); Äärelä (n 29); Paadar v Finland, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/110/D/2102/2011. 
35 Poma Poma v Peru, UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006.  
36 Diergaardt et al. v Namibia, UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997. 
37 Green v State of Queensland [2017] QCAT 008. 
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• Restricting the nature, timing and or frequency of the limiting conduct;38   
• Requiring consultation with relevant cultural groups before further action;   
• Education of relevant parties to prevent future breaches;   
• Changes to policies of specific public authorities for dealing with cultural groups; or   
• Changes to public policy.   
Lastly, potential conciliation outcomes for s 27 disputes might be something more symbolic or explanatory, 
which seek to acknowledge past events:  
• A private apology;39  
• A public apology (for example in print or online media40);   
• A monument or similar acknowledgement to recognise the cultural activity (for example where the 
activity used land);   
• An explanation; or   
• A donation to a related cause or charity.41   
 
38 Jouni Länsman (No 1) (n 19).  
39 Bell v Islam [2016] QCAT 520.   
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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Section 28: Cultural Rights – Aboriginal Peoples and Torres 
Strait Islanders 
Emma Beckinsale and Christabelle Stafford-Smith 
‘28 Cultural Rights – Aboriginal Peoples and Torres Strait Islanders 
(1) Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples hold distinct cultural rights. 
(2) Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples must not be denied the right, 
with other members of their community— 
(a) to enjoy, maintain, control, protect and develop their identity and cultural heritage, 
including their traditional knowledge, distinctive spiritual practices, observances, 
beliefs and teachings; and 
(b) to enjoy, maintain, control, protect, develop and use their language, including 
traditional cultural expressions; and 
(c) to enjoy, maintain, control, protect and develop their kinship ties; and 
(d) to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual, material and economic 
relationship with the land, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources with 
which they have a connection under Aboriginal tradition or Island custom; and 
(e) to conserve and protect the environment and productive capacity of their land, 
territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources. 
(3) Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples have the right not to be 
subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.’ 
 
Section 28 of the Queensland Human Rights Act 2019 (‘HRA’) aims to protect the cultural rights of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The provision gives effect to the preamble of the HRA, which notes the 
‘special importance’ of human rights to Indigenous people.1 Section 28 is modelled on articles from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)2 and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’).3 The outline below considers how Queensland decision-makers 
are likely to interpret s 28 and the potential outcomes that complainants may achieve under the HRA’s 
conciliation process.    
Public Entities 
The HRA makes it unlawful for a public entity to act in a manner that is incompatible with human rights or to 
make decisions that do not take proper consideration of relevant human rights.4 Examples of public entities 
that are most likely to impact Aboriginal cultural rights include police, public schools, public health services, 
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) Preamble s 6 (‘HRA’). 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) (‘ICCPR’). 
3 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61.295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 
September 2007) (‘UNDRIP’) 
4 HRA (n 1) s 58. 
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correctional facilities, courts or tribunals (acting in an administrative capacity),5 public housing and 
government departments (particularly those relating to child protection and natural resources).6 
Nature of Indigenous Cultural Rights 
Comparison with ACT and Victoria  
In contrast to human rights legislation in the ACT and Victoria, the HRA protects general cultural rights and 
Aboriginal cultural rights in separate provisions.7 The HRA thereby avoids treating Indigenous peoples as 
homogenous and does not frame Indigenous peoples’ rights through a minority claims model.8 Further, ss 
28(2)(e) and 28(3) are unique to the HRA, broadening the Queensland legislation compared to its interstate 
counterparts.  
Given that Queensland is the only Australian jurisdiction to use two separate provisions for the protection of 
general cultural rights and Indigenous cultural rights, it is unclear how these rights may interact with each 
other and how the scope of each provision may differ. However, based on its plain ordinary meaning, s 28 
appears to be more specific and more extensive than the general cultural rights under s 27, although s 27 
has the potential to cover the same matters as s 28. In matters affecting Indigenous peoples, it would be 
more appropriate to apply the specific s 28 rights. This is consistent with international jurisprudence on 
human rights law,9 as well as general principles of statutory interpretation stipulating that specific provisions 
should prevail over general provisions (i.e. generalia specialibus non derogant and generaliabus specialia 
derogant).10 However, both ss 27 and 28 could apply in certain circumstances, for example, to protect the 
cultural rights of a person who is mixed race. 
Negative versus Positive Rights 
The negative wording of s 28 (‘must not be denied the right’) could be read to suggest that only substantial 
infringements with cultural rights will be incompatible with the provision.11 However, when commenting on the 
international human rights law on which s 28 is modelled, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(‘HRC’) has stated that, despite this language, cultural rights constitute positive rather than negative rights.12 
In practice, however, the HRC has found that conduct with a limited impact on cultural rights did not 
necessarily amount to a breach.13 Similarly, a restriction on cultural rights that has both reasonable and 
objective justification will be compatible with the right.14 
Nonetheless, despite the HRC's decisions, the language of s 28 supports an interpretation of the provision 
as conferring positive rights. Indeed, the HRA goes further than the ACT and Victorian legislation, including a 
right to ‘enjoy’ as well as ‘maintain’, ‘control’, ‘protect’ and ‘develop’ certain cultural rights.15 International 
 
5 Ibid s 9. 
6 See e.g. Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights’, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Victoria 
(Brochure) <https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/home/our-projects-a-initiatives/aboriginal-cultural-rights-in-victoria>; 
Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know – Fact Sheet for 
Public Authorities’, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Victoria (Fact Sheet) 3 <https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/home/our-
projects-a-initiatives/aboriginal-cultural-rights-in-victoria>; ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander 
Cultural Rights under the ACT Human Rights Act’, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Rights (Brochure, January 2019) < 
https://hrc.act.gov.au/aboriginal-torres-strait-islander-cultural-rights/>. 
7 HRA (n 1) ss 27 and 28. Cf Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 27; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 19 
(‘Victorian Charter'). 
8 Michael Dodson, ‘The Unique Nature of the Australian Indigenous Experience’ (1996) 9 Without Prejudice 3, 6; quoted in Jackie 
Hartley, ‘Indigenous Rights under the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic)’ (2007) 11(3) Australian Indigenous Law Review 6, 14.   
9 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1) SA 765 (CC) [15]. 
10 Smith v R (1994) 181 CLR 338, 348; R Refrigerated Express Lines (A/Asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (No 2) 
(1980) 29 ALR 333. 
11 Alistair Pound and Kylie Evans, An Annotated Guide to the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (Lawbook Co., 
2008) 178. 
12 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 50th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (8 April 
1994) at [6.1] (‘General Comment No 23’). 
13 Länsman v Finland (Communication No 671/1995) at [10.3] 
14 Lovelace v Canada (Communication no 24/1977) at [16]. See also HRA (n 1) s 13. 
15 HRA (n 1) s 28(2). 
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jurisprudence indicates that the right to ‘strengthen’ and ‘develop’, as opposed to merely ‘maintain’, cultural 
rights places positive duties on the State.16 Therefore, the breadth of s 28 supports an interpretation that 
places both negative and positive duties on public entities. 
Individual versus Collective Rights 
The Preamble to the HRA refers to the importance of the right to self-determination to Indigenous peoples.17 
Section 28(2) provides that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples hold cultural rights ‘with other 
members of their community’. However, the right of self-determination is notably absent from s 28 and s 
11(2) provides that ‘only individuals have human rights’ under the HRA.18 Therefore, Aboriginal cultural rights 
under s 28 are unlikely to be interpreted as conferring collective rights. 19 Rather, s 28 may be interpreted as 
conferring individual rights with ‘a collective dimension’20 insofar as the provision ‘protects the identity of the 
minority’.21 
Interpretation of Indigenous Cultural Rights 
Section 28 creates six discrete rights22 that are considered individually below. 
Identity and Cultural Heritage 
Section 28(2)(a) provides that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a right to ‘enjoy, maintain, 
control, protect and develop their identity and cultural heritage, including their traditional knowledge, 
distinctive spiritual practices, observances, beliefs and teachings’. This is based on art 27 of the ICCPR and 
art 31 of UNDRIP.23  
The HRA does not define ‘identity’ or ‘cultural heritage’.24 Further, unlike the Victorian Charter,6 the HRA 
does not contain a definition of ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Torres Strait Islander’. There are several definitions of 
Indigenous identity and cultural heritage that Queensland decision-makers may apply. Firstly, courts may 
apply the common law definition that has previously been approved by the High Court.25 This test defines an 
Aboriginal person as someone who is descended from an Aboriginal person, identifies as Aboriginal and is 
accepted by his/her Aboriginal community.26 However, this definition has recently fallen out of favour, with 
French J commenting that it ‘should not be seen as representing the contemporary content of the word 
“Aboriginal”’.27  
Queensland decision-makers are therefore likely to apply a less onerous definition. For example, the test for 
accessing the Murri Court may be adopted, which requires self-identification, kinship or appropriate 
connection to the community.28 Similarly, courts may consider that descent alone is sufficient, in accordance 
 
16 Claire Charters, ‘Chapter 14: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories, and Resources in the UNDRIP’ in Jessie Hohmann 
and Marc Weller (eds), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 22 
March 2018) 412. 
17 HRA (n 1) Preamble (6). 
18 Ibid s 11(2). 
19 See generally, Hartley (n 8) 16; Human Rights Consultation Committee, Rights, Responsibilities and Respect: The Report of the 
Human Rights Consultation Committee (2005) 22, 51. 
20 Stefania Errico, ‘Rights to Land and Territory, Natural Resources and Environment’ in Jessie Hohmann and Marc Weller (n 16) 152-
53. 
21 General Comment No 23 (n 12) [6.2]. 
22 HRA (n 1) ss 28(2)(a)-(e) and 28(3). 
23 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 4, 23 (‘Explanatory Notes’). 
24 Cf Victorian Charter (n 7) s 3 (definition of ‘Aboriginal’). 
25 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 274 (Deane J); see also Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 70 (Brennan 
J). More recently, see Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Attorney General (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 25 FCR 125, 147-8; Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261, 302-3 [179]. 
28 Queensland Courts, Murri Court Procedure Manual (Manual, 2017) 15 
<https://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/493893/cip-mc-procedures-manual.pdf>. 
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with the definition adopted in several cases29 as well as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody.30  
Culture has been defined in international law as ‘dynamic and evolving’.31 Cultural heritage encompasses 
practices, expressions, oral traditions, rituals, epistemologies, skills, objects and cultural spaces.32 The right 
under s 28(2)(a) will not only protect traditional cultural practices, but also those that have evolved over time 
in response to modern conditions and technologies,33 as well as economic activities.34 However, despite the 
broad definitions of both identity and cultural heritage, s 28 will not affect intellectual property rights. Section 
28(2)(a) specifically omits the reference to intellectual property included in art 31 UNDRIP. Further, the 
equivalent ACT provision was drafted so as not to confer or create intellectual property rights, as this is a 
matter for Commonwealth regulation.35  
Cemino v Cannan provides an example of the application of the equivalent right in Victoria.36 In that case, 
the Victorian Supreme Court held that courts must take Aboriginal cultural rights into account when 
considering an Aboriginal person’s request to be heard in the Koori Court.37 Similar obligations are therefore 
likely to apply to requests by Aboriginal people in Queensland to be heard in the Murri Court. 
Language  
Section 28(2)(b) is based on art 27 of the ICCPR and protects the right of Indigenous peoples ‘to enjoy, 
maintain, control, protect and develop and use their language, including traditional cultural expression’.38 
According to the State Library of Queensland, there are at least 173 different Indigenous languages used by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Queensland.39  
Article 27 of the ICCPR includes a right to positive measures of protection.40 Therefore, public authorities 
acting in accordance with the HRA may need to take positive steps to protect and foster Indigenous 
language rights, or at the least, take steps to prevent encroachments on these rights. Section 28(2)(b) would 
therefore encompass a right to use Indigenous languages in community with others and not to have 
communications in Indigenous languages limited, prohibited or prevented.41 Considering the degradation of 
many Indigenous languages, this right may be interpreted as requiring public entities to take positive steps to 
protect and maintain Indigenous languages.42 For example, the right could be used to support Aboriginal 
peoples’ requests and claims for public entities to provide services adapted to cultural differences (such as 
interpreters)43 or certain educational or other materials in Indigenous languages.44 
 
29 Attorney General (Cth) v Queensland (n 27), 147-8 (French CJ); Eatock v Bolt (n 27) 302-3. See also UNDRIP (n 3) art 33. 
30 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1. 
31 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21 on the Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life 
(Article 15(1)(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN ESCOR, 43rd sess, UN Doc 
E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009) [11]. See also Länsman v Finland (Communication No 511/1992) at [9.2]. 
32 UNESCO Convention on the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003, 2368 UNTS 3, Preamble (6) and art 
2(1). 
33 Länsman v Finland (Communication No 511/1992) [9.2]. 
34 Kitok v Sweden (Communication No 197/1985) [9.2]; Mahuika v New Zealand (Communication No 547/1993) [9.3]. 
35 Revised Explanatory Statement, Human Rights Amendment Bill 2005 (ACT) 5. 
36 (2018) 56 VR 480. 
37 Ibid [141], [147]-[150], [154]. See also Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 6(2)(b), 32(1). 
38 Explanatory Notes (n 23) 4, 23. 
39 ‘Indigenous Languages Map of Queensland’, State Library of Queensland (Web Page, 2019) 
<https://www.slq.qld.gov.au/discover/aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-cultures-and stories/languages/queensland/indigenous-
languages-map>. 
40 General Comment No 23 (n 12) [6.2]. 
41 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Section 19 Right to 
Protection of Cultural Rights’, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Victoria (Fact Sheet) 1-2 
<https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/media/k2/attachments/Charter_FS_IND_SECT_19.pdf> 
42 Judicial College of Victoria, ‘Charter of Human Rights Bench Book’ (2018) at 6.13.3. 
43 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 3. 
44 Ibid.   
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As language is strongly intertwined with cultural identity and heritage, this right significantly overlaps with the 
right in s 28(2)(a).45 Cemino v Cannan is therefore also illustrative of this right in practice.46 As discussed 
above, the claimant in Cemino v Cannan relied on cultural rights to support a request for a transfer to the 
Koori Court.47 Courts such as the Koori Court and the Murri Court aim to remove language and 
communication barriers for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people involved in the criminal justice 
system.48 Therefore, s 28(2)(b) could also be used to support transfers to the Murri Court or requests for 
similar services that also provide language or communication assistance to Indigenous peoples. 
Kinship 
Section 28(2)(c) is based on art 27 of the ICCPR and protects the right of Indigenous peoples ‘to enjoy, 
maintain, control, protect and develop their kinship ties’.49  
Family law is likely to inform the interpretation of this provision. Section 61F of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
requires that, when considering the kinship ties of Indigenous children, a court must have regard to the 
particular practices of the relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture to which the child belongs.50 
Similarly, in relation to s 28(2)(c), courts are likely to adopt Indigenous definitions of kinship rather than 
Western definitions of family. The Aboriginal understanding of kinship is far broader than non-Aboriginal, 
western conceptions and extends beyond the immediate family into the broader community.51  
Section 28(2)(c) is likely to be most significant in relation to matters concerning child protection,52 
guardianship,53 bail applications54 and correctional facilities.55 There are several cases considering the 
equivalent Victorian kinship right that provide illustrative examples of how the right may operate in 
Queensland. Firstly, the Victorian Supreme Court has held that, in child protection matters, the Children, 
Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic)56 engages the right to maintain kinship ties.57 Therefore, s 28(2)(c) could 
be used to support Aboriginal parents’ and families’ rights to maintain custody of children. Secondly, in the 
context of involuntary mental health treatment orders, the Victorian kinship right has been held to support the 
granting of a Community Treatment Order rather than an Inpatient Treatment Order.58 Further, the Victorian 
Supreme Court has observed that s 3A of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic), which requires a court to take into account 
Indigenous cultural issues, should be read in conjunction with Victoria's equivalent ‘kinship’ right.59  
The Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission has released a report stating that the right 
to maintain kinship ties could be used to support the right of Aboriginal persons in custody (especially 
Aboriginal youths) to use technology to communicate with family, to use temporary leave programs to visit 
family, to increase or abolish time limits for contacting or visiting with family members, to provide 
 
45 Tobias Stoll, ‘Chapter 11: Intellectual Property and Technologies’ in Jessie Hohmann and Marc Weller (n 16) 316. 
46 (2018) 56 VR 480. 
47 Ibid [141], [147]-[150], [154]. 
48 Natalia Stroud, ‘The Koori Court Revisited: A Review of Cultural and Language Awareness in the Administration of Justice’ (2010) 
Monash University Law Research Series 12; Australian Institute of Criminology, Evaluation of the Queensland Murri Court: Final 
Report (AIC Report 39, 2010) 8, 131, 134. 
49 Explanatory Notes (n 23) 4, 23. 
50 Donnell v Dovey (2010) 42 Fam LR 559 [321]-[323] citing Davis v Davis (2008) 38 Fam LR 671. 
51 Donnell v Dovey (n 50) [281], [321]-[323]. See also Judicial College of Victoria (n 42) 6.13.3. 
52 Secretary to the Department of Human Services v Sanding (2011) 36 VR 221; Tamara Walsh, ‘Balancing Rights in Child Protection 
Law’ (2017) 31 Australian Journal of Family Law 47, 59. Cf OP v Secretary to the Department of Justice (Occupational and Business 
Regulation) [2010] VCAT 1054. 
53 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Cultural Rights’, Human Rights Law (Fact Sheet, July 2019) 2 
<https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/19896/QHRC_factsheet_HRA_s27.pdf>. 
54 DPP v SE [2017] VSC 13. 
55 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Youth Justice Centres (Report, July 2018) 13 
<https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/home/our-resources-and-publications/reports/item/1729-aboriginal-cultural-rights-
in-youth-justice-centres-jul-2018>; AQH [2017] VMHT 24; DPP v SE [2017] VSC 13.  
56 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) ss 10, 176. 
57 Secretary, Department of Human Services v Sanding (2011) 36 VR 221, [56]. 
58 AQH (n 55).  
59 DPP v SE (n 55) [21]-[29]. 
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accommodation for family members to stay overnight at the facility, and to attend funerals of their extended 
kinship circle.60 
Therefore, based on the case law and commentary from Victoria, the kinship right is likely to have a broad 
application in Queensland. This is particularly so because the Victorian kinship right is narrower than its 
Queensland counterpart – the Victorian right constitutes a right to ‘maintain’ kinship ties,61 whereas the HRA 
provides that Indigenous peoples have a right to ‘enjoy, maintain, control, protect and develop’ kinship ties.62 
Relationship with Land 
Section 28(2)(d) is derived from art 25 of the UNDRIP and protects the right of Indigenous peoples ‘to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual, material and economic relationship with the land, 
territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources with which they have a connection under Aboriginal 
tradition or Island custom’.63  
Foreign jurisdictions have found that art 25 of the UNDRIP and similar cultural rights have been breached 
when Indigenous peoples were forcibly evicted from land, prevented from accessing land, or had waterways 
or land altered without consultation.64 
Section 28(2)(d) may be narrower in scope, as the HRA does not affect native title rights and interests.65 
However, this right will likely be engaged where conduct by public entities impacts Indigenous peoples’ 
access to, use of and commercialisation of land. The provision has been used in Victoria to support 
employment policies exclusively recruiting Indigenous people for positions working on and caring for 
country.66 The HRC has held that the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain their cultural heritage and 
relationship with the land will not be breached where the relevant Indigenous people were consulted and 
participated in the decision-making.67 Therefore, s 28(2)(d) could also be relied upon to require public entities 
to consult with Indigenous groups and involve these groups in decision-making that will affect their land and 
associated cultural rights. 
Importantly, the right goes beyond ‘material’ connections to land and includes ‘spiritual’ connections. Indeed, 
the right does not require that an Aboriginal person own or reside on the relevant land.68 However, the 
definition of ‘connection’ may still be fairly restrictive, particularly if Queensland decision-makers adopt the 
definitions used in native title case law. For example, in Yorta Yorta, the High Court held that in order to 
establish a connection with land, Indigenous peoples must be able to demonstrate that a connection subsists 
under laws or customs that have been passed from generation to generation, substantially uninterrupted and 
which have existed since the time of sovereignty.69 
Environment 
Section 28(2)(e) is based on art 29 of the UNDRIP and provides that Indigenous peoples have the right ‘to 
conserve and protect the environment and productive capacity of their land, territories, waters, coastal seas 
and other resources’.70 This right does not appear in the Victorian or ACT human rights legislation. 
Therefore, there is no case law from these jurisdictions to provide any guidance as to the potential 
application of this provision.  
 
60 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Youth Justice Centres (n 55) 10. 
61 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) s 19(2)(c). 
62 HRA (n 1) s 28(2)(c). 
63 Explanatory Notes (n 23) 4, 23. 
64 Center For Minority Rights Dev. V Kenya, Comm. 276/2003, 27th ACHPR AAR Annex [Jun 2009-Nov 2009]; Poma v Peru, 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006. 
65 HRA (n 1) s 107. 
66 Parks Victoria (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) [2011] VCAT 2238. 
67 Länsman v Finland (Communication No 511/1992) at [9.6]. 
68 Clark-Ugle v Clark [2016] VSCA 44. 
69 Members of the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, [47]. 
70 Explanatory Notes (n 23) 4, 23. 
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Article 29 of the UNDRIP was drafted to protect Indigenous peoples and their environment from the effects of 
uncontrolled mining, military nuclear testing, pollution and hazardous wastes.71 The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (‘IACHR’) has interpreted art 29 of the UNDRIP as imposing obligations on States to 
guarantee an environment that does not compromise Indigenous peoples’ exercise of fundamental rights.72 
Similarly, the African Commission has clarified that art 29 requires States to take positive measures ‘to 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation’.73 However, s 28(2)(e) does not include an obligation to restore 
the environment, as this was intentionally removed from the initial draft of UNDRIP and has not been 
included in the HRA.74  
Foreign jurisdictions considering art 29 have placed considerable emphasis on the importance of 
consultation and the participation of Indigenous peoples in conduct affecting the environment.75 Therefore, s 
28(2)(e) could be relied upon to support consultation and participation of Indigenous groups in relation to 
policy and practices impacting the environment. 
Assimilation and Destruction 
Finally, s 28(3) is based on art 8 of the UNDRIP and provides that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples have the right ‘not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture’.76 As with the 
environmental right discussed above, this right is unique to Queensland and therefore there is no Australian 
case law providing guidance as to its potential application.  
Article 8 of the UNDRIP has been interpreted as providing ‘a minimum level of protection for the continued 
existence of Indigenous communities’.77 Case law concerning art 8 of the UNDRIP has recognised that the 
protection of rights to land is inherent in the protection of Indigenous culture.78 Therefore, s 28(3) will likely 
be engaged by actions that limit the use of Indigenous language or cultural expressions, remove children 
from their families and communities, or dispossess Indigenous peoples from their land.79  
Conciliation Outcomes 
Common outcomes reached in conciliations include:  
• acknowledgement of distress; 
• private and/or public apology; 
• compensation; 
 
71 Errico (n 20) 451-2. 
72 IACHR, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral Lands—Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc 56/09 (30 December 2009) [194], [197], [216ff]. See also (Sipakepense and Mam) of the Sipacapa 
and San Miguel Ixtahuacán Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos, Guatemala (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, PM 
260-07, 20 May 2010). 
73 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, (Communication No 155/1996) 
(2001) [52]. 
74 Errico (n 20) 451-2. 
75 Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, Decision No 03343-2007-AA of 19 February 2009; Constitutional Court of Columbia, Decision C-
366/11 of 11 May 2011, [13.2], [23.1]. See also See ILO Governing Body, 282nd Session, November 2001, representation under Art 
24 of the ILO Constitution, GB.282/14/2, para 36. See also Mahuika v New Zealand (Communication No 547/1993) [9.5] citing 
Länsman v Finland (Communication No 511/1992). See also Poma v Peru (Communication No 1457/2006) [7.6]. 
76 Explanatory Notes (n 23) 4, 23. 
77 Jessie Hohmann, ‘Group Identity, Self-determination, and Relations with UNDRIP and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Existence 
and Identity, and Non-Assimilation’ in Jessie Hohmann and Marc Weller (n 16) 152-153. 
78 Kichwa Indigenous Peoples of Sarayaku v Equador (Merits and Reparations), IACtHR (2012). See also J Gilbert and C Doyle, ‘A New 
Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent’ in Allen and Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart 2011) 2; F Lenzerini (ed), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2008) 295–96. 
79 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), ‘Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the Future: Summary of the Final Report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada’ (TRC 2015) 55, 133; TRC, ‘Canada, Aboriginal Peoples and Residential 
Schools: They Came for the Children’ (TRC 2012) 202; Minority Schools in Albania Advisory Opinion, 1935 PCIJ (ser A/B) No 64, 
17; Yanomami, Case No 7615 (Brazil) IACHR Res No 12/85 (5 March 1985); Yakye Axa v Paraguay, IACHR, Cancado-Trindade 
and Ventura Robles (2005). Cf Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
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• change to policy; 
• staff training (e.g. cultural awareness or anti-discrimination training); 
• reinstatement of employment or provision of job reference; 
• disciplinary measures against individuals involved; 
• provision of goods or services; and 
• reversal of decision.80 
In addition to these outcomes, more specific resolutions that might be sought in conciliations concerning s 28 
could include the following: 
• allowing access to or use of certain land, waters, etc;81 
• ceasing activity that is harmful to the environment and/or implementing restorative measures;82 
• providing services adapted to cultural differences (e.g. providing an interpreter);83  
• removing a ban preventing access to services;84 
• transferring the applicant to different facilities (e.g. health care, aged care or correctional facilities);85 
• allowing access to certain educational or other materials in Indigenous languages;86 
• introducing Indigenous cultural and language programs in schools; 
• giving Indigenous people priority for jobs that relate to the care of their land or maintenance of their 
culture;87 
• allowing greater communication and visitation with family members/kin (e.g. in the context of child 
removal or incarceration);88  
• providing public housing;89 and 
• consulting with Indigenous communities in relation to future policies and practices.90 
 
80 See generally Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Case Studies’, Resources (Web Page, 29 June 2019) 
<https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/resources/case-studies>; ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘Complaint Outcomes’, Complaints (Web 
Page) <https://hrc.act.gov.au/complaints/complaint-outcomes/>; Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, 
‘Complaint Process’, Discrimination (Web Page) <https://www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/discrimination/making-a-
complaint/complaints>; Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Conciliation Register’, Complaints (Web Page, 14 December 2012) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-register>. 
81 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Cultural Rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’, Human Rights Law (Fact 
Sheet, July 2019) 2 <https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/19897/QHRC_factsheet_HRA_s28.pdf>; Victorian 
Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 3. See also Lubicon 
Lake Band v Canada (Communication No 167/1984). 
82 See eg, Peru Constitutional Court, Decision No 03343-2007-AA of 19 February 2009 (restoration of the status quo ante or prior state 
of the environment). 
83 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 3. 
84 Australian Human Rights Commission (n 80). 
85 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Cultural Rights’ (n 50) 2; Australian Human Rights Commission (n 80). 
86 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 3.  
87 Parks Victoria (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) [2011] VCAT 2238. 
88 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 4; Victorian 
Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Cultural Rights in Youth Justice Centres (n 55) 10. 
89 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Cultural Rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (n 81) 3; citing the Victorian 
Aboriginal Legal Service; Australian Human Rights Commission (n 80). 
90 Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal Cultural Rights: What You Need to Know’ (n 6) 3; ACT Human 
Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Rights’, Human Rights (Web Page) 
<https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/guides-and-publications/detailed-information-enshrined-rights/aboriginal-and-torres-strait-
islander-cultural-rights/>. See also Länsman v Finland (Communication No 511/1992) at [9.6]. 
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In conciliations concerning Aboriginal cultural rights, it is also pertinent that the complainant is entitled to the 
assistance of an interpreter or another person ‘with appropriate cultural or social knowledge and 
experience’.91  
Finally, conciliations may also allow for flexibility in the conduct of the conference. The former Anti-
Discrimination Commission Queensland (now the Queensland Human Rights Commission) previously 
conducted a ‘shuttle’ conciliation, travelling between the complainant’s and respondent’s respective 
communities.92 This could be of particular significance for complaints made under s 28, as Indigenous 
complainants may face barriers to their access to the Queensland Human Rights Commission or may prefer 
to meet on country. 
 
91 HRA (n 1) s 84. 
92 Queensland Human Rights Commission, ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Case Studies’, Case Studies (Web Page, 28 June 
2019) <https://www.qhrc.qld.gov.au/resources/case-studies/a-and-tsi-case-studies>.  
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Section 30: Humane Treatment when Deprived of Liberty  
Brooke Nickerson and Alexia Cuss 
‘30 Humane treatment when deprived of liberty 
(1) All persons deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. 
(2) An accused person who is detained or a person detained without charge must be 
segregated from persons who have been convicted of offences, unless reasonably 
necessary. 
(3) An accused person who is detained or a person detained without charge must be 
treated in a way that is appropriate for a person who has not been convicted.’ 
 
Interpretation 
Section 30(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) is modelled on art 10(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Relations (‘ICCPR’)1 and is almost identical to the equivalent right found in 
New Zealand,2 the ACT3 and Victoria.4  
The right applies to persons who are “deprived of liberty” in places of detention, such as prisons or 
psychiatric facilities in Queensland.5   
‘Treated with Humanity’ and ‘Dignity’ 
A number of principles emerge from domestic and international jurisprudence which are instructive on how 
the words ‘treated with humanity’ and ‘dignity’ should be interpreted.  
 European Court of Human Rights - Applying article 10(1) of the ICCPR 
Article 10(1) imposes a ‘positive obligation’ 6 on the State to ‘ensure that a person is detained in conditions 
which are compatible with respect for their human dignity.’ 7 This requires the State to provide persons 
deprived of liberty with certain minimum services to meet their ‘basic [human] needs’ (outlined in the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).8 This includes the provision of adequate 
 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, vol. 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 
on 23 March 1976. 
2 Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 23(5). 
3 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 19(1). 
4 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 22(1) (‘Victorian Charter’). 
5 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2008, 25 (‘Explanatory Notes’). In the ACT, this also extends to the process of grant of parole: 
ZS v Sentence Administration Board [2018] ACTSC 289 [138]. In Victoria, this also applies to pre-trial detention, as well as 
detention after conviction: Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, Charter Guidelines: Section 22 – Humane treatment when 
deprived of liberty (23 August 2017) <http://humanrights.vgso.vic.gov.au/sites/humanrights/>. 
files/22.pdf> (‘Victorian Charter Guidelines’). The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also adopted a broader application 
to include persons who are deprived of liberty in correctional institutions, hospitals (although particularly psychiatric hospitals), 
detention centres or elsewhere: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 21: Article 10 (Humane 
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty) (Forty-fourth session, 1992), [2] (‘General Comment No. 21’).  
6 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil  and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, 2nd ed, 2005), 250. 
7 Illascu v Maldovia (European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004) [96] (‘Illascu’); Istratii v Maldovia [2005] 
ECHR 8721/05, 8705/05 and 8742/05. See also Eastman v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Justice and Community 
Safety [2010] ACTSC 4 [86] (‘Eastman v DJCS’); Islam v Director-General of the Department of Justice and Community Safety 
Directorate [2018] ACTSC 322 [63] (‘Islam v DJCS’). 
8 Nowak (n 6). See also Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Mandela Rules), GA Res 70/175, UN Doc 
A/RES/70/175 (8 January 2016, adopted 15 December 2015). 
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quality food, clothing, bedding, medical care, sanitary facilities, recreation and exercise, communication, light 
and ventilation.9 A person who is detained must not be subjected to ‘distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.’10  
New Zealand Courts - Applying section 23(5) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) 
Section 23(5) imposes a positive duty of ‘humane treatment’,11 which is treatment ‘as befits a human being 
with compassion.’12 This section is focused on protecting persons from conduct ‘lacking humanity’.13 This 
has been described as conduct which ‘… lacks humanity, but falls short of being cruel; which demeans the 
person, but not to an extent which is degrading; or which is clearly excessive in the circumstances, but not 
grossly so.’14 The failure of a State to meet detained peoples’ basic needs, as outlined above in relation to 
the provision of minimum services, amounts to a violation of the right.15 
Victorian Courts - Applying section 22(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic) 
A necessary consequence of the deprivation of liberty is that ‘rights and freedoms which are enjoyed by 
other citizens will necessarily be “curtailed”, “attenuated” and “qualified” merely by reason of the deprivation 
of liberty’ (for example, freedom of movement).16 A person who is deprived of liberty otherwise retains all 
their rights.17 
Whilst the act of detention alone does not violate section 22(1), the specific conditions of that detention 
can.18 An evaluation of the specific circumstances is required.  
“[N]ot every act which causes inconvenience, distress or even pain is inhumane; and not every 
act which limits the rights and freedoms of individuals can be said to be made without respect 
for the person’s dignity.”19  
The conduct must have a degree of severity to violate s 22(1).20  
Case Examples 
United Nations Human Rights Committee 
The Human Rights Committee has found a breach of art 10(1) of the ICCPR where detainees were: 
 
9 See Jakob Möller, ‘Treatment of Persons Deprived of Liberty: Analysis of the Human Rights Committee’s Case Law under Article 10 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden (2004) 667; 
Nowak (n 6); Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 [80] (‘Taunoa’); B v Waitemata District Health Board [2017] NZSC 88 
[58] (Judge Ellen France) and [174] (Judge Asher); and Victorian Charter Guidelines (n 5).  
10 Kudla v Poland (European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 30210/96, 26 October 2000) [94]. See also Renolde v France 
(European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 5608/07, 16 October 2008); Illascu (n 7); Eastman v DJCS (n 7) [86]; Islam v 
DJCS (n 7) [63]; Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children (2016) 51 VR 473 [172]-[173], citing Castles v Secretary to 
the Department of Justice [2010] VSC 310 [108] (‘Castles’); De Bruyn v Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health [2016] VSC 111 
[111] (‘De Bruyn’); Re HL (No 2) [2017] VSC 1 [125]; and Haigh v Ryan [2018] VSC 474 [84]. 
11 Taunoa (n 9) [7], [273]; Islam v DJCS (n 7) [56]. 
12 Taunoa (n 9) [275]; Islam v DJCS (n 7) [57]. 
13 B v Waitemata District Health Board [2017] NZSC 88 [56]. 
14 Taunoa (n 9) [177], cited in De Bruyn (n 10) [116].  
15 Taunoa (n 9) [157], citing Becciev v Moldova (2007) 45 EHRR 11. 
16 De Bruyn (n 10) [111] citing R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 [5]. This is also recognised in the 
Explanatory Notes (n 5) 25, with the Explanatory Notes going on to say that this position reflects the fact that punishment is 
intended to be limited to the deprivation of liberty. 
17 Victorian Charter Guidelines (n 5).  
18 Haigh v Ryan [2018] VSC 474, [85] (‘Haigh’). 
19 De Bruyn (n 10) [127], where it was held that a no smoking policy within a mental health facility did not violate s 22(1) as the policy 
was introduced for the purpose of protecting people from the known harmful effects of smoking.  
20 Haigh (n 18) [86]; Islam v DJCS (n 7) [66]. 
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• held in ‘incommunicado’ detention;21 
• refused medical attention;22 
• detained in freezing temperatures;23 
• held in solitary confinement for a long period of time;24 
• held in a small triangular cage awaiting court appearance;25 
• deprived of food for three days;26 
• without clean clothing, personal hygiene items and no bedding;27 
• without adequate sanitation, lighting, ventilation or palatable food;28 and 
• without re-education and work programs.29 
New Zealand 
In Taunoa,30 the Supreme Court of New Zealand found that the treatment of five prisoners under a behaviour 
management programme constituted a breach of s 23(5) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. The programme 
included: 
• segregation from other prisoners for between 22-23 hours a day; 
• loss of conditions while segregated; 
• a poor standard of hygiene; 
• small cells with poor natural lighting and deficient ventilation; 
• inadequate opportunity to exercise outside; 
• routine strip searches in breach of legislative requirements; 
• no rehabilitation programs; and 
• inadequate monitoring of inmate mental health. 
In Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204, the New Zealand Court of Appeal found that the failure 
to provide sanitary products and clean clothing over a 23 hour period to an illegal immigrant held in prison 
pending deportation constituted a breach of s 23(5).  
In Vogel v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 545 the Court made a declaration that the appellant’s cell 
confinement for 21 days was in breach of his rights under s 23(5).  
 
21 Espinoza de Polay v Peru, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994; Caldas v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979; Sharifova v 
Tajikistan, UN CCPR/C/92/D/1209 (‘Sharifova’), 1231/2003 & 1241/2004; and Umarova v Uzbekistan, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/100/D/1449/2006 (‘Umarova’). 
22 Mpandanjila v Zaire, UN Doc CCPR/C/27/D/138/1983. 
23 Campos v Peru, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994. 
24 Manera v Uruguay, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/D/123/1982 where a man was held in solitary confinement for eight months with the electric 
lights continuously turned on; and Umarova (n 22) where a man was held in an isolated holding cell for 19 days. 
25 Cabal & Passini v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001. 
26 Sharifova (n 21). 
27 Umarova (n 21). 
28 Deidrick v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/62/D/619/1995; Morgan & Williams v Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/64/D/720/1996; Shaw v 
Jamaica, UN Doc CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996 (‘Shaw’). 
29 Shaw (n 28). 
30 Taunoa (n 9). 
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Australian Capital Territory 
In Islam v DJCS the failure to provide vegetarian food to a prisoner who was a practising Muslim was found 
to be a breach of s 19(1) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).31  
Victoria 
In Dale v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] VSCA 212 a dangerous prisoner was subject to isolation, 
strip searches, shackling with leg irons when out of the unit and a requirement that he avoid eye contact with 
other prisoners. The Court of Appeal noted such conditions may raise questions under s 22(1) of the Charter 
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), although it declined to express a definitive view.32  
In Castles,33 Emerton J found that a female prisoner had a right to IVF treatment which was both reasonable 
and necessary for the preservation of her health.34  
In Haigh,35 the Supreme Court of Victoria was not persuaded that the withholding of four tarot cards from a 
prisoner engaged or curtailed his right to be treated with humanity.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
There is no stand-alone legal remedy for a contravention of the HRA. 36 In relation to court proceedings, a 
person may only bring a human rights claim together with a different cause of action. 37  The remedy that is 
available is the one in relation to the other cause of action. 38 These remedies include, but are not limited to, 
declaratory and injunctive relief,39 order to compel performance of duty (mandamus),40 order of certiorari 
quashing or setting aside the decision of a public authority,41 or judicial review.42  
In relation to a conciliation, there are three main outcomes a person may seek if they make a complaint 
against a public entity: an apology,43 an agreement to implement practices and policies to rectify the 
breach,44 and compensation.45 
An agreement to implemented practices and policies to rectify the breach was identified by Lord Bingham in 
R (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department as more important than compensation; Lord 
Bingham said: “where an infringement of an individual's human rights has occurred, the concern will usually 
be to bring the infringement to an end and any question of compensation will be of secondary, if any, 
 
31 Islam v DJCS (n 7) [65]. On the basis that the choice to be vegetarian for religious reasons is an option that is not limited by the fact 
that the prisoner has been deprived of liberty. 
32 Dale v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] VSCA 212 [38]. 
33 Castles (n 10).  
34 The principle issue was determined on the basis of the express right under section 47(1)(f) of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic) for 
prisoners to have access to reasonable medical care and treatment necessary for the preservation of their health. However, the 
application of section 22(1) of the Charter served to confirm the interpretation that had been arrived at: [4]. A fundamental aspect of 
section 22(1) of the Charter is the access to health care: [108]. Although, Her Honour noted that “the dignity right does not 
encompass the right to any and all medical treatment that is available in the community. The right of prisoners to medical treatment 
is a more limited one, but one that guarantees that the health of prisoners is protected and accorded no less importance than the 
health of other members of the community”: [113]. 
35 Haigh (n 18). 
36 Explanatory Notes (n 5) 7-8. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Castles (n 10) [1]. 
40 Weaven v The Secretary of the Department of Justice [2012] VSC 582. 
41 Kheir v Robertson [2019] VSC 422. 
42 Haigh (n 18).  




45 Australian Human Rights Commission (n 43).  
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importance.”46 A further example of this can be found in the case of Islam v DJCS, where the plaintiff sought 
an order that the defendant take reasonable steps to replace the current food ordering system.47  
Regarding compensation, damages are not available for a contravention of the HRA.48 However, in New 
Zealand, damages may be awarded where they are necessary to provide an effective remedy for breach of 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990.49 Indeed, in Taunoa50 damages were awarded to the plaintiffs for the breaches of 
their rights. Additionally, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has also recommended that claimants 
be monetarily compensated for their losses caused by a breach of art 10(1) of the ICCPR.51 
 
 
46 [2005] 1 WLR 673 [53], citing Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004] QB 1124, [52]–[53]. 
47 Islam v DJCS (n 7).  
48 Human Rights Bill 2018 Explanatory Notes (n 6) 8. 
49 Taunoa (n 9) [4]. 
50 Taunoa (n 9).  
51 See, eg, Barkovsky v Belarus, UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2247/2013 5 [8].  
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Section 31: Right to a Fair Hearing  
Fergus Rees 
‘31 Fair Hearing 
(1) A person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right 
to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial 
court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. 
(2) However, a court or tribunal may exclude members of media organisations, other 
persons or the general public from all or part of a hearing in the public interest or the 
interests of justice. 
(3) All judgments or decisions made by a court or tribunal in a proceeding must be 
publicly available.’ 
 
The right to a fair hearing is a ‘cardinal requirement of the rule of law’.1 Section 31 of the Human Rights Act 
2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) enshrines a positive right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial court or tribunal. 
Section 31 is largely based upon art 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’),2 and shares similarities with the equivalent rights contained in s 24 of the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’) and s 20 of the Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT). Accordingly, it is useful to the interpretation of s 31 to consider international and domestic 
jurisprudence on the right, to ensure a consistent interpretation and application is adopted in Queensland.   
In Victoria, the common law obligation to ensure a fair hearing operates in addition to the Charter. According 
to the court in Matsoukatidou:3 
‘The obligations imposed by the two rights are so close and overlapping that a court or tribunal 
is almost always entitled to proceed upon the basis that advice and assistance which satisfies 
the common law standard will also represent reasonable adjustments and accommodations 
under the human rights standard and vice versa’.4 
Indeed, Victorian courts have found that the statutory right ‘includes or embraces’ the common law rights of 
unimpeded access to courts,5 a reasonably expeditious hearing,6 and legal advice and representation.7 
Interpretation 
A Competent, Independent and Impartial Court or Tribunal 
Section 31(1) requires that proceedings be heard by a ‘competent, independent and impartial court or 
tribunal’. The impartiality of judges has been brought into question when providing assistance to self-
represented litigants.8 To maintain impartiality in such cases, arbiters must ensure that the litigant ‘is fully 
 
1 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin UK, 2011) 243. 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 14(1) (‘ICCPR’). See also Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld), 4, 25.  
3 Matsoukatidou v Yarra Ranges Council [2017] VSC 161 (‘Matsoukatidou’).  
4 Ibid [179]. 
5 Brazel v Westin [2013] VSC 527, [21]. 
6 Kracke v Mental Health Review Board (2009) 29 VAR 1. 
7 Slaveski v Smith [2012] VSCA 25, [51] (‘Slaveski’) 
8 Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337. 
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aware of the legal position in relation to the substantive and procedural aspects of the case’, but must stop 
short of advising them on the particular actions they should take.9 
A Fair Hearing 
Equality of Arms 
The content of a ‘fair hearing’ is not defined in the HRA. However, in contemplation of the equivalent 
provision in the Victorian Charter, it has been noted that the precise meaning of a ‘fair hearing’ will depend 
on the nature and circumstances of the proceedings. Justice Forrest characterised the statutory right to a fair 
hearing in Knight v Wise10 as follows: 
‘The right to a fair hearing is concerned with the procedural fairness of a decision. What fairness 
requires will depend on all the circumstances of the case. Broadly, it ensures a party has a 
reasonable opportunity to put their case in conditions that do not place them at a substantial 
disadvantage compared to their opponent. This principle is commonly known as the principle of 
“equality of arms” [between applicants]’.11 
Knight concerned a decision to deny a prisoner an in-cell computer in preparation of their court proceedings. 
Justice Forrest determined that the lack of access to an in-cell computer amounted only to a ‘mere 
inconvenience’ and did not place the applicant in a position of substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
prosecution.12 Accordingly, a ‘breach of the right to a fair hearing requires more than just inconvenience’.13  
In Roberts v Harkness14 the Victorian Court of Appeal suggested that the right’s ‘essential requirement’ of a 
‘reasonable opportunity’ to present a case would ‘ordinarily include being informed of the case to be 
advanced by the opposing party and having an opportunity to respond’.15 The case concerned the decision 
of a magistrate to exclude the self-represented defendant from a hearing for ‘persistent refusal to accept the 
ruling [against an objection to jurisdiction], and disrespectful and disruptive behaviour.’16 The Court of Appeal 
unanimously held that a fair hearing required: 
‘A combination of patience and judgment and an ability to discriminate between those cases 
where the interests of justice demand a prolongation or adjournment of the hearing — so that 
the unrepresented litigant’s case can be fairly presented — and those where the interests of 
justice call for expeditious disposal’.17 
Accordingly, the content of a 'fair hearing’ is inherently subject to the circumstances of the case, and the 
statutory and decision-making framework in which it is decided. Thus, the ‘right’ to an equality of arms 
between applicants is not absolute. 
Judicial Duties 
In Taha18 the Court of Appeal considered legislation under which a magistrate had ordered the imprisonment 
of a person with a disability due to an unpaid fine. The court construed the legislation as engaging the right 
to a fair hearing, because the legislative purpose of the Act was to prevent the imprisonment of persons 
except as a means of last resort.19 Accordingly, ‘just as the content of the requirement to provide an 
 
9 Ibid [89]. 
10 [2014] VSC 76. 
11 Ibid [36]. 
12 Ibid [26]. 
13 Ibid [37]. 
14 (2018) 57 VR 334. 
15 Ibid [48]. 
16 Ibid [5]. 
17 Ibid [66]. 
18 Victorian Police Toll Enforcement v Taha; State of Victoria v Brookes (2013) 49 VR 1, [150] (‘Taha’). 
19 Ibid [96]. 
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opportunity to be heard is variable, so too is what is necessary for an arbiter to do to discharge the duty to 
inquire, and will naturally vary from case to case’.20 However, for judicial officers to act compatibly with the 
right to a fair hearing, they should at a minimum inquire into the personal circumstances of the accused 
before making an imprisonment order, and should ask ‘if there are any special circumstances relevant to the 
case’, such as ‘the offender having a mental or intellectual impairment, serious drug addiction or being 
homeless’.21  
Right to Access the Courts 
The Victorian Courts have readily interpreted the Victorian Charter as incorporating the common law right to 
unimpeded access to the courts. In Brazel v Westin,22 a case factually similar to Knight, Justice Kaye 
distinguished the substantive fairness of the decision from its procedural effect. The primary consideration is 
‘whether the action or inaction of the [relevant authority] would preclude the plaintiff from having effective 
access to the court.’23 His Honour acknowledged that the circumstances rendered preparation ‘more difficult 
than it ought to be’, but assessed the facilities to be adequate and the hindrance caused thus not significant 
enough to constitute a breach of the right. 
The English Court of Appeal adopted a similar position in Perotti v Collyer-Bristow.24 In Perotti the claimant 
submitted that the ineffective administration of his uncle’s estate had breached the right to a fair hearing 
under art 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).25 The Court unanimously rejected the 
claimant’s submissions, stating that: 
‘It is not sufficient that the court might feel that the case could be presented better; the question 
for the court is whether it feels that the case is being, or will be, presented in such a way that it 
cannot do what it is required to do – that is to say, reach a just decision. If it cannot do that the 
litigant is effectively deprived of proper access to the courts.’26 
The Victorian Supreme Court has relied on the reasoning of international courts. In Slaveski it was stated 
that, ‘given the similarities between s 24(1) of the [Victorian Charter] and art 6(1) of the [ECHR], we are 
disposed to construe s 24(1) of the [Victorian Charter] in similar fashion.’27 The same should accordingly 
apply in Queensland in relation to the application and interpretation of s 31 of the HRA.  
Public Hearing and Public Availability of Decisions 
Section 31(1) further requires that hearings are ‘public’. The ‘requirement that justice be administered in 
public’ derives from the principle of open justice.28 The principle requires that: 
‘…the work of the courts is to be performed under public scrutiny, this being a powerful 
safeguard against the risk of their abusing their power, or departing from the strictest standards 
of impartiality’.29 
However, the requirement of a public and open hearing is not absolute. Section 31(2) empowers the court or 
tribunal to exclude media or other persons where it is in the ‘public interest or interests of justice’ to do so. 
 
20 Ibid [168]. 
21 Ibid. 
22 [2013] VSC 527. 
23 Ibid [22]. 
24 [2004] 2 All ER 189. 
25 European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 4 November 1953, [1953] ETS 5 (entered into force 3 September 
1953). 
26 Ibid [31]-[32]. 
27 Slaveski (n 7) [52]. 
28 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Bourke [2018] VSC 380 [77]. 
29 News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel (2010) 30 VR 248, [35]-[36]. See also United Nations Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 32 Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to fair trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007) 
[28]. 
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For example, the Victorian Coroners Court, in the application of a comparable provision, held that documents 
pertaining to internal police procedures should not be disclosed in the interests of justice.30 Justice Coate 
provided that the discretion to exclude persons or evidence from the court ought to be exercised with the 
least infringement to the right as possible, and in a manner that is proportionate to the harm that is sought to 
be avoided.31  
Conciliated Outcomes 
The Victorian Civil Justice Review expressed some concerns at the use of judicial review for matters that 
could otherwise be remedied by alternative dispute resolution. The review notably found that: 
‘Public confidence in the administration of justice is not necessarily enhanced by measures 
which seek to achieve ‘perfect’ justice, if such measures inexorably lead to substantial 
increases in complexity, cost and delay. This will usually be unacceptable to both individual 
litigants and the public generally’.32 
This observation is consistent with the court’s concerns in Roberts v Harkness, regarding the competing 
demands on the courts’ resources and the importance of striking a balance between ‘the interests of justice 
of the particular case, with the competing public interest of the efficient use of public resources and access to 
justice for other litigants waiting to have their cases heard’.33 In circumstances similar to Roberts v Harkness 
it may have been appropriate for inexpensive mediation to reduce the ‘tension between the demands of 
managerial efficiency and [the proper] administration of justice’.34  
Mediation may also be appropriate in matters with self-represented litigants to circumvent the complexity and 
formality of judicial proceedings. In Knight and Bazel, despite the court’s sympathy to the applicant’s 
infrequent access to computers, the court could not prove any ‘substantial disadvantage’ had occurred. The 
legal shortcomings of the case may have had less bearing in mediation.35 It would also have facilitated 
dialogue between the applicants and the prison authority, which may stimulate reform of internal policies. In 
discussing the issues, the applicants are less likely to become disenchanted with the administration of 
justice. 
Circumstances like Taha present an opportunity for the court to offer more tangible remedies. A conciliation 
conference may have led to compensation for the psychological harm and time on remand while the 
administrative mechanics of judicial review were undertaken.36 Compensation and the issuing of an apology 
may also be appropriate conciliatory remedies in the event of s 31 of the HRA being breached.  
 
30 Inquest into the death of Tyler Cassidy, Ruling on suppression application by the Chief 
Commissioner of Police pursuant to section 73(2)(b) of the Coroners Act 2008 (2008) COR 2008 5542. 
31 Ibid [39]. 
32 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review (Report No 14, March 2008).  
33 Roberts v Harkness (n 16) [66]. 
34 Murray Gleeson, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (Speech delivered at the 13th Commonwealth Law Conference, Melbourne, 17 April 
2003). 
35 Mary Anne Noone and Lola Akin Ojelabi, ‘Ensuring access to Justice in Mediation within the Civil Justice System’ [2014] Monash 
University Law Review 22. 
36 Alan Robertson SC, ‘Administrative Law Remedies: Some discretionary considerations’ (2002) 22 Australian Bar Review 119. 
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Section 33: Children in the Criminal Process 
Emily Hulme and Ritvik Ravi 
‘33 Children in the criminal process 
(1) An accused child who is detained, or a child detained without charge, must be 
segregated from all detained adults. 
(2) An accused child must be brought to trial as quickly as possible. 
(3) A child who has been convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is 
appropriate for the child’s age.’ 
 
With the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’), Queensland has joined Victoria and 
the ACT in legislatively safeguarding fundamental human rights as drawn from international law.1 Among 
these rights exists a trio of obligations, embedded in s 33 of the HRA, relating to the treatment of children in 
the criminal process. Firstly, an accused child who is detained, or a child detained without charge, must be 
segregated from all detained adults;2 secondly, an accused child must be brought to trial as quickly as 
possible;3 and thirdly, a child who has been convicted of an offence must be treated in a way that is 
appropriate for the child’s age.4 These provisions exist in recognition of the inherent vulnerability of children 
in the criminal process. The Queensland judiciary and Human Rights Commission must now consider how 
this legislation is to be interpreted in light of domestic and international jurisprudence, and further, which 
conciliated outcomes are appropriate and available to a plaintiff who makes a human rights complaint.  
Interpretation 
Scope 
In 2016, the age at which a person can be charged as an adult in Queensland was changed from 17 years 
old to 18 years old.5 This amendment brings Queensland’s legal definition of a ‘child’ into alignment with art 1 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (‘UNCROC’).6 Consequently, all children under the 
age of 18 in Queensland are to be afforded the rights contained in s 33 of the HRA. 
Segregation 
Children who are imprisoned with adults are at higher risk of violent victimisation, exposure to illicit 
substances and escalating criminality.7 Further, children have greater needs than those of adult offenders.8 
Thus, the segregation of children from detained adults stipulated under s 33(1) acts to protect the child’s 
basic safety and wellbeing.9 Interestingly, Australia has expressed reservation about the international 
 
1 The Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Human Rights (1 July 2019) Queensland Government <https://www.qld.gov.au/law/your-
rights/discrimination-and-equality/human-rights>.  
2 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 33(1) (‘HRA’).  
3 Ibid s33(2).  
4 Ibid s33(3).  
5 Youth Justice and Other Legislation (Inclusion of 17-year-old Persons) Amendment Act 2016 (Qld) ss 4-6. 
6 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, (entered into force 2 September 1990) 
art 1 (‘UNCROC’).   
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process, Report No 84 (29 July 2010).    
8 Australian Institute of Criminology, What makes juvenile offenders different from adult offenders? (February 2011) < 
https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi409> 
9 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 10: Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, 45th sess, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/10 
(25 April 2007) [85]. 
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equivalent of s 33(1), art 37(c) of the UNCROC.10 Australia’s ratification of the UNCROC was prefaced by the 
assertion that the obligation to separate children from adults in prison is accepted only to the extent that it is 
feasible and consistent with the obligation that children maintain contact with their families.11 Consequently, it 
is the Commonwealth’s position that a child’s detention within an adult facility may be justified where it is 
within the child’s best interests to prioritise family contact.12 Such cases would invoke the Court’s parens 
patriae jurisdiction, where the overriding consideration is the ‘best interests of the child’.13 Accordingly, when 
adjudicating under s 33(1) of the HRA, Queensland decision-makers should weigh the dangers of a child’s 
exposure to an adult prison against that child’s best interests, based on the factual circumstances at hand. If, 
on the Court’s determination, a public body places a child within an adult prison without proper consideration 
of the child’s best interests, that body will breach s 33(1) and their obligation to make decisions compatible 
with human rights under s 58 of the Act. 
Trial 
Section 33(2) of the HRA, art 40(2)(b)(iii) of the UNCROC and art 10(2)(b) of the ICCPR14 each recognise an 
accused child’s right to be brought to trial as quickly as possible. This obligation is more onerous than the 
general standard of bringing an accused to trial ‘without unreasonable delay’,15 given the greater 
criminological and psychological consequences of imprisoning children.16 Consequently, Queensland 
decision-makers must determine what constitutes ‘reasonable’ delay for the purposes of s 33(2). In Philis v 
Greece, the European Court of Human Rights asserted that reasonableness of delay must be assessed in 
light of the particular circumstances of the case, including its complexity.17 This test was cited in Perovic v 
CW  where, while adjudicating on the ACT’s equivalent provision,18 the Court held that an unjustifiable delay 
of 16 months between the offence and prosecution resulted in injustice for the accused child.19 Moreover, the 
ACT Supreme Court has described the obligation to act ‘as quickly as possible’ as an obligation to give 
priority to the child’s case and take positive steps towards its expeditious completion.20 The European Court 
of Human Rights has accordingly held that ‘reasonable time’ begins to run as soon as the accused is 
charged.21 In contrast, ACT courts have held that the omission of the term ‘accused’ from the description of 
child in s 20(3) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) indicates an intention for time to begin to run as soon as 
the child is subject to police investigation.22 Given that s 33(2) specifically refers to ‘accused’ children, 
meaning children who have been charged, the Queensland decision-makers should find the European 
position more persuasive.  
Treatment 
Children in the criminal process are likely to be known to child safety services, have taken drugs, 
experienced domestic violence, be disengaged from their family and not attend school regularly.23 
Consequently, children who have been convicted are tremendously vulnerable and must be treated in an 
 
10 UNCROC (n 6) art 37(c).  
11 United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child (6 September 2019) < 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en> 
12 Human Rights & Discrimination Commissioner, ACT Human Rights Commission, Rights of Children in the Criminal Process (s 20) < 
https://hrc.act.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Section-20-Rights-of-children-in-the-criminal-process.pdf>  
13 State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454, 455.  
14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 
10(2)(b (‘ICCPR’).  
15 LM v Childrens Court of the Australian Capital Territory and the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Australian Capital Territory 
[2014] ACTSC 3, at [54]. 
16 Human Rights & Discrimination Commissioner (n 12).  
17 (No 2) (1998) Eur Court HR 417, [35]. 
18 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 20(3).  
19 Perovic v CW (Unreported, ACT Childrens Court, Magistrate Somes, 1 June 2006).  
20 LM v ACT Childrens Court (n 15) [54].  
21 Eckle v Germany (1982) 5 Eur Court HR 1, [73].  
22 Perovic v CW (n 19). 
23 Tamara Walsh, ‘From child protection to youth justice: Legal responses to the plight of “cross-over kids”’ (2019) 46(1) University of 
Western Australia Law Review 90. 
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age-appropriate manner, as stipulated by s 33(3) of the Act and art 37(c) of the UNCROC.24 Queensland 
decision-makers must subjectively assess what the ‘appropriate’ treatment of a child is based on their age 
and the individual circumstances. To assist, the court may refer to the United Nations Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.25 These standards stipulate an extensive list of rules 
relating to the treatment of child offenders, including that children in detention shall: 
• Have access to education or vocational training in preparation for reintegration into the community, 
and where possible, this education or training should take place in community facilities;26 
• Engage in daily recreational activities;27 
• Receive adequate medical care to detect and treat any physical or mental illness that may hinder 
their rehabilitation;28 
• Be administered medicine only for necessary medical treatment;29 
• Have adequate communication with the outside world and the right to receive frequent visits;30 and  
• Never be placed in solitary confinement or subject to punishment that may compromise their mental 
or physical health.31 
Considering these standards, an example of neglecting to appreciate the age and needs of children is found 
in the Certain Children32 case, which involved the establishment of a youth justice centre at Barwon adult 
prison. Evidence was given that the children were placed in isolated lockdown for hours, given medication 
without consent, did not have adequate access to educational and recreational facilities, and that limitations 
were placed on their developmental needs.33 The Victorian Supreme Court ruled that the youth detention 
centre was incompatible with international and domestic human rights law. Although the plaintiffs in Certain 
Children34 were detained on remand and had not yet been convicted, the case demonstrates how 
Queensland decision-makers should oversee the treatment of children in the criminal justice system when 
their human rights are violated.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
Section 33 of the HRA could be engaged by: activities which affect the speed at which a child may be 
brought to trial; the detention of children in unsuitable facilities; or improper alteration of youth prison 
programs.35 In such cases, a child making a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission might 
choose to resolve the matter via conciliation. Depending on the case, a range of conciliated outcomes may 
be appropriate to informally and efficiently settle the matter,36 and assist in remedying the harm caused by a 
breach of this section. 
One of the most commonly desired conciliated outcomes is an apology made by the respondent to 
acknowledge the hurt and distress caused to the complainant. Apologies can be public or private, based on 
the preference of the complainant. In cases involving a breach of s 33, the respondent is likely to be a large 
public body such as a correctional facility, or the Department of Public Prosecutions. Consequently, a public 
apology would involve acknowledgement of the actions leading to a breach of the child’s human rights, and 
 
24 UNCROC (n 6). 
25 United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (14 December 1990).  
26 Ibid Part IV E 38-42. 
27 Ibid Part IV F 47. 
28 Ibid Part IV H 49-51. 
29 Ibid Part IV H 55.  
30 Ibid Part IV J 59-61. 
31 Ibid Part IV L 67. 
32 Certain Children by Their Litigation Guardian v Minister for Families and Children & Ors [2016] VSC 796. See also Certain Children v 
Minister for Families and Children & Ors (No 2) [2017] VSC 251.   
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Human Rights & Discrimination Commissioner (n 12). 
36 HRA (n 2) s 80.  
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holding the respondent to account in a public forum. Similarly, the complainant may seek a statement of 
regret, which involves the public entity expressing remorse for their actions and for causing distress or harm 
to the complaint.37  
Complainants may pursue conciliation with the objective of altering the conditions of their detention in a way 
that properly accommodates their age. For example, in Certain Children, the plaintiffs sought an outcome 
that prevented their transfer to an adult facility.38 Similarly, in DPP v S L the respondent sought to be 
separated from adults whilst they were in remand awaiting court hearings.39 The complainant may also seek 
physical modifications to a youth detention facility, or for modifications to be made to educational and 
vocational programs offered. This conciliated outcome may be more appropriate where substantive change 
to procedures or environments is warranted to bring the conduct of the public entity into alignment with their 
obligations under s 33. The complainant could seek an undertaking from the authority to make any changes 
to internal policy necessary, to accommodate the human rights afforded to children in the criminal process. 
Compensation may be appropriate where the conduct of the public authority has caused significant hurt and 
distress,40 such as in Brough v Australia, where compensation was awarded after the plaintiff had been 
unlawfully held in solitary confinement.41 Importantly, conciliation may not be sufficient in instances where 
the child’s human rights have been violated by conduct that is abusive or violent, or where the hurt and 
distress caused to the child is too significant and has a lasting impact. 
 
37 Australian Human Rights Commission, Understanding and Preparing for Conciliation – Unlawful Discrimination (14 December 2012) < 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/complaint-guides/understanding-and-preparing-conciliation-unlawful-discrimination> 
38 Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children & Ors (No 2) [2017] VSC 251. 
39 DPP v S L [2016] VSC 714. 
40 Australian Human Rights Commission, Conciliation Register < https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-
register/list?field_discrimination_type_value=All&field_grounds_value=All&field_areas_value=All&field_date_value=All&keys=&page
=0> 
41 UN Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1184/2003, 86th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1184/2003 (17 March 2006) 
(‘Brough v Australia’). 
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Section 36: The Right to Education 
Sienna McInnes-Smith and Christoph Baer 
‘36 Right to education 
(1) Every child has the right to have access to primary and secondary education 
appropriate to the child’s needs. 
(2) Every person has the right to have access, based on the person’s abilities, to further 
vocational education and training that is equally accessible to all.’ 
 
The right to education is an ‘empowerment’ right,1 being both a multiplier and bridge to other human rights.2 
This means that its realisation facilitates the fulfilment of other rights, while its denial precludes enjoyment of 
them.3 In the seminal case of Brown v Board of Education in 1954, the United States Supreme Court 
emphasised the importance of education to a democratic society and observed that education enables 
citizenship, making it the most important function of state and local governments.4 This is particularly so in 
Australia, with the country being founded upon principles of representative and responsible government, and 
even more so in Queensland, where there is a unicameral Parliament. Thus, the right to education contained 
in s 36 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) must be interpreted carefully.  
Interpretation 
International Law 
Queensland’s right to education is derived from art 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) and is intended to provide rights regarding ‘the aspects of education service 
delivery for which the State is responsible’.5 Under the HRA, courts are expressly permitted to consider 
international law to aid the interpretation of rights in the Act.6 Furthermore, state parties are obliged to 
exercise the right without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.7  
Australian Jurisdictions 
Other than Queensland, the only other Australian jurisdiction to have a right to education is the ACT. That 
right was added as an amendment eight years after the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT) itself, to facilitate a person in exercising their right to vote.8 The ACT right is distinguishable from 
Queensland’s because it is explicitly confined to immediately realisable aspects and freedom from 
discrimination in education.9 Furthermore, only two cases have been brought in relation to the ACT right: 
 
1 ‘Special Rapporteur on the right to education’, Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (Web page, 25 August 2019) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/SREducation/Pages/SREducationIndex.aspx> .  
2 Katarina Tomasevski, Education Denied: Costs and Remedies (Zed Books, 2003) 1.  
3 Ibid.  
4 (1954) 347 US 483, 493.  
5 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2019 (Qld) 28 .  
6 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 48(3) (‘HRA’).  
7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A(XXI), 21 UN GAOR, Supp No 16, 
UN Doc A/6316 (16 December 1966) art 13 (‘ICESCR’). 
8 Explanatory Statement, Human Rights Amendment Bill 2012 (ACT) 4.   
9 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 27A(3); Islam v Director-General of the Department of Justice and Community Safety Directorate 
[2018] ACTSC 322 [69].  
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Wang and Islam.10 The former involved little discussion of the right, and in the latter it was not enforced, due 
to a lack of discrimination.11 Few other Commonwealth countries have such express rights to education.12 
While the United Kingdom (UK) subscribes to the European Convention on Human Rights which does 
contain a right to education, it is quite different from the right contained in the HRA.13  
Education cases in Australia, conducted without a right to education, have been predominantly framed as 
discrimination cases, often centred around disability.14 This is because education decisions are generally not 
reviewable,15 and successfully argued discrimination cases may enliven remedies.16 However, few cases 
brought in this manner have been successful since the decision in Purvis.17 Purvis made education 
discrimination cases difficult to argue because the court narrowed the circumstances in which discrimination 
based upon disability would be found. They held that the test was whether a comparator would have been 
treated similarly, in circumstances not materially different, if they displayed all the characteristics of the 
disabled person, apart from the disability itself.18 This meant, in that case, that the treatment the complainant 
had received was compared to the treatment of a child without his brain injury, but with his behaviour,19 
irrespective of the relationship between the brain injury and the behaviour. 
Purvis was clearly outcome-driven and relied on Parliament to make legislative changes.20 Subsequently, 
new legislation was implemented to clarify Purvis,21 imposing a duty to make reasonable adjustments for 
children with disabilities so that they could access education facilities and services.22 Despite this, Purvis 
continues to be applied in the usual way.23 This appears to be because without other grounds for legal 
review, education decisions continue to be framed and contested as discrimination cases. The right to 
education thus appears to provide a more appropriate ground upon which to base complaints regarding 
education, constituting a turning point in Queensland for students and education providers. It remains to be 
seen, however, exactly what a right to education means.   
The Right in Queensland 
Appropriate Education 
Previously, it was open to educational institutions to provide support for children with special needs, but 
there was no obligation to do so,24 nor was there an obligation to provide minimum, baseline levels of 
education across educational institutions or to detained children and other persons.25 The right to education 
appears to address the former, by implementing an entitlement for children to have access to education 
‘appropriate’ to their needs and access to further education ‘based on ability’.26 The idea of an ‘appropriate’ 
 
10 Wang v Australian Capital Territory (Discrimination) [2015] ACAT 5 and Islam v Director-General of the Department of Justice and 
Community Safety Directorate [2018] ACTSC 322 (‘Islam’).  
11 Islam (n 10) [153]. 
12 Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483, 493.  
13 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 
(entered into force 3 September 1953), as supplemented by Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 20 March 1952, ETS No 9 (entered into force 18 May 1954) Art 2.  
14 See inter alia: Hinchcliffe v University of Sydney [2004] FMCA 85; Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland 
[2005] FCA 405; Clarke v Catholic Education Office [2003] FCA 1085. 
15 Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) s 401 and Education Act 1990 (NSW) s 107, excepting Education Act (NT) Part 5.   
16 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 22; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), ss 7(h).  
17 Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
18 Ibid [223]-[224].  
19 Ibid [225].  
20 Ibid [96].  
21 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 December 2008, 12292 (Robert McClellend, Attorney-General).  
22 Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) ss5(2) and 6(2). 
23 Although see Woodforth v State of Queensland [2017] QCA 100; and see further Tamara Walsh and Bridget Burton, ‘Queensland’s 
new right to education: What does it mean for children with disabilities?’ (2019)   
24 Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) s 420.  
25 This was a concern of the ACT Human Rights Commission in 2011: ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘The Right to Education: 
Human Rights Legal Factsheet’ (2012) 4. 
26 HRA (n 6) s 36.  
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education is well established in UK legislation and United States case law.27 It is underpinned by the 
principle that children should be educated together where possible, with the use of supplementary aids and 
services such as individualised education plans.28 Indeed, the United Nations Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights Committee has elaborated upon this ‘appropriateness’ standard, stating that reasonable 
accommodations should be made to ensure that disabled students receive an equal standard of education.29 
As rights are to be construed broadly in Australia,30 the wording of the right appears to place a similar 
positive duty on public education institutions to provide student with disabilities with sufficient support to level 
the education playing field, as well as constituting a ground for redress when that duty is neglected. 
However, s 13 of the HRA allows the right to education to be reasonably limited. While the question of what 
is ‘reasonable’ will invariably depend on the facts of each case, cases brought under anti-discrimination 
legislation may provide some guidance on the likely approach of the courts. Those cases have tended to 
focus on an institution’s resources,31 the student’s capacity to learn without extra resources,32 and the 
availability of less costly means of providing support.33  
An important gap relates to independent schools, which receive significant federal funding. Federal funding 
models disproportionately benefit schools catering to students from affluent backgrounds,34 yet only public 
education institutions, like the Department of Education,35 public vocational institutions and state schools,36 
are bound by the right.37 It is unclear whether the right might allow for mandated minimum educational 
standards to be set. Notably, art 13 of the ICESCR does not go so far as to require equal treatment between 
schools, but only that the right to education must conform to such minimum educational standards as may be 
laid down or approved by the State.38 
Regardless, education must be ‘equally accessible to all’.39 The accessibility of education has been 
interpreted in relation to the ICESCR right to education, which should guide the interpretation of the 
Queensland right.40 Accessibility is one of the four As (accessibility, availability, acceptability and 
adaptability),41 forming the minimum standards with which states must comply.42 According to the Special 
Rapporteur, ‘access’ to education has three elements: equal access (non-discriminatory), physical access 
(including to rural areas and vulnerable populations) and economic access.43 ‘Available’ education is closely 
related to ‘accessible’ education, requiring there to be sufficient quantities of educational programs and 
institutions with the necessary means of functioning.44 ‘Acceptable’ education focuses on the form and 
substance of education and its quality, while an ‘adaptable’ education requires it to be flexible to meet the 
 
27 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001 (UK) s 1 and in the US: Parks v Pavkovic (1985) 753 F2d 1397; Timothy W v 
Rochester School District (1989) 875 F2d 954 and more recently: Andover Schools Committee v Bureau of Special Education 
(2013) Appeals of the Div. of Admin. Law Appeals, No. 12-12288-DPW.  
28 Tamara Walsh, ‘Children with special needs and the right to education’ (2012) 18(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 27, 32.  
29 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [6]. 
30Certain Children by their Litigation Guardian Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for Families and Children [2016] VSC 796 [143]. 
31 Phu v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) [2009] NSWADT 282; Woodbury v ACT [2007] ACTDT 4. 
32 Turner v Department of Education and Training (2007) VCAT 873. 
33 YB v State of Queensland [2010] QCAT 395; Woodbury v ACT [2007] ACTDT 4.  
34  Lindsay Connors and Jim Morrow, ‘Imperatives in Schools Funding: Equity, Sustainability and Achievement’ (Australian Educational 
Review, 2015) 50; Louise Watson and Chris Ryan, ‘Choosers and Losers: The Impact of Government Subsidies on Australian 
Secondary Schools’ (2010) 54(1) Australian Journal of Education 86, 86-87. 
35 HRA (n 6) s 9(1)(a).   
36 Ibid s 9(1)(h).  
37 Ibid s 58.  
38 ICESCR (n 7) art 13 (3). 
39 HRA (n 6) s 36(2).  
40 Ibid s 48. See also Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s14B(1)(a).  
41 Katarina Tomaševski, Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, UN ESCOR, Communication on 
Human Rights, 55th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49 (13 January 1999), 15-23; adopted by CESCR: Committee on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 13: The Right to Education, 21st sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (13 January 1999) [6]. 
42 Phillip Alston, ‘Out of the Abyss: the Challenges Confronting the New UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 9 
Human Rights Quarterly 332, 353.  
43 Tomaševski (n 41) 20.  
44 Ibid 18. 
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needs of the communities and societies in which it operates and to respond to the needs of culturally and 
socially diverse students.45  
The above interpretation would likely affect the provision of education services to persons in detention. In 
2011, the ACT Human Rights Commission raised concerns that the quality of education provided to young 
people in detention facilities may not be consistent with the scope of the right to education.46 This may arise 
where logistical or security arrangements prevent the provision of education services meeting the baseline 
standard required by the right, especially in cases involving persons with low literacy levels or who require 
more learning support than a typical student.47 However, it seems that the inadequacy of that education 
would have to be severe to infringe the right.48  
Further Education 
Queensland’s right also appears to apply to ‘further education’, which has been interpreted broadly in the 
ACT. In Islam, McWilliam J suggested that ‘further education’ may include higher level tertiary education, 
such as masters and PhD courses, however, the Queensland right expressly limits ‘further education and 
training’ to that which is ‘vocational’, and where there is ‘ability’ to complete such courses.49 The reason for 
using ‘ability’, rather than ‘capacity’ as in the ICESCR right, is unknown. However, the difference is unlikely to 
be substantive: the definition of each word in the Macquarie Dictionary contains the other.50 Moreover, by 
limiting this right to where there is ‘ability’, educational institutions retain their power to determine entry 
requirements and standards,51 without burdening the right.  
Application 
In considering how public education institutions can act consistently with the right to education, Queensland 
decision-makers may heed the Maastricht Principles, which delineate a ‘respect, protect, fulfil’ interpretation 
of states’ duties under art 13 of ICESCR.52 This would discourage education providers from preventing a 
person from attending their institution, protect them from expulsion and fulfil their right by providing the 
progressive realisation of free education. However, this obligation is subject to the reasonable limitation of 
rights where demonstrably justified.53 
The right to education appears to oblige public educational institutions to make appropriate adjustments to 
allow all students to access education equally. This means that the ultimate question will become one of 
reasonableness and proportionality,54 which balances the rights of students with the ability of institutions to 
provide them with equal educational opportunities.  
Conciliated Outcomes 
Previously, there were no remedies for decisions regarding education in Queensland because those 
decisions were not reviewable.55 While the HRA does not contain any remedies, it will allow a declaration of 
incompatibility to be made where a law is inconsistent with the right.56 This lack of effective remedies 
 
45 Ibid 22-23. 
46 ACT Human Rights Commission, ‘The ACT Youth Justice System 2011: A Report to the ACT Legislative Assembly by the ACT 
Human Rights Commission’ (2011) 265. 
47 Ibid 265. 
48 Islam v Director-General Justice and Community Safety Directorate (No 3) [2016] ACTSC 27. 
49 HRA (n 6) s 36(2).  
50 Macquarie Dictionary (online at 30 August 2019) ‘Ability’ and Macquarie Dictionary (online at 30 August 2019) ‘Capacity’.  
51 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 109 [15]. 
52 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR, 
24th sess, Agenda Item, Doc E/C.12/2000/13 (2 October 2000) [6]. 
53 HRA (n 6) s 13.  
54 Walsh (n 28) 47.  
55 Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) s 401.  
56 HRA (n 6) s 53.  
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increases the importance of conciliated outcomes because they can provide redress to an aggrieved party 
which is quicker, cheaper and more likely to be favourable than court proceedings. 
There are several kinds of conciliated outcomes that a claimant may seek regarding a perceived breach of 
their right to education, depending upon the circumstances of their case. The most commonly given 
outcomes in education discrimination conciliations are: 
• Statements of regret; 
• compensation; 
• policy changes; 
• anti-discrimination training; and  
• revised terms.57  
Less frequently given outcomes include: 
• (re)enrolment; and  
• compensation for expenses incurred by enrolling in a new institution.58  
Although the most commonly received outcome in education discrimination conciliations is a statement of 
regret,59 those most useful to complainants are substantive ones such as enrolment, adjustments and 
revised terms or practices or the provision of more resources. Revised terms and adjustments may include 
extra exam time, extra teacher training, supplying a teacher’s aide or formulating an individualised education 
plan. In doing so, the institution may agree to consult with members of the affected community and even 
donate to a charity or advocacy organisation as a measure of goodwill. While a statement of regret is 
important because it acknowledges the claimant’s suffering, it is not a remedy and means that the 
respondent does not admit liability for their (in)action. Where substantive changes are unachievable, an 
apology may be more appropriate in upholding the inherent dignity and worth of all human beings enshrined 
in the Preamble of the Act.60  
 
57 This is from my own observations of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Conciliation Register, 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/complaints/conciliation-register>. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid.  
60 HRA (n 6) Preamble.  
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Section 37: The Right to Health Services 
Zoe Cornwell and Gemma Galloway 
‘37 Right to health services  
(1) Every person has the right to access health services without discrimination. 
(2) A person must not be refused emergency medical treatment that is immediately 
necessary to save the person’s life or to prevent serious impairment to the person.’ 
 
The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’) enshrines a ‘right to health services’ in s 37.1 This provision is 
comprised of two limbs: the right to access health services without discrimination,2 and the right not to be 
refused emergency medical treatment.3 The outline below considers how Queensland decision-makers are 
likely to interpret s 37 and the potential outcomes that complainants may seek under the HRA’s conciliation 
process.    
Interpretation  
Public Entities  
It is unlawful under the HRA for a public entity to make a decision that is not compatible with human rights or 
to fail to give proper consideration to a human right.4 ‘Public entity’ is defined as ‘an entity whose functions 
are, or include, functions of a public nature when it is performing the functions for the State or a public 
entity’.5 Section 10(3)(b) provides that emergency and public health services are both functions of a public 
nature. Therefore, public hospitals and emergency health service providers constitute public entities under 
the HRA. Arguably, private hospitals may not be classified as public entities,6 however, they may choose to 
‘opt in’ to the public authority provisions.7  
Other Jurisdictions 
While Victoria8 and the ACT9 have human rights legislation, neither of these jurisdictions have a right to 
health services. Therefore, there is no case law from any Australian jurisdictions to provide guidance as to 
the potential interpretation and application of s 37.  
Internationally, South Africa is the only jurisdiction with an express right to health services.10 However, other 
jurisdictions and international instruments confer similar protections under other rights, in particular the ‘right 
to life’ and the ‘right to health’.11 Some of the more relevant international instruments are outlined briefly 
 
1 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 37. 
2 Ibid s 37(1). 
3 Ibid s 37(2). 
4 Ibid s 58(1). 
5 Ibid s 9(1)(h). 
6 Jasmine Sears, ‘Human Rights Act for Queensland and Healthcare Implications’ (Article, 28 March 2019) 
<https://www.bnlaw.com.au/page/Insights/Insurance_Alerts/Health_Alerts/Human_Rights_Act_for_Queensland_and_healthcare_im
plications/>.  
7 HRA (n 1) s 60. 
8 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘Victorian Charter’). 
9 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) (‘ACT act’). 
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) s 27 (‘South African Constitution’). 
11 PBU and NJU v Mental Health Tribunal [2018] VSC 564 [94]; Constitution of the World Health Organisation, (adopted by the 
International Health Conference, New York, 19 June–22 July 1946); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UN 
GAOR, 3rd sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) art 25; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (‘ICESCR’); Convention on the 
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below. These instruments are relevant to the interpretation of s 37 because Australian courts can consider 
international law and the judgments of foreign courts and tribunals when interpreting ambiguous statutory 
provisions.12 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) 
The ICESCR is the central instrument for the protection of the right to health, which is included in art 12(1).13 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) has stated that ‘the right to health must 
be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary 
for the realisation of the highest attainable standard of health.’14 This encompasses the ‘underlying 
determinants of health’, such as access to food, water, nutrition, housing, sanitation, healthy working 
conditions and a health environment.15 The CESCR has interpreted the right to health not as a ‘right to be 
healthy’ but as a right that constitutes both freedoms and entitlements.16  
South Africa 
The only international jurisdiction with an express right to healthcare services is South Africa.17 Section 27 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides a right to access health care services, sufficient 
food and water and social security,18 and a right not to be refused emergency medical treatment.19 The 
application of South African jurisprudence to s 37 of the HRA is considered further below. 
Canada 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not contain a specific right to health, but actions 
regarding health are brought under s 15 (equality rights).20 For example, in Eldridge v British Columbia,21 a 
publicly funded Medicare scheme’s failure to provide sign language interpretation services to deaf people 
amounted to discrimination and violated s 15(1). 
United Kingdom  
Similarly, although the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) does not contain a right to access health services, it 
contains the right to life in art 2, which is particularly relevant to matters concerning the provision of health 
services.22 The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has interpreted art 2 as requiring the state to 
make regulations compelling hospitals to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of patients’ lives.23  
 
Rights of Persons With Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, [2008] ATS 12 (entered into force 3 March 2008); Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK); European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 4 November 1953, [1953] ETS 5 (entered into 
force 3 September 1953); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered 
into force 18 July 1978); European Social Charter, opened for signature 18 October 1961, [1965] ETS 35 (entered into force 26 
February 1965); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, opened for signature November 4 2000, [2000] OJ C 364/1 
(entered into force 1 December 2009) (‘EU Charter’); Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms’). 
12 HRA (n 1) s 48(3); Victorian Charter (n 8) s 32(2); ACT Act (n 9) s 31. 
13 ICESCR (n 11) art 12. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the World Health 
Organisation, The Right to Health: Fact Sheet No 31 (United Nations, Geneva, June 2008) 9 (‘The Right to Health: Fact Sheet No 
31’). 
14 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14 (2000): The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard 
of Health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN ESCOR, 22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, 
UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) [9] (‘General Comment No 14’). 
15 Ibid [4], [11]-[12], [36].  
16 Jill Stavert and Rebecca McGregor, ‘Domestic Legislation and International Human Rights Standards: The Case of Mental Health and 
Incapacity’ The International Journal of Human Rights 22 (2018) 80. 
17 South African Constitution (n 10) s 27(1)(a). 
18 Ibid s 27(1). 
19 Ibid s 27(2). 
20 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (n 11) s 15. 
21 Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624. 
22 Elizabeth Haggett, The Human Rights Act 1998 and Access to NHS Treatment and Services: A Practical Guide (University College 
London, 2001) 13. 
23 Oyal v Turkey (2010) 51 EHRR 30 [54]; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v Portugal (2016) 66 EHRR 28 [39]. 
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Central and South America 
The American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’) includes a right to life.24 In Yakye Axa,25 this right was 
interpreted as requiring the state to take positive action to ensure the provision of 'medicine, food, clean 
water and sanitation'.26 
EU Charter 
The (‘EU Charter’) protects the right to health, which includes health services as well as the underlying 
determinants of health.27 In Poland, the Appellate Court held that the right to the protection of health under 
art 35 of the EU Charter is one of the forms in which the state protects the right to life.28 
European Social Charter  
The European Social Charter is the ‘regional counterpart’ of the ICESCR and includes the right to the 
protection of health.29 In International Federation,30 the CESCR stated that '…legislation or practice which 
denies entitlement to medical assistance to foreign nationals, within the territory of a State Party… is contrary 
to the Charter'.31  
The Right to Access Health Services 
Section 37(1) protects the right to access health services without discrimination.32 For the reasons outlined 
below, s 37(1) is likely to be construed more narrowly than a more general right to health or a right to life as 
contained in international instruments. 
Meaning of ‘Health’ and Overlap with the Right to Life 
Section 37 could arguably encompass a right to both ‘health’ and ‘health services’, as the right to health 
services is derivative of the right to health. Indeed, access to health services is an integral part of the right to 
health.33 Section 37 is based on art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,34 which recognises ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’.35 According to the CESCR, the right to health contains four interrelated 
elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.36 However, the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the HRA indicates that s 37(1) is narrower than art 12 ICESCR and is not intended to encompass rights in 
relation to provision of the ‘underlying determinants of health’, such as food, water, social security, housing, 
clean environments37 and insurance.38 This qualification therefore narrows the scope of s 37, which will not 
encompass a more general right to health or ‘underlying health determinants’.39 
 
24 American Convention on Human Rights (n 11) art 4. 
25 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 125, 17 June 2005). 
26 Steven Keener and Javier Vasquez, ‘A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ Columbia Human Rights Law Review 40 (2009) 595, 611. 
27 EU Charter (n 11) art 35; Poland: Appellate Court in Wroclaw / I Aca 1337/11 (19 January 2012). 
28 Poland: Appellate Court in Wroclaw / I Aca 1337/11 (19 January 2012). 
29 European Social Charter (n 11) art 11. 
30 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France, Complaint No 13/2003 (Merits) (ECSR, 8 September 2004). 
31 Ibid 30–31. 
32 HRA (n 1) s 37(1). 
33 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 14) [12]. 
34 Explanatory Notes, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld) 3 (‘Explanatory Notes’). 
35 ICESCR Rights (n 11) art 12. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 11) art 25. 
36 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Toolkit on the Right to Health (Web Page, 2019) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/Health.aspx>. 
37 Explanatory Notes (n 34) 28. 
38 Cf Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right (n 14) 7. 
39 Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Human Rights Bill 2018 (Parliamentary Report No 26, 
February 2019) 58; Townsville Community Legal Service Inc, Submission No 35 to Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, 
Human Rights Bill 2018 (23 November 2018) 10-11; Youth Advocacy Centre, Submission No 41 to Legal Affairs and Community 
Safety Committee, Human Rights Bill 2018 (no date) 7; Civil Liberties Australia, Submission No 57 to Legal Affairs and Community 
Safety Committee, Human Rights Bill 2018 (25 November 2018) 2. 
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It is worth noting that the HRA also contains a right to life.40 The right to life has been used in international 
jurisdictions to assert a right to health.41 However, complaints concerning the provision of health services in 
Queensland would likely not fall under s 16. South African jurisprudence indicates that the right to life should 
not be used as a vehicle of complaint where the right to health services deals specifically with the issue.42 
Similarly, given the presence of s 16, courts are unlikely to interpret s 37 in a broad manner such that it 
encompasses a right to life, a right to health or a right to the ‘underlying health determinants’. 
Meaning of ‘Health Services’ 
While ‘health’ may be construed narrowly, ‘health services’ has the potential for very broad application. In 
addition to reproductive healthcare,43 which is explicitly included in the South African right,44 ‘health services’ 
under the HRA are likely to encompass trained healthcare professionals, hospitals, community health 
facilities, treatments, medication and equipment.45 Access to traditional medicine46 and transgender 
transitioning treatment47 will likely also be caught under s 37(1). 
Section 37 does not merely provide a right to health services, but to health services that are medically 
appropriate and of good quality.48 Quality of health services encompasses the services themselves as well 
as the means of delivery; therefore, s 37 protects patients’ rights to privacy and confidentiality,49 to be treated 
with respect,50 and to only be provided treatment in accordance with their fully informed consent.51  
With 18.3% of Queenslanders living with a disability,52 much of this group is at high-risk of receiving 
treatment without giving valid consent due to their perceived inability to understand information and 
communicate their wishes to practitioners.53 As a result, people with a disability, mental illnesses, non-
English speakers and people with other communication barriers are more likely than the general population 
to be detained and forcibly medicated.54 If patients are unable to understand the presented health 
information, the health service is under an obligation to provide assistance to allow the patient to 
understand.55 
Meaning of ‘Access’ 
The main issues arising under s 37 are likely to relate to patients’ ability to access health services. Indeed, 
the UN Human Rights Committee has stated that ‘access to medicine is one of the fundamental elements in 
achieving… the highest attainable standard of… health.’56 Both physical access and financial access are 
relevant to the right to access health services under s 37.  
 
40 HRA (n 1) s 16. 
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Queensland’s unique geographic context and health landscape mean that accessing health services can be 
difficult in regional, rural or remote areas, when a treatment is ‘unavailable’, or when patients lack financial 
resources.57 While the common law standard of care owed to patients does not differ based on treatment in 
the ‘city’ or ‘country’,58 s 37(1) may impose an obligation to provide adequate healthcare in non-metropolitan 
areas.59 South African jurisprudence suggests that where a health service is not offered in an area, and 
facilities exist in the area but are not being utilised, the government is under an obligation to make the 
facilities operational.60 Furthermore, the government may be under an implicit obligation to ‘progressively 
realise’ the right to access health services by taking steps to expand facilities and services.61 This would help 
to address the inequalities faced by non-metropolitan Queenslanders, particularly in relation to access to 
chemotherapy, dental services, mental health services62 and services for victims of sexual assault.63  
However, the public entities may be able to escape obligations to provide health services under s 37 by 
pointing to budgetary constraints. As resource allocation is a matter for the health service itself, health 
services have the discretion to limit the number of people who can access a specific treatment to optimise 
the advantage to the maximum number of patients.64 Thus, if providing additional services would come at an 
unreasonable cost, the health service is not obliged to provide the service.65 Notably, the ‘resourcing’ 
argument could also be used to re-allocate resources where a disproportionate share of the budget was 
assigned to a minor need, thus neglecting health needs more broadly.66 
Section 37(1) indicates that people who cannot afford treatment may have a right to have health services 
subsidised by the Queensland Government, additional to the Medicare system. In South Africa, having a 
right to health services does not automatically entitle a person to treatment at the State’s expense. Rather, it 
requires the State to ‘devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme progressively to realise the right’.67 However, the State cannot merely declare that providing 
financial assistance would ‘impose an impermissibly high financial burden’; instead it must provide ‘clear 
evidence’ to demonstrate the unaffordability of any proposed program.68 Whilst Canadian courts suggest that 
the State does not have an obligation to provide financial assistance to refugees,69 the HRA makes it clear 
that the s 37(1) right is for ‘all individuals in Queensland’.70 
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victims-sent-away-in-taxi/10889132>; Lydia Lynch, ‘Victim “Appalled” by Brisbane Hospital’s Refusal to Complete a Rape Kit’, 
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Therefore, whilst the right under s 37(1) could be used to make health services accessible to people at all 
economic levels of society,71, the Queensland Government may rely on budgetary constraints to escape this 
obligation. 
Meaning of ‘Without Discrimination’ 
Section 37(1) prohibits discrimination in access to health services. This will include the discriminatory factors 
in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld),72 namely sex,73 age,74 race,75 impairment,76 religious belief,77 
gender identity78 and sexuality.79 Discrimination on the basis of ‘choice’ (such as being a drug user) 80 or 
‘status’ (like being HIV-positive) is also likely to be unlawful under s 37(1).81 The right is also particularly 
relevant to people who are incarcerated82 or those in aged care or assisted living homes,83 who should not 
be delayed in accessing health services. 
The Right not to be Refused Medical Treatment 
Under s 37(2), a person must not be refused medical treatment that is ‘immediately necessary’ to save the 
person’s life or to prevent ‘serious impairment’ to the person.84 This reflects common law obligations on 
health workers to assist in emergency situations.85 
The South African Constitution contains a similar right providing that ‘no one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment’.86 The scope of the South African right was considered in Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health (Kwazulu-Natal).87 That case concerned a patient with chronic and irreversible renal failure who was 
seeking to prolong his life through regular dialysis. The hospital was a provincial health department with a 
limited number of dialysis machines. It refused to admit the patient to renal dialysis program, instead 
prioritising patients with acute and treatable renal failure. The South African Constitutional Court held that the 
constitutional right to emergency medical treatment did not support the ongoing treatment of chronic illness 
for the purpose of prolonging life.88 Chaskalson P noted that the ordinary meaning of ‘emergency medical 
treatment’ did not extend to ongoing treatment for chronic illness, and an intention to create a broader 
definition would have been expressed in positive and specific terms.89 The Court highlighted that the purpose 
of the right is to ensure that bureaucratic requirements do not frustrate the provision of emergency 
treatment.90 The judgment also emphasised that courts should be ‘slow to interfere with rational decisions 
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taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters’.91 
It appears likely that s 37 of the HRA was drafted to capture the definition of emergency adopted by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in Soobramoney. Arguably, the right to treatment that is necessary to 
‘prevent serious impairment’ could include a right to treatment of chronic illnesses to prolong life. However, it 
appears more likely that s 37 was drafted to provide a narrow definition of emergency treatment, in contrast 
to the South African Constitution, which leaves the definition of emergency treatment open to interpretation.92 
In Soobramoney, Chaskalson P acknowledged that rights legislation often calls for a generous interpretation, 
consistent with the principle of legality.93 Therefore, it appears that s 37 was drafted to prevent the possibility 
of a broader interpretation encompassing treatment of chronic illness. This interpretation is also supported by 
the fact that the term ‘serious impairment’ is qualified by the requirement that treatment must be ‘immediately 
necessary’.94 As such, s 37 crystallises the approach taken by the South African Court, ensuring that the 
right does not extend to ‘ongoing states of affairs’ such as chronic illnesses.95 
Limitations on Section 37 Rights 
The ECtHR has generally been reluctant to find human rights violations. In Osman,96 the court held that 
article 2 ECHR did not confer a right to treatment and the state merely owed a duty to take adequate steps.97 
Domestic courts in the UK have also displayed an unwillingness to usurp the role of the medical profession 
in making decisions regarding the allocation of treatment and resources98 for the fear of ‘straying far from the 
sphere which under [their] constitution is accorded to [them].’99 The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
expressed similar sentiments in Soobramoney.100 Even in cases where medical negligence is established, 
the ECtHR has found a substantive violation of article 2 only if the relevant regulatory framework failed to 
ensure proper protection of the patient’s life.101  
Queensland courts’ ability to give effect to human rights through statutory construction is limited by:102 the 
requirement to give effect to Parliament’s ‘intention’, 103 the presumption of consistency with international law, 
the requirement to adhere to an ‘unambiguously expressed’ meaning104 and the presumption that statutes do 
not intend to breach constitutional limits. 105 Indeed, s 37 rights are not absolute, and can be limited if it is 
reasonable and ‘demonstrably justifiable’ to do so.106 Therefore, it is likely that Queensland decision-makers 
may follow the conservative approach of foreign courts in interpreting and applying the right to health 
services under s 37. Particular instances where the right is most likely to be limited are considered below.  
Violent Patients 
Health workers are often exposed to violent patients exhibiting life-threating conditions,107 for example, 
crystal methamphetamine users.108 The HRA is intended to operate alongside existing legislation, and the 
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rights contained therein are not absolutely protected.109 For example, security officers have the power to deal 
with persons causing a public nuisance under ss 182 and 183 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 
(Qld).  This power exists alongside the obligations in the HRA, providing an extra set of factors for 
consideration in exercising this discretion.110 If the patient is threatening the safety of other patients, staff or 
visitors, it may be reasonable to exclude them for aggressive conduct,111 unless it is an emergency. 
However, a patient should not be refused treatment, or be prematurely discharged, merely because of 
rudeness112 or lateness to appointments.113  
Scope of Practice 
A health service may be able to refuse treatment if the requested treatment is not within its scope of practice. 
In an emergency, this is likely to require the health service to refer and transfer the patient to a service that 
can provide treatment.114 
Necessity and Prioritising Patients 
Where there is no emergency, or the service is not medically required, the health service is not obliged to 
fulfil a patient’s request. For example, patients seeking opioids with no clinical indication can be refused 
treatment.115 Patients may also have treatments validly delayed or refused if it is necessary to prioritise other 
patients on the basis of urgency.116 Section 37(2) would also allow for the needs of patients to be prioritised 
in more extreme cases, even those leading to loss of life. For example, the separation of conjoined twins in 
an emergency, which would result in the death of one twin, would likely be permitted to save the life of the 
other twin.117 Additionally, s 37 would not affect the legality of medical treatment terminating a pregnancy.118 
Religious Belief 
While the right to health services may be limited in some of the above instances, s 37(2) will not permit 
healthcare workers to refuse to perform a procedure based on their religious beliefs or morals,119 such as 
refusing to prescribe contraceptive pills. 
Conciliated Outcomes 
Under the HRA, the Queensland Human Rights Commission can receive and conciliate human rights 
complaints, or refer the matter to another agency for investigation, such as the Office of the Health 
Ombudsman.120 
The conciliated outcomes that complainants might seek when making a complaint under section 37 include: 
• listening to the complaint;121 
• issuing an explanation or apology;122 
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• paying compensation (extending to out-of-pocket expenses, corrective treatment costs, or a 
refund);123 
• providing education and training for staff, for example training relating to anti-discrimination policies, 
prioritising patients, delivering quality health services, or dealing with violent patients;124 
• developing decision-making support tools to assist health workers to properly balance human rights, 
including balancing competing needs, appropriately prioritising patients or dealing with violent 
patients; 125 
• revising internal complaints management processes to manage human rights complaints, including 
complaints about discriminatory treatment, the provision of poor quality services, failure to provide 
services, or failure to consider relevant factors when prioritising patients;126 
• revising policies, procedures and patient information documentation;127 
• referring the provider to the relevant registration board;128 
• declaring that a decision contravenes the HRA and directing that the entity act in a manner 
consistent with the right; 
• directing the complainant’s transfer to another hospital or health service; 
• removing an exclusion in an insurance policy; and 
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